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Supreme Court of India
Rajesh Dhiman vs The State Of Himachal Pradesh on 26 October, 2020Author: Surya Kant
Bench: N.V. Ramana, Surya Kant, Aniruddha Bose
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1032 of 2013
Rajesh Dhiman ….. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Himachal Pradesh …..Respondent(s)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1126 OF 2019
Gulshan Rana ….. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of Himachal Pradesh …..Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Surya Kant, J.
Heard over video conferencing.
2. These Criminal Appeals have been preferred against a
common judgment of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh dated
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
SATISH KUMAR YADAV
Date: 2020.10.26
16:53:50 IST
Reason:
28.08.2012, by which the appellants’ acquittal under Section 20
of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985
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(“NDPS Act”) was reversed and a sentence of ten years rigorous
imprisonment and fine of Rs 1,00,000 each was awarded.
FACTS
3. The facts giving rise to both the appeals are common. On
09.01.2002, at about 1.00 P.M., a police team led by ASI
Purushottam Dutt (PW8) and also comprising Constable Sunder
Singh (PW1), Constable Bhup Singh (PW2) and Constable Bhopal
Singh (PW7) were checking traffic at Shamshar when a
motorcycle without a number plate was spotted. Gulshan Rana
(appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 1126 of 2019) was driving the
vehicle and Rajesh Dhiman (appellant in Criminal Appeal No.
1032 of 2013) was seated on the pillion with a backpack slung
over his shoulders. They were signalled to stop and documents of
the motorcycle were demanded. Meanwhile, another vehicle was
halted and its occupants Karam Chand (PW3) and Shiv Ram were
included in the search. An attempt was made to associate local
residents to witness the subsequent proceedings, but none
agreed. Subsequently, the appellants were given option to be
searched in the presence of a Magistrate or Gazetted Officer but
they consented to be searched by the police on the spot itself. The
police then discovered polythene bags containing charas from the
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backpack carried by Rajesh Dhiman. The polythene bags were
weighed and found to be 3kg 100gms. After separating some
samples, the charas was duly sealed and handed over to Karam
Chand (PW3) who later deposited it at the police station. After
completion of personal search of the appellants, they were
formally arrested.
4. The prosecution examined nine witnesses to support their
case of chance recovery, which included eight police officials and
one independent witness, Karam Chand (PW3). Whereas the
police witnesses strongly corroborated each other’s testimony,
PW3 was declared hostile for he claimed not to have witnessed
the seizure of the narcotics. The spot map, arrest memo, search
memos, consent memo, seizure memo, rukka seals, chemical
analysis report and samples of charas were also adduced as
evidence. In response, both appellants asserted their innocence.
Although the appellants did not lead any defence evidence but
they propounded an alternative version and claimed that while
returning from a nearby temple, they had given a lift to an
unidentified third person. The backpack containing the recovered
narcotics was claimed to be owned by the said stranger, who
allegedly escaped from the spot when the motorcycle was stopped
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by the police.
5. The learned Special Judge through judgment dated
28.12.2002 acquitted the appellants holding that charges under
the NDPS Act had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. The
trial Court viewed that the witnesses on the spot had either not
been examined or turned hostile. Thus, each individual element
of the prosecution case, namely, from preparation of personal
search memo to consent memo to recovery memo to notifying
appellants’ relatives about their arrest or handing over of seal to
PW3 had come under cloud for want of independent
corroboration. Failure to include any other locallyresident as a
neutral witness in terms of Section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973 (“CrPC”), was also held to cast serious
aspersions on the prosecution version. Relying upon a decision of
the Rajasthan High Court in Gyan Chand v. State of
Rajasthan1, learned Special Judge was also critical of the fact
that the complainant himself was the investigating officer which
caused serious prejudice to the fairness of the investigation. The
trial Court thus concluded that since two versions had emerged,
the one which was favourable to the accused ought to be
1
1993 Cri LJ 3716.
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preferred. Consequently, it held that no charas was recovered
from the appellants as deposed by the independent witness.
6. However, the High Court in appeal, setaside the acquittal
and convicted the appellants for possession of charas under
Section 20 of the NDPS Act. The High Court observed that
although association of independent witnesses in NDPS cases is
always desirable but their nonexamination would not per se be
fatal to the prosecution case, especially when due efforts are
made by the police to secure their presence. Adverting to the
facts of the case in hand, the High Court found no reason to draw
an adverse inference against nonexamination of independent
witnesses as PW8 had deposed that an unsuccessful attempt was
made to join persons from the locality, and Shiv Ram had been
won over. The High Court reappreciated the entire evidence
on record and firmly held that the chain of events commencing
from seizure of contraband to its chemical analysis, was complete
in all respects. In the absence of any allegation of bias, it was
held to be wrong to discard the otherwise impeccable statements
of the official witnesses. The High Court dissected a catena of
judgments and opined that the police officers’ testimonies ought
to be subjected to a vigorous standard of scrutiny and
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corroboration; which, after careful and cautious appraisal, had
been met in the instant case. The quantity of charas recovered
was held to be ‘commercial’ and consequently a sentence of 10
years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs.1,00,000 (rupees one
lakh) was imposed on each of the appellants.
CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
7. We have heard counsels for the parties at a considerable
length and gone through the record. Learned counsel for the
appellants vehemently contended that the High Court ought not
to have reversed the wellmerited acquittal as two distinct
versions of the same incident had emerged from the evidence on
record, and thus the one beneficial to the appellants ought to be
adopted, given the presumption of innocence under our legal
system. It was highlighted that the complainant and investigating
officer were one and the same, thus, casting doubts on the
fairness and neutrality of the investigation. Nonexamination of
Shiv Ram and noncorroboration by Karam Chand (PW3) was
projected as being fatal to the prosecution case. A subtle
distinction was sought to be made between cases where
independent witnesses were not present and where during cross
examination they actively controverted the prosecution version. It
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was also argued that the High Court ought not to have convicted
the appellants only on the premise that the effect of non
examination of independent witness was inconsequential, for the
trial Court’s acquittal was predicated on many other legs which
have not been engaged with by the High Court at all, including
the alternate version given by PW3, read with the statements of
the appellants under Section 313 CrPC, as well as the non
compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act.
8. Learned State counsel, on the other side, drew our attention
to a recent judgment of the Constitution Bench of this Court in
Mukesh Singh v. State (Narcotic Branch of Delhi) 2, which has
authoritatively settled the law on permissibility of the
complainant also being the investigating officer in cases under
the NDPS Act. Controverting the appellants’ contention regarding
nonexamination of independent witnesses, an attempt was made
to portray the evidence of the official witnesses as being
unimpeachable and inspiring confidence; and therefore,
rescission by one independent witness being wholly insufficient
for the appellants to earn acquittal.
2
2020 SCC OnLine SC 700.
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ANALYSIS
I. Whether bias was caused by complainant also being
the investigating officer?
9. The primary issue debated by both sides concerns the effect
of the complainant in the present case, PW8, also being the
investigating officer. The appellants sought to contend that a long
line of cases, ending with Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab3, has
laid down the legal proposition that investigation by the
complainant himself would be contrary to the scheme of the
NDPS Act, thus jeopardizing the entire trial.
10. Suffice to say that the law on this point is no longer res
integra and the controversy, if any, has been set at rest by the
Constitutional Bench of this Court in Mukesh Singh (supra).
The earlier position of law which allowed the solitary ground of
the complainant also being the investigating officer, to become a
spring board for an accused to be catapulted to acquittal, has
been reversed. Instead, it is now necessary to demonstrate that
there has either been actual bias or there is real likelihood of
bias, with no sweeping presumption being permissible. It would
be worthwhile to extract the following conclusions drawn in the
3
(2018) 17 SCC 627.
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aforecited judgment:
“102. From the above discussion and for the reasons stated
above, we conclude and answer the reference as under:
I. That the observations of this Court in the cases of
Bhagwan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 15;
Megha Singh v. State of Haryana, (1996) 11 SCC 709; and
State by Inspector of Police, NIB, Tamil Nadu v. Rajangam,
(2010) 15 SCC 369 and the acquittal of the accused by this
Court on the ground that as the informant and the
investigator was the same, it has vitiated the trial and the
accused is entitled to acquittal are to be treated to be
confined to their own facts. It cannot be said that in the
aforesaid decisions, this Court laid down any general
proposition of law that in each and every case where the
informant is the investigator there is a bias caused to the
accused and the entire prosecution case is to be disbelieved
and the accused is entitled to acquittal;
II. In a case where the informant himself is the
investigator, by that itself cannot be said that the
investigation is vitiated on the ground of bias or the
like factor. The question of bias or prejudice would
depend upon the facts and circumstances of each
case. Therefore, merely because the informant is the
investigator, by that itself the investigation would not
suffer the vice of unfairness or bias and therefore on
the sole ground that informant is the investigator, the
accused is not entitled to acquittal. The matter has to be
decided on a case to case basis. A contrary decision of this
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Court in the case of Mohan Lal v. State of Punjab, (2018) 17
SCC 627 and any other decision taking a contrary view that
the informant cannot be the investigator and in such a case
the accused is entitled to acquittal are not good law and they
are specifically overruled.”
[emphasis supplied]
11. We, therefore, see no reason to draw any adverse inference
against PW8 himself investigating his complaint. The appellants’
claim of bias stems from the purported delays, noncompliance of
statutory mandates and nonexamination of independent
witness. In effect, the appellants are seeking to circuitously use
the very same arguments which have individually been held by
the High Court to be factually incorrect or legally irrelevant.
Although in some cases, certain actions (or lack thereof) by the
Investigating Officer might indicate bias; but mere deficiencies in
investigation or chinks in the prosecution case can’t be the sole
basis for concluding bias. The appellants have at no stage
claimed that there existed any enmity or other motive for the
police to falsely implicate them and let the real culprits walk free.
Further, such a huge quantity of charas could not have been
planted against the appellants by the police on its own.
12. The appellants have creatively sought to argue that failure
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of the police to investigate the alternate theory proffered at the
stage of Section 313 CrPC, has caused serious prejudice to them
and that reason alone is sufficient not to hold them guilty
‘beyond reasonable doubt’. They have explicitly relied upon Paras
18 and 19 of Mukesh Singh (supra), which we deem appropriate
to extract as follows:
“18. If the defence of the accused is not properly investigated
to rule out all other possibilities, it cannot ever be said that the
prosecution has established the guilt “beyond reasonable
doubt”. A tainted investigation by a complaint who is a
“witness” himself to a substantial ingredient of an offence,
would in fact give rise to a “doubt” and it is impossible that the
case can be established on the parameter of “beyond
reasonable doubt”;
19. A person accused of criminal offence punishable with a
peril to his life or liberty, enjoys certain rights under the
Constitution or through long standing development of criminal
jurisprudence. Any action which impinges or affects those
rights would be said to cause “prejudice to an accused”. That
in the case of Rafiq Ahmad v. State of U.P., (2011) 8 SCC 300,
it is observed and held that prejudice to an accused or failure
of justice has to be examined with reference to (i) right to fair
trial (ii) presumption of innocence until pronouncement of guilt
and (iii) the standards of proof. It is observed in the said
decision that whenever a plea of prejudice is raised by the
accused, it must be examined with reference to the above
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rights and safeguards, as it is the violation of these rights
alone that may result in the weakening of the case of the
prosecution and benefit to the accused in accordance with
law;”
13. At the outset, we may clarify that the observations relied
upon by the appellants, are not findings, conclusion or resolution
by this Court in Mukesh Singh (supra). Instead, a perusal of the
judgment shows that it was a contention put forth by one of the
parties which the Bench eventually disagreed with. Further, not
only the alternative version projected by the appellants is vague
and improbable, but it escapes our comprehension how non
investigation of a defence theory disclosed only at an advanced
stage of trial, could indicate bias on part of the police.
II. Whether alternate version has been established and
what is the effect of lack of independent witnesses?
14. The contention of the appellants that they are entitled to be
acquitted on the ground of there being two varying versions of the
same incident does not carry any weight. We may firstly clarify
that the expression “reasonable doubt” is a welldefined
connotation. It refers to the degree of certainty required of a court
before it can make a legally valid determination of the guilt of an
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accused. These words are inbuilt measures to ensure that
innocence is to be presumed unless the court finds no reasonable
doubt of the guilt of the person charged. Reasonable doubt does
not mean that proof be so clear that no possibility of error exists.
In other words, the evidence must only be so conclusive that all
reasonable doubts are removed from the mind of an ordinary
person.
15. This Court in K. Gopal Reddy v. State of Andhra
Pradesh,4 explained that “if two reasonably probable and evenly
balanced views of the evidence are possible, one must necessarily
concede the existence of a reasonable doubt. But, fanciful and
remote possibilities must be left out of account. To entitle an
accused person to the benefit of a doubt arising from the
possibility of a duality of views, the possible view in favour of the
accused must be as nearly reasonably probable as that against
him.” The appellants in the present appeal have miserably failed
to make out a case where two reasonable conclusions can be
reached on the basis of evidence on record.
16. Secondly, it is useful to point out that in their respective
statements under Section 313, CrPC the appellants have claimed
4
(1979) 1 SCC 355.
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that when they were coming after visiting a temple, “a person
obtained lift from us on vehicle”. When they reached Ani Bazar,
the police officials demanded the documents of the vehicle and
for that purpose they were taken to police station “along with the
vehicle and in the meanwhile third person fled away from the
place of the incident.” This claim that the seized contraband was
being carried by an unknown stranger, who had mysteriously
appeared on the side of the road seeking a lift and had equally
incognizably vanished into thin air as soon as the motorcycle was
stopped by the police is exfacie fanciful, and is without even a
shred of evidence. A critical appreciation of such version merely
bolsters the prosecution case. The appellants effectively have
ended up admitting that they were present on the spot; some
interaction with the police had indeed taken place; that there was
sufficient cause to stop the vehicle, and that such search was
based not on any prior information but was spontaneous and
thus, it was a case of chance recovery.
17. Reliance can also not be placed on Karam Chand’s (PW3)
testimony by the appellants. First, his statement that he was told
by the police that there was a third person on the spot is hearsay
and inadmissible in view of Section 60 of the Indian Evidence
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Act, 1872. Second, his credibility had effectively been impeached
by the prosecutor during trial. PW3 denies in his examinationin
chief being on the spot or a party to any proceeding; but later he
makes a poor attempt to contradict the prosecution story. He also
admits to having travelled to the trial Court on the morning of his
deposition along with Shiv Ram, who had been won over by the
appellants. Third, given that PW3 himself claims to not being
present at the time of incident, his statement can at best be
construed to mean that no charas was recovered in front of him,
and not that no charas was recovered from the appellants at all.
18. As correctly appreciated by the High Court in detail, non
examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto entitle
one to seek acquittal. Though a heighted standard of care is
imposed on the court in such instances but there is nothing to
suggest that the High Court was not cognizant of this duty.
Rather, the consequence of upholding the trial Court’s reasoning
would amount to compulsory examination of each and every
witness attached to the formation of a document. Not only is the
imposition of such a standard of proof unsupported by statute
but it is also unreasonably onerous in our opinion. The High
Court has rightly relied upon the testimonies of the government
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officials having found them to be impeccable after detailed re
appreciation of the entire evidence. We see no reason to disagree
with such finding(s).
III. Whether High Court erred in reversing acquittal in
appeal?
19. There is no gainsaid that High Courts are well within their
power to reverse an acquittal and award an appropriate sentence;
though they cautiously exercise such powers in practice.
Illustratively, a few permissible reasons which would necessitate
such interference by the High Court include patent errors of law,
grave miscarriage of justice, or perverse findings of fact.
20. Here, the trial Court appreciated facts in a mechanical
manner and dismissed the prosecution case based on a mis
interpretation of law, particularly qua satisfying the burden of
proof. Hence, there were more than enough reasons for the High
Court to interfere with the acquittal and arrive at a different
finding.
21. The appellants’ claim that the High Court erred in not
considering noncompliance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act at
the stage of appeal, is also premised upon a mistaken
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understanding of the law. As held in State of Himachal
Pradesh v. Pawan Kumar5, the safeguards for search of a
person would not extend to his bag or other article being carried
by them. Given how the narcotics have been discovered from a
backpack, as per both the prosecution and defence versions,
there arises no need to examine compliance with Section 50 of
NDPS Act.
CONCLUSION
22. For the aforestated reasons, we do not find any merit in
these appeals which are accordingly dismissed. The appellants’
bail bonds, if any, are cancelled and the respondentState is
directed to take them into custody to serve the remainder of their
tenyear sentences. All other pending applications are disposed of
accordingly.
…………………………….. J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
…………………………… J.
(SURYA KANT)
……………………………J.
(HRISHIKESH ROY)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 26.10.2020
5
(2005) 4 SCC 350.
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