caselaws
Supreme Court of India
Maharashtra State Road Transport … vs Dilip Uttam Jayabhay on 3 January, 2022Author: M.R. Shah
Bench: M.R. Shah, B.V. Nagarathna
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7403 OF 2021
Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation ..Appellant (S)
Versus
Dilip Uttam Jayabhay ..Respondent (S)
JUDGMENT
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order dated 23.01.2020 passed by the High
Court of Judicature at Bombay in Writ Petition No.8401 of
2003, by which the High Court has dismissed the said writ
petition preferred by the appellant – Maharashtra State
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by R
Natarajan
Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as
Date: 2022.01.03
17:12:37 IST
Reason:
“MSRTC”) in which it challenged the order passed by the
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Industrial Court in Revision Application (ULP) No.13 of
2002, directing reinstatement of respondent without back
wages but with the continuity of service, original writ
petitioner – MSRTC has preferred the present appeal.
2. The respondent herein was serving as a driver and plying
passenger buses. That on 23.10.1992 when he was driving
the bus, it met with an accident with a jeep coming from
the opposite direction. It appears that instead of taking the
bus to the left side, he took the bus to the extreme right
which was the wrong side and as a result, the jeep and the
bus collided. The accident resulted in death of four
passengers on the spot and six passengers were seriously
injured. The jeep was completely damaged with its radiator
and engine board broken and damaged and the inside of
the jeep was completely crushed. The impact of the
collision was so high that the jeep was pushed back by
about 25 feet. The bumper of the bus was also crushed.
The driver of the jeep also sustained injuries. The
respondent was subjected to disciplinary enquiry. On
conclusion of enquiry he was dismissed from service. He
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was also prosecuted for the offence under Section 279 of
IPC. However, he came to be acquitted. (his acquittal shall
be dealt with herein below). The respondent challenged the
order of dismissal before the Labour Court. The Labour
Court upheld the order of dismissal. In a revision
application the Industrial Tribunal considering the
acquittal of the respondent in criminal proceedings and
observing that the drivers of both the vehicles were
negligent (contributory negligence), the Industrial Tribunal
exercised powers under item No.1(g) of ScheduleIV of the
Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention
of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971. (“MRTU” and “PULP
Act, 1971” for short), and held that the order of dismissal
is disproportionate to the misconduct proved. Before the
Industrial Tribunal the respondent/workman did not press
for the back wages. The Industrial Tribunal directed his
reinstatement without back wages but with continuity of
service.
3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the order dated
31.07.2003 passed by the Industrial Tribunal ordering
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reinstatement without back wages but with continuity of
service, the appellant preferred writ petition before the
High Court. By the impugned judgment and order the High
Court has not only dismissed the writ petition preferred by
the appellant, but has also directed appellant to pay to the
respondent back wages with effect from 01.11.2003 to
31.05.2018 i.e. which is the date of his superannuation.
The High Court has also directed that the respondent shall
also be entitled to retiral benefits on the basis of continuity
of service with effect from date of his dismissal and till his
superannuation.
4. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
judgment and order passed by the High Court, dismissing
the writ petition and confirming the order passed by the
Industrial Tribunal setting aside the order of dismissal and
ordering reinstatement with continuity of service and back
wages, the MSRTC has preferred the present appeal.
5. Ms. Mayuri Raghuvanshi, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant – MSRTC has vehemently submitted
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that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the
Industrial Court committed a grave error in interfering with
the order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority
on the ground that the same is shockingly disproportionate
to the misconduct proved.
5.1 It is submitted that both, the High Court as well as the
Industrial Court have not at all considered and/or
appreciated the difference between the disciplinary enquiry
and the criminal proceedings.
5.2 It is submitted that the High Court as well as the Industrial
Court had erred in relying upon the acquittal of respondent
in criminal case. It is submitted that the Industrial Court
and the High Court have failed to appreciate that the
acquittal has no bearing or relevance on the disciplinary
proceedings as the standard of proof in both the cases are
different and the proceedings operate in different fields and
have different objectives. Reliance is placed on the
decisions of this Court in cases of Samar Bahadur Singh
Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., (2011) 9 SCC 94 and Union of
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India & Ors. Vs. Sitaram Mishra & Anr., (2019) 20 SCC
588.
5.3 It is further submitted that in fact the Labour Court rightly
held that acquittal in the criminal case would not come to
the rescue of the respondent as the acquittal in the
criminal case is on the failure of the prosecution to
examine investigating officer, panch for spot panchnama,
etc., and to prove their case beyond doubt. It is submitted
that on the other hand in the departmental proceedings
misconduct has been proved. It is therefore submitted that
the Industrial Court and the High Court ought not to have
given undue importance to the acquittal of the respondent
in the criminal case.
5.4 It is further submitted that even otherwise in the facts and
circumstances of the case when in the vehicle accident four
persons died due to the negligence on the part of the
respondent in driving the vehicle carelessly and negligently
and during his three years’ tenure he was punished four
times earlier, it cannot be said that the punishment of
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dismissal was shockingly disproportionate. It is submitted
that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the case
would not fall under item No.1(g) of ScheduleIV of the
MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.
5.5 It is further submitted that even the Industrial Court
specifically observed in the order that the misconduct is
not of a minor or technical character. It is further
submitted that the Industrial Court also observed that
there is no victimization and the action of the MSRTC
cannot be said to be not in good faith. The Industrial Court
also observed that the MSRTC has neither falsely
implicated the complainant – respondent nor has it
dismissed the respondent for patently false reasons and
therefore respondent failed to prove the alleged unfair
labour practice as per the MRTU and PULP Act, 1971. It is
submitted that however the Industrial Court has interfered
with the order of punishment/dismissal imposed by the
disciplinary authority invoking clause 1(g) of ScheduleIV of
MRTU and PULP Act, 1971.
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5.6 It is further submitted that even the respondent admitted
that he was gainfully employed after his dismissal.
Therefore, the order of reinstatement was not warranted at
all.
5.7 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant that even otherwise the directions
issued by the High Court in the impugned judgment and
order in para 8 directing the appellant – MSRTC to pay to
the respondent back wages with effect from 1 st November,
2003 to 31st May, 2018, could not have been passed in a
petition filed by the appellant – MSRTC. It is submitted
therefore that such an order is as such beyond the scope of
the writ petition before the High Court.
6. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to allow the
present appeal.
7. Shri Nishanth Patil, learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respondent has supported the judgment and order
passed by the Industrial Court and confirmed by the High
Court.
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7.1 It is submitted that in the facts and circumstances of the
case when the Industrial Court found the order of
dismissal disproportionate to the misconduct proved, the
same can be said to be an unfair labour practice as per
item No. 1(g) of ScheduleIV of the MRTU & PULP Act,
1971. Thus the Industrial Court rightly interfered with the
order of dismissal and the same is rightly confirmed by the
High Court.
7.2 It is contended that in the present case as such it was not
the fault on the part of the respondent – driver. That the
jeep driver coming from the opposite side was on the wrong
side of the road and the respondent tried to avoid the
accident. It is submitted that the criminal court found that
even the jeep driver was also negligent and considering the
fact the criminal court acquitted the respondent – driver,
the judgment and order passed by the Industrial Court,
ordering reinstatement without back wages but with
continuity of service does not warrant any interference. It
is submitted therefore that the High Court rightly did not
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interfere with the judgment and order passed by the
Industrial Court ordering reinstatement without back
wages.
8. Making the above submissions, it is prayed to dismiss the
present appeal.
9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length.
10. At the outset, it is required to be noted that in the
departmental proceedings the misconduct alleged against
the respondent – driver of driving the vehicle rashly and
negligently due to which the accident occurred in which
four persons died has been proved. Thereafter, the
disciplinary authority passed an order of dismissal,
dismissing the respondent – workman from service. The
Labour Court did not interfere with the order of dismissal
by giving cogent reasons and after reappreciating the
entire evidence on record including the order of acquittal
passed by the criminal court. However, the Industrial
Court though did not interfere with the findings recorded
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by the disciplinary authority on the misconduct proved,
interfered with the order of dismissal solely on the ground
that punishment of dismissal is disproportionate to the
misconduct proved and the same can be said to be to be
unfair labour practice as per item No.1(g) of ScheduleIV of
the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. The same is not interfered
with by the High Court.
10.1 Therefore, the short question which is posed for the
consideration of this Court is whether in the facts and
circumstances of the case the punishment of dismissal can
be said to be an unfair labour practice on the ground that
the same was disproportionate to the misconduct proved
and therefore the Industrial Court was justified in
interfering with the order of dismissal and ordering
reinstatement with continuity of service.
10.2 Having gone through the findings recorded by the enquiry
officer in the departmental enquiry and the judgment and
order passed by the labour court as well as the Industrial
Court and even the judgment and order of acquittal passed
by the criminal court, it emerges that when the respondent
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was driving the vehicle it met with an accident with the
jeep coming from the opposite side and in the said accident
four persons died. From the material on record it emerges
that the impact of the accident with the jeep coming from
the opposite side was such that the jeep was pushed back
25 feet. From the aforesaid facts it can be said that the
respondent – workman was driving the vehicle in such a
great speed and rashly due to which the accident had
occurred in which four persons died. Even while acquitting
the accused – respondent – driver who was facing the trial
under Sections 279 and 304(a) of IPC Criminal Court
observed that the prosecution failed to prove that the
incident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the
accused – respondent herein only and none else. Therefore,
at the best even if it is assumed that even driver of the jeep
was also negligent, it can be said to be a case of
contributory negligence. That does not mean that the
respondent – workman was not at all negligent. Hence, it
does not absolve him of the misconduct.
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10.3 Much stress has been given by the Industrial Court on the
acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. However,
as such the Labour Court had in extenso considered the
order of acquittal passed by the criminal court and did not
agree with the submissions made on behalf of the
respondent – workman that as he was acquitted by the
criminal court he cannot be held guilty in the disciplinary
proceedings.
10.4 Even from the judgment and order passed by the criminal
court it appears that the criminal court acquitted the
respondent based on the hostility of the witnesses; the
evidence led by the interested witnesses; lacuna in
examination of the investigating officer; panch for the spot
panchnama of the incident, etc. Therefore, criminal court
held that the prosecution has failed to prove the case
against the respondent beyond reasonable doubt. On the
contrary in the departmental proceedings the misconduct
of driving the vehicle rashly and negligently which caused
accident and due to which four persons died has been
established and proved. As per the cardinal principle of law
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an acquittal in a criminal trial has no bearing or relevance
on the disciplinary proceedings as the standard of proof in
both the cases are different and the proceedings operate in
different fields and with different objectives. Therefore, the
Industrial Court has erred in giving much stress on the
acquittal of the respondent by the criminal court. Even
otherwise it is required to be noted that the Industrial
Court has not interfered with the findings recorded by the
disciplinary authority holding charge and misconduct
proved in the departmental enquiry, and has interfered
with the punishment of dismissal solely on the ground that
same is shockingly disproportionate and therefore can be
said to be an unfair labour practice as per clause No.1(g) of
ScheduleIV of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.
10.5 Now so far as the order passed by the Industrial Court
ordering reinstatement with continuity of service by
invoking clause No.1(g) of ScheduleIV of the MRTU &
PULP Act, 1971 is concerned, as per clause No. 1(g) only in
a case where it is found that dismissal of an employee is
for misconduct of a minor or technical character, without
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having any regard to the nature of the particular
misconduct or the past record of service of the employee,
so as to amount to a shockingly disproportionate
punishment. Clause No.1 of ScheduleIV of the MRTU &
PULP Act, 1971 reads as under:
“Schedule IV
1. To discharge or dismiss employees
(a) by way of victimisation;
(b) not in good faith, but in the colourable exercise
of the employer’s rights;
(c) by falsely implicating an employee in a criminal
case on false evidence or on concocted evidence;
(d) for patently false reasons;
(e) on untrue or trumped up allegations of absence
without leave;
(f) in utter disregard of the principles of natural
justice in the conduct of domestic enquiry or
with undue haste;
(g) for misconduct of a minor or technical
character, without having any regard to the
nature of the particular misconduct or the past
record of service of the employee, so as to
amount to a shockingly disproportionate
punishment.”
Applying clause No.1(g) of ScheduleIV of the MRTU &
PULP Act, 1971, to the present case it cannot be said that
the dismissal of the respondent was for misconduct of a
minor or technical character, without having any regard to
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the nature of the misconduct. The respondent – workman
has been held to be guilty for a particular charge and
particular misconduct. Even the past record of service of
the respondent has not been considered by the Industrial
Court. As per case of the appellant – MSRTC the
respondent – workman was in service for three years and
during three years’ service tenure he was punished four
times. Therefore, it cannot be said that the order of
dismissal was without having any regard to the past record
of the service of the respondent. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstances of the case, the Industrial Court wrongly
invoked clause No.1(g) of ScheduleIV of the MRTU & PULP
Act, 1971.
11. Even otherwise in the facts of the case when in the
departmental enquiry, it has been specifically found that
due to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver –
respondent, the accident took place in which four persons
died, when the punishment of dismissal is imposed it
cannot be said to be shockingly disproportionate
punishment. In the departmental proceedings every aspect
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has been considered. At the cost of repetition, it is observed
that even the Industrial Court has not interfered with the
findings recorded by the enquiry officer in the
departmental proceedings. Therefore, in the facts and
circumstance of the case, the Industrial Court committed a
grave error and has exceeded in its jurisdiction while
interfering with the order of dismissal passed by the
disciplinary authority, which was not interfered by the
Labour Court.
12. It is also required to be noted that before the Industrial
Court the respondent – workman – driver admitted that
after the order of dismissal he has been gainfully employed.
Therefore also the reinstatement in service with continuity
of service was not warranted.
13. Even the directions issued by the High Court in para 8 in
the impugned judgment and order directing the appellant
to pay wages to the respondent – workman for the period
from 01.11.2003 to 31.05.2018 also could not have been
passed by the High Court in a writ petition filed by the
appellant. It was not the petition filed by the workman –
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respondent. Therefore, even otherwise the directions issued
in para 8 of the impugned judgment and order cannot be
sustained as the same is beyond the scope and ambit of
the controversy before the High Court.
14. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present Appeal Succeeds. The judgment and order passed
by the Industrial Court in Revision Application (ULP) No.13
of 2002 and the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court in Writ Petition No.8401 of 2003 are hereby
quashed and set aside and the judgment and Award
passed by the Labour Court in Complaint (ULP) No.96 of
1993 is hereby ordered to be restored. Consequently, the
order of dismissal passed by the disciplinary authority
dismissing the respondent – workman from service is
hereby upheld. The present appeal is allowed to the
aforesaid extent. There shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
January 03, 2022
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