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Supreme Court of India
Bhimrao Ramchandra Khalate … vs Nana Dinkar Yadav (Tanpura) on 13 August, 2021Author: Hemant Gupta
Bench: Hemant Gupta, A.S. Bopanna
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10197 OF 2010
BHIMRAO RAMCHANDRA KHALATE
(DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. …..APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
NANA DINKAR YADAV (TANPURA) & ANR. …..RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
HEMANT GUPTA, J.
1. The plaintiff is in appeal before this Court aggrieved against the
judgment passed by the High Court on 11.8.2006 in second appeal
whereby the order passed by the First Appellate Court on
14.1.2000 was affirmed, while dismissing the suit for redemption
of the mortgage property.
2. Brief facts leading rise to the present appeal are that the plaintiff
was the owner of 20 gunthas of agricultural land1 situated in
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Jayant Kumar Arora
Date: 2021.08.13
Village Khunte. The plaintiff was in need of money so he borrowed
16:44:40 IST
Reason:
Rs.3,000/- from defendant No. 1 on 22.2.1969 by executing a
1
For short, the ‘suit land’
1
document titled “conditional sale deed” as a security for the loan
amount. The plaintiff requested defendant No. 1 to reconvey the
suit land by accepting the loan amount of Rs.3,000/- but
defendant No. 1 refused to do so. On 25.2.1989, defendant No. 1
transferred the suit land in favour of his brother (defendant No. 2).
The plaintiff filed a suit against the defendants on 5.4.1989 under
the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 2 for redemption of mortgaged
property and possession. The claim of the plaintiff is that the
transaction dated 22.2.1969 was in the nature of mortgage even
though it was titled as the conditional sale.
3. The entire dispute revolves around whether the document dated
22.2.1969 is a document of conditional sale or a mortgage?
4. Before we advert to the nature and terms of the document, certain
principles of law need to be stated. Section 58(c) of the Act was
amended in the year 1929 when a proviso was inserted that
“provided that no such transaction shall be deemed to be a
mortgage, unless the condition is embodied in the document
which effects or purports to effect the sale”.
5. In Pandit Chunchun Jha v. Sheikh Ebadat Ali & Anr.3, the
plaintiff’s suit for redemption was dismissed by the High Court but
appeal allowed by this court reading the deed as mortgage. The
question examined was whether a given transaction is a mortgage
2
For short, the ‘Act’
3
AIR 1954 SC 345
2
by conditional sale or a sale outright with a condition of
repurchase. It was held that two documents are seldom expressed
in identical terms and when it is necessary to consider the
attendant circumstances the imponderable variables which that
brings in its train make it impossible to compare one case with
another. Each must be decided on its own facts. But certain broad
principles were stated. The Court found that the document had no
clause for retransfer and instead says (clause 6) that if the
executants pay the money within two years, the property shall
come in exclusive possession and occupation with the transferors.
The document had no clause for retransfer. In these
circumstances, this Court held as under:
“12. The next step is to see whether the document is
covered by Section 58(c) of the Transfer of Property Act, for,
if it is not, then it cannot be a mortgage by conditional sale.
The first point there is to see whether there is an
“ostensible sale”. That means a transaction which takes the
outward form of a sale, for the essence of a mortgage by
conditional sale is that though in substance it is a mortgage
it is couched in the form of a sale with certain conditions
attached. The executants clearly purported to sell the
property in clause (5) because they say so, therefore, if the
transaction is not in substance a mortgage, it is
unquestionably a sale: an actual sale and not merely an
ostensible one. But if it is a mortgage, then the condition
about an “ostensible sale” is fulfilled.
13. We next turn to the Conditions. The ones relevant to
the present purpose are contained in clauses (6) and (7).
Both are ambiguous, but we have already said that on a fair
construction clause (6) means that if the money is paid
within the two years then the possession will revert to the
executants with the result that the title which is already in
3
them will continue to reside there. The necessary
consequence of that is that the ostensible sale becomes
void. Similarly, clause (7), though clumsily worded, can only
mean that if the money is not paid, then the sale shall
become absolute. Those are not the actual words used but,
in our opinion, that is a fair construction of their meaning
when the document is read as a whole. If that is what they
mean, as we hold they do, then the matter falls squarely
within the ambit of Section 58(c).
20. ………….It is true this can also be read the other way
but considering these very drastic provisions as also the
threat of a criminal prosecution in sub-clause (a), we think
the transferee was out to exact more than his pound of
flesh from the unfortunate rustices with whom he was
dealing and that he would not have agreed to account for
the profits : indeed that is his own case, for he says that
this was a sale out and out. In these circumstances, there
would be no need to keep a reasonable margin between the
debt and the value of the property as it ordinarily done in
the case of a mortgage. Taking everything into
consideration, we are of opinion that the deed is a
mortgage by conditional sale under Section 58 (c) of the
Transfer of Property Act..”
6. In a judgment reported as Shri Bhaskar Waman Joshi v. Shri
Narayan Rambilas Agarwal4, a Bench of this Court has upheld
the right of redemption. The argument raised by the transferor
was that the property transferred was intended to be mortgage
under a deed of conditional sale. The transferees contended that
the deed was absolute sale and that the conveyance was subject
to a condition of repurchase. It was, inter alia, held that a transac-
tion shall not be deemed to be a mortgage unless the condition re-
ferred to in the clause is embodied in the document which affects
4
AIR 1960 SC 301
4
or purports to affect the sale. It was held that the mortgage by
conditional sale postulates the creation by the transfer of a rela-
tion of mortgagor and mortgagee, the price being charged on the
property conveyed. The Court held as under:
“7. …………….. The question whether by the incorporation
of such a condition a transaction ostensibly of sale may be
regarded as a mortgage is one of intention of the parties to
be gathered from the language of the deed interpreted in
the light of the surrounding circumstances. The
circumstance that the condition is incorporated in the sale
deed must undoubtedly be taken into account, but the
value to be attached thereto must vary with the degree of
formality attending upon the transaction. The definition of a
mortgage by conditional sale postulates the creation by the
transfer of a relation of mortgagor and mortgagee, the price
being charged on the property conveyed. In a sale coupled
with an agreement to reconvey there is no relation of
debtor and creditor nor is the price charged upon the
property conveyed, but the sale is subject to an obligation
to retransfer the property within the period specified. What
distinguishes the two transactions is the relationship of
debtor and creditor and the transfer being a security for the
debt. The form in which the deed is clothed is not decisive.
The definition of a mortgage by conditional sale itself
contemplates an ostensible sale of the property.
…………………… The question in each case is one of
determination of the real character of the transaction to be
ascertained from the provisions of the deed viewed in the
light of surrounding circumstances. If the words are plain
and unambiguous they must in the light of the evidence of
surrounding circumstances be given their true legal effect.
It there is ambiguity in the language employed, the
intention may be ascertained from the contents of the deed
with such extrinsic evidence as may by law be permitted to
be adduced to show in what manner the language of the
deed was related to existing facts. Oral evidence of
intention is not admissible in interpreting the covenants of
the deed but evidence to explain or even to contradict the
recitals as distinguished from the terms of the documents
may of course be given. Evidence of contemporaneous
5
conduct is always admissible as a surrounding
circumstance; but evidence as to subsequent conduct of the
parties is inadmissible.
xx xx xx
13. Counsel for the transferees sought to rely upon the
evidence of subsequent conduct of the transferors as
indicative of the character of the transaction as a sale, but
as already observed, that evidence is inadmissible.”
7. In another judgment reported as P.L. Bapuswami v. N. Pattay
Gounder5, this Court decreed the suit for redemption though the
same was dismissed by the High Court. The High Court held that
the transaction was an outright sale and not a mortgage by condi-
tional sale. The alternative plea based on the covenant for re-con-
veyance, the High Court considered that there was no proof that
the plaintiff had tendered the amount within the period stipulated
in the document. In appeal, this court held that the distinction be-
tween the conditional sale and mortgage is the relationship of
debtor and creditor and the transfer being a security for the debt.
The Court held as under:
“5. …The definition of a mortgage by conditional sale pos-
tulates the creation by the transfer of a relation of mort-
gagor and mortgagee, the price being charged on the prop-
erty conveyed. In a sale coupled with an agreement to re-
convey there is no relation of debtor and creditor nor is the
price charged upon the property conveyed, but the sale is
subject to an obligation to retransfer property within the pe-
riod specified. The distinction between the two transactions
is the relationship of debtor and creditor and the transfer
being a security for the debt. The form in which the deed is
5
AIR 1966 SC 902
6
clothed is not decisive. The question in each case is one of
determination of the real character of the transaction to be
ascertained from the provisions of the of document viewed,
in the light of surrounding circumstances. If the language is
plain and unambiguous it must in the light of the evidence
of surrounding circumstances be given its true legal effect.
If there is ambiguity in the language employed, the inten-
tion may be ascertained from the contents of the deed with
such extrinsic evidence as may by law be permitted to be
adduced to show in what manner the language of the deed
was related to existing facts…”
8. In view of the Judgments referred to above, now we examine the
facts of present case. The deed in question is Ex. 68. The docu-
ment reads as under:
“I, above Executant, given in writing that I am executing
this conditional sale deed in your favour in front of Sub-Reg-
istrar, Phaltan as I am taking Rs.3,000/- (three thousand) in
cash from you for my household expenses in respect of land
which is in my possession owned by me and enjoyed by me
absolutely on this date. The description of the land located
within limits of town Khunte, Division Satara, Tq. Phaltan, ir-
rigated by Government Canal. Its boundaries and other
particulars are –
xx xx xx
The above land owned and enjoyed by me along with all
materials standing on it including trees, stones, mud etc. is
being handed over to you by me for your possession on the
condition that you are giving back its possession to me any-
time within one year from t he date of this sale deed when I
repay the above amount to you while re-transferring the
above land to my name. In case non-payment by me of the
said amount within the stipulated period, this sale deed will
be taken as a permanent one and you will enjoy the posses-
sion of the land as your own. Any future disputes in respect
of the said land will be dealt by me if they arise.
I sign this sale deed today on 22nd February, 1969.”
7
9. A perusal of the aforesaid document would show that:
(i) The plaintiff has borrowed a sum of Rs.3,000/- from the de-
fendant for his household expenses in respect of the land
which was in his possession.
(ii) The possession of land was handed over to the defendant on
the condition that the possession will be given back to him
within one year from the date of conditional sale deed.
(iii) The defendant is bound to retransfer the land to the plaintiff
when he repays the amount of Rs.3,000/-.
(iv) If the amount is not paid within the stipulated period, the
conditional sale deed may be taken as a permanent one.
10. A complete reading of the document would show that a sum of
Rs.3,000/- was taken as a loan from the defendant for household
expenses. The same was to be returned and the defendant was
bound to retransfer the land. The condition that if the plaintiff is
not able to pay the loan amount within one year, the document
will be taken as a permanent sale deed is the contentious clause
between the parties.
11. In view of the judgments mentioned above, the intention of the
parties has to be seen when the document is executed. It is not in
dispute that the condition of retransfer is a part of the same docu-
ment (Ex. 68). Such is the condition inserted by an amendment in
the year 1929 expressed by the proviso of Section 58(c) of the Act.
As held in Pandit Chunchun Jha, a transaction which takes the
8
outward form of a sale but in essence the documents are of a
mortgage, though it is couched in the form of a sale. This Court
held that it is impossible to compare one case with another. Each
case must be decided on its own facts and circumstances. The
document has to read as a whole and if any word is ambiguous,
then to find out the intention of the parties when such document
was executed.
12. Therefore, a reading of the document would show that the docu-
ment was executed for the reason that the plaintiff has borrowed a
sum of Rs.3,000/- for his household expenses and the defendant is
bound to retransfer the land if the amount is paid within one year.
The advance of loan and return thereof are part of the same docu-
ment which creates a relationship of debtor and creditor. Thus, it
would be covered by proviso in Section 58(c) of the Act. Now,
some of the later judgments of this Court interpreting the proviso
in Section 58(c) of the Act need to be considered.
13. This Court in Umabai & Anr. v. Nilkanth Dhondiba Chavan
(Dead) by LRs & Anr.6 was examining contemporaneous docu-
ments executed on 30.12.1970 whereby the plaintiff had agreed to
sell the property for consideration of Rs.45,000/-. A sale deed was
executed as well. Another agreement to sale was executed be-
tween the parties on the same date where the defendants agreed
to reconvey the property on receipt of Rs.45,000/-. It was, thus,
6
(2005) 6 SCC 243
9
held that the benefit of Section 58(c) of the Act would not be appli-
cable to the plaintiff as the document of reconveying the property
was not part of the same document. This Court held as under:
“21. There exists a distinction between mortgage by con-
ditional sale and a sale with a condition of repurchase. In a
mortgage, the debt subsists and a right to redeem re-
mains with the debtor; but a sale with a condition of repur-
chase is not a lending and borrowing arrangement. There
does not exist any debt and no right to redeem is reserved
thereby. An agreement to sell confers merely a personal
right which can be enforced strictly according to the terms
of the deed and at the time agreed upon. Proviso ap-
pended to Section 58(c), however, states that if the condi-
tion for retransfer is not embodied in the document which
effects or purports to effect a sale, the transaction will not
be regarded as a mortgage. ………………”
14. In Tulsi & Ors. v. Chandrika Prasad & Ors.7, this Court held
that a distinction exists between a mortgage by way of conditional
sale and a sale with condition to repurchase. In the former the
debt subsists and a right to redeem remains with the debtor but in
case of the latter, the transaction does not evidence an arrange-
ment of lending and borrowing, thus, right to redeem is not re-
served. The circumstances which weighed with the High Court
holding are that the transaction in question was mortgaged by
way of sale, it reads thus:
“9. The following circumstances weighed with the learned
trial court as well as the High Court in arriving at the
finding that the transaction in question was a mortgage by
way of a conditional sale:
7
(2006) 8 SCC 322
10
(i) The husband of Appellant 1 was a tenant in respect of
the property and he continued to occupy the same in the
same capacity.
(ii) The appellants bore the costs of stamp duty which is
not the normal practice in a case of absolute sale.
(iii) The transaction essentially was a Baibulwafa viz.
mortgage by conditional sale.
(iv) The land was required to be kept in the existing
condition.
(v) The transferor had an option to repay the entire
consideration in one instalment whereupon a deed of
reconveyance was to be executed by the transferor in her
favour. For the said purpose a specific date was fixed viz.
30-12-1971 and on obtaining such amount the transferee
was to restore possession of the land to the plaintiff and
only in the event of default on her part to repay the same
was the sale to become absolute and perfect.
(vi) In the margin of the deed, the transferor categorically
stated that he had executed a deed of Baibulwafa in
respect of two parts of the shop.
(vii) The amount has been received by the transferor in
the presence of the husband of the transferee.”
In view of the factors mentioned in para 9, the defendants
appeal was dismissed and, the decree for redemption was main-
tained.
15. In Vithal Tukaram Kadam & Anr. v. Vamanrao Sawalaram
Bhosale & Ors.8, the suit for redemption was decreed by setting
aside the judgment of the High Court. It was held as under:
8
(2018) 11 SCC 172
11
“14. The essentials of an agreement to qualify as a
mortgage by conditional sale can succinctly be
broadly summarised. An ostensible sale with transfer
of possession and ownership, but containing a clause
for reconveyance in accordance with Section 58( c) of
the Act, will clothe the agreement as a mortgage by
conditional sale. The execution of a separate agree-
ment for reconveyance, either contemporaneously or
subsequently, shall militate against the agreement
being mortgage by conditional sale. There must exist
a debtor and creditor relationship. The valuation of
the property and the transaction value along with the
duration of time for reconveyance are important con-
siderations to decide the nature of the agreement.
There will have to be a cumulative consideration of
these factors along with the recitals in the agree-
ment, intention of the parties, coupled with other at-
tendant circumstances, considered in a holistic man-
ner.”
16. In another judgment reported as Ganpati Babji Alamwar
(Dead) by LRs Ramlu & Ors. v. Digambarrao Venkatrao
Bhadke & Ors.9, the decree in a suit for redemption was main-
tained by the High Court. The Court held as under:
“10. Whether an agreement is a mortgage by conditional
sale or sale with an option for repurchase is a vexed question
to be considered in the facts of each case. The essentials of
an agreement, to qualify as a mortgage by conditional sale,
can succinctly be summarised. An ostensible sale with trans-
fer of possession and ownership, but containing a clause for
reconveyance in accordance with Section 58( c) of the Act,
will clothe the agreement as a mortgage by conditional sale.
The execution of a separate agreement for reconveyance, ei-
ther contemporaneously or subsequently, shall militate
against the agreement being mortgage by conditional sale.
There must exist a debtor and creditor relationship. The valu-
9
(2019) 8 SCC 651
12
ation of the property, and the transaction value, along with
the duration of time for reconveyance, are important consid-
erations to decide the nature of the agreement. There will
have to be a cumulative consideration of these factors, along
with the recitals in the agreement, intention of the parties,
coupled with other attendant circumstances, considered in a
holistic manner. The language used in the agreement may
not always be conclusive.”
17. On the other hand, learned counsel for the defendants relied upon
Vanchalabai Raghunath Ithape (Dead) by LR v. Shankarrao
Baburao Bhilare (Dead) by LRs & Ors. 10. It was a case where
the suit for redemption filed by plaintiff-appellant was maintained.
However, the judgment of this Court reported in Umabai and
Tulsi were not brought to the notice of this Court. In the absence
of consideration of such judgments, we find that the judgment of
this Court in Vanchalabai Raghunath Ithape will not lay down a
binding precedent.
18. In Dharmaji Shankar Shinde & Ors. v. Rajaram Shripad Joshi
(Dead) through LRs & Ors. 11, the defendants appeal was al-
lowed by this court and the suit for redemption was dismissed. It
was, inter alia, held that if the sale and agreement to repurchase
are embodied in the separate documents then the transaction can-
not be a “mortgage by conditional sale” irrespective of whether
the documents are contemporaneously executed; but the con-
verse does not hold good. This Court held as under:
10
(2013) 7 SCC 173
11
(2019) 8 SCC 401
13
“22. ………………. Considering the contemporaneous conduct
of the parties, it is clear that Shankar Shinde and thereafter
the appellants were dealing with the suit property as if they
were the owners of the land. The clause in Ext. P-73 that if
the amount is not paid within a period of five years, the
transaction will become a permanent sale deed and there-
after, the transferee will have the absolute right over the
property are consistent with the express intention of parties
making the transaction a conditional sale with option to re-
purchase.”
19. A perusal of the above judgment shows that the plaintiff has bor-
rowed a sum of Rs.7000/- for the marriage of his daughter eight
days prior to execution of the document. While executing docu-
ment on 28.7.1967, the plaintiff borrowed an additional amount
and a document titled as “mortgage by conditional sale” was exe-
cuted for a consideration of Rs.2500/-, but the plaintiff received
Rs.1800/- only. This Court held that the intention of the parties in
putting an end to the debtor creditor relationship with respect to
the sum of Rs.700/- is clear from the recitals of the document. It
was held that clauses in the document are consistent with the in-
tention of the parties making the transaction of a conditional sale
with an option to repurchase. The Court held that there are no
recitals in the document to establish creditor debtor relationship,
nor does it contain the right of foreclosure, payment of interest
etc. which are essential requirements in a mortgage deed. The
Court held that undetermined mortgage amount for which the in-
terest in the immovable property was created as security, indi-
14
cates that the parties have never intended to create a mortgage
deed.
20. The said judgment does not help the argument raised by the de-
fendants, as the document in the present case clearly stipulates
the amount of Rs.3000/- was borrowed by the plaintiff and on re-
turn of such amount, a mandate to defendant No. 1 to execute re-
conveyance of suit land was asked for which was refused by de-
fendant no.1.
21. Another judgment referred to by the learned counsel for the defen-
dants is Sopan (Dead) through his LR v. Syed Nabi12 but that
was a case where the registered sale deed was executed on
10.12.1968 and on the same date, a separate agreement was exe-
cuted whereby the plaintiff has agreed to repay the amount and
secure reconveyance of the property. Since the two separate doc-
uments were executed, this Court has rightly found that it is not a
document of mortgage but of conditional sale which is not covered
by the proviso to Section 58(c) of the Act.
22. Learned counsel for the defendants has also referred to the fact
that the suit for redemption was filed after twenty years of the
document being executed and, in the meantime, defendants have
made improvements over the land. Thus, the plaintiff would not
be entitled to seek redemption. Section 63 of the Act contem-
12
(2019) 7 SCC 635
15
plates that any accession by the mortgagee, during the continu-
ance of the mortgage, the mortgagor shall on redemption be enti-
tled to such accession in the absence of a contract to the contrary.
Under Section 63(a) of the Act, the liability of mortgagor to pay for
improvement will arise if the mortgagee had to incur the costs to
preserve the property from destruction or deterioration or was
necessary to prevent the security from becoming insufficient or
being made in compliance with the lawful order of any public ser-
vant or public authority. None of the eventualities arose in the
present case compelling the mortgagor to pay for the improve-
ments if any carried out by the mortgagee. A mortgagee spends
such money as is necessary for the preservation of the mortgaged
property for destruction, forfeiture or sale; for supporting the mort-
gagor’s title to the property; for making his own title thereto good
against the mortgagor; and when the mortgaged property is a re-
newable lease-hold, for the renewal of the lease, such expenditure
incurred by the mortgagee can be added to the cost of improve-
ments in the principal amount due. However, in the absence of
any positive evidence of any improvement and the cost incurred,
the defendants are not entitled to recover anything more than the
mortgage amount. Since the possession was given to the mort-
gagee, he has enjoyed usufruct from the mortgage property which
compensates not only of the user of the land but also improve-
16
ments made by him. The improvements were to enjoy the
usufruct of the property mortgaged.
23. The argument that plaintiff has filed suit for redemption after 20
years of execution of the document is not tenable as the suit for
redemption can be filed within 30 years from the date fixed for re-
demption. The period of 30 years would commence on 22.2.1969
and the suit was filed in the year 1989, which is within the period
of limitation.
24. In view thereof, we find the order of the First Appellate Court ac-
cepting the appeal of the defendants and dismissing the suit for
redemption is not sustainable in law, so as the order passed by the
High Court. Consequently, the judgment and decree passed by
the First Appellate Court and that of the High Court are set aside
and the suit is decreed. The plaintiff may pay or deposit the mort-
gage amount within three months of the receipt of copy of the or-
der. The appeal is allowed with no order as to costs.
………………………………………J.
(HEMANT GUPTA)
………………………………………J.
(A.S. BOPANNA)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 13, 2021.
17
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