Supreme Court of India
Sudam @ Rahul Kaniram Jadhav vs The State Of Maharashtra on 1 October, 2019Author: Mohan M. Shantanagoudar

Bench: J. Chelameswar




Sudam @ Rahul Kaniram Jadhav …Petitioner

The State of Maharashtra …Respondent



The instant review proceedings pertain to Review Petition

(Cri.) No. D19901 of 2012 seeking to review the final judgment

and order dated 04.07.2011 passed by this Court in Criminal

Appeal Nos. 185-86 of 2011 dismissing the appeal filed by the

Review Petitioner (in short “the Petitioner”) and confirming his

conviction under Sections 201 and 302 of the Indian Penal Code
Signature Not Verified

(in short, “IPC”). Vide the impugned judgment, this Court
Digitally signed by
Date: 2019.10.01
17:57:50 IST

upheld the sentence under Section 201, IPC and the death

sentence under Section 302, IPC imposed upon the Petitioner.

2. The brief facts pertaining to this case are as follows:

2.1 On the morning of 21.08.2007, the bodies of four children

were discovered floating in the village pond (known as Juna

Pani talav) in the village of Rupla Naik Tanda, District Nanded,

Maharashtra. A male child aged six years along with a female

child aged ten years were found tied together, and a female

child aged ten months along with a male child of two to four

years, were found tied separately. The body of an unidentified

woman with a mangalsutra on her neck was also subsequently

discovered below a nearby boulder by the police. The deceased

persons were eventually identified as Anita, the daughter of

one Maroti Madavi, the two children born to her from her first

husband and the two children born to her from the Petitioner.

The Petitioner was found by the police on 24.08.2007, but is

alleged to have absconded subsequently, and was arrested

only on 22.09.2007.

3. The investigation revealed that the deceased Anita had

been living with the Petitioner as his wife and had come to

know about his marriage with PW-6 Muktabai. The deceased

was opposed to this relationship, which led to a serious dispute

amongst the three of them. The Petitioner allegedly divorced

PW-6, and agreed to pay her a sum of Rs. 15,000/-, which the

deceased Anita promised to bear. Thereafter, PW-6 went to her

village, and the Petitioner, the deceased Anita and her four

children came to the village of Juna Pani, where, because of the

strained relationship with his wife, the Petitioner murdered her

and the four children by strangulating them.

4. The principal evidence put forth by the prosecution

against the Petitioner includes the motive of the accused, the

evidence put forth by PW-8 Prahlad that the deceased were last

seen with the Petitioner, and that of PW-6 Muktabai and PW-9

Ishwar with respect to the extra-judicial confessions made to

them by the Petitioner. The Trial Court convicted the Petitioner

for the offences stated supra on the basis of the last seen

circumstance as deposed to by PW-8; the motive of the

accused as deposed to by PW-5, the mother of the deceased

Anita; the extra-judicial confession made by the Petitioner to

PW-9 Ishwar; the fact that the Petitioner had absconded after

the commission of the offence; and his failure to explain the

circumstances leading to the homicidal deaths of the deceased.

The High Court confirmed the conviction and sentence as

awarded by the Trial Court, including the sentence of death,

holding that the case at hand falls into the category of the

rarest of rare cases warranting punishment with death. This

Court, in appeal, confirmed the same.

5. Review Petition (Cri.) No. D19901 of 2012 filed by the

Petitioner against the above judgment and order of this Court

was dismissed by circulation vide order dated 26.07.2012. A

criminal miscellaneous petition was filed by the Petitioner

seeking reopening of this review petition, placing reliance on

the decision of this Court in Mohd. Arif @ Ashfaq v.

Registrar, Supreme Court of India, (2014) 9 SCC 737, which

held that in light of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution, review

petitions arising out of appeals where the death sentence had

been affirmed were required to be heard orally by a 3-Judge

Bench, and specifically permitted the reopening of review

petitions in all cases where review petitions had been

dismissed by circulation. This Court subsequently recalled the

order dated 26.07.2012 passed in Review Petition No.

D19901/2012 and permitted the re-hearing of such petition in

open Court.

6. Learned counsel for the Petitioner, Ms. Nitya

Ramakrishnan, argued for the acquittal of the Petitioner,

contending that there are various infirmities in how the

material on record has been appreciated by the Courts, in

addition to highlighting errors apparent on the face of the

record. The broad thrust of her argument was that the entire

case was built on circumstantial evidence, i.e. the “last seen”

evidence, two purported extra-judicial confessions, and the

motive of the Petitioner, all of which were erroneously relied


6.1 Thus, she virtually seeks a re-appreciation of the entire

evidence, submitting that it is permissible to raise any

additional ground at the stage of review. To make this

submission, learned Counsel relied on the permission given by

this Court to the petitioner in Md. Arif @ Ashfaq v.

Registrar, Supreme Court of India, vide order dated

19.01.2016 passed in Review Petition (Criminal) No. 692 of

2015 in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 77 of 2014, to raise any

additional ground as may be legally permissible in the re-

hearing of his review petition. The relevant observation from

the said order is reproduced below:

“We permit the petitioner to raise all such additional
grounds in support of the said review petition as may
be legally permissible to him.”

6.2 We would like to deal with this argument raised by learned

Counsel for the Petitioner at this juncture itself. It has been

well-settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that review

proceedings cannot be treated as an appeal in disguise.

Particularly, in criminal proceedings, the scope of review

jurisdiction of this Court is guided by Article 137 of the Indian

Constitution as well as Order XL Rule 10 of the Supreme Court

Rules, 1966, which permit the Court to correct miscarriage of

justice caused by an error apparent on the face of the record. In

this regard, it would be fruitful to refer to the decision of this

Court in Vikram Singh v. State of Punjab, (2017) 8 SCC 518,

where the Court was re-hearing a review petition against the

award of the death penalty to the review petitioner therein,

pursuant to the decision in Md. Arif @ Ashfaq v. The

Registrar, Supreme Court (supra). In this decision, after

comprehensively explaining the scope of the review jurisdiction

of this Court in criminal proceedings and revisiting its earlier

decisions on this aspect, including P.N. Eswara Iyer v. The

Supreme Court, (1980) 2 SCR 889 and Suthendraraja v.

State, (1999) 9 SCC 323, this Court concluded as follows:

“23. In view of the above, it is clear that scope,
ambit and parameters of review jurisdiction are well
defined. Normally in a criminal proceeding, review
applications cannot be entertained except on the
ground of error apparent on the face of the record.
Further, the power given to this Court under Article
137 is wider and in an appropriate case can be
exercised to mitigate a manifest injustice. By review
application an applicant cannot be allowed to reargue
the appeal on the grounds which were urged at the
time of the hearing of the criminal appeal. Even if the
applicant succeeds in establishing that there may be
another view possible on the conviction or sentence
of the accused that is not a sufficient ground for
review. This Court shall exercise its jurisdiction to
review only when a glaring omission or patent
mistake has crept in the earlier decision due to
judicial fallibility. There has to be an error apparent
on the face of the record leading to miscarriage of
justice to exercise the review jurisdiction under
Article 137 read with Order 40 Rule 1. There has to
be a material error manifest on the face of the record
with results in the miscarriage of justice.” (emphasis

6.3 We prefer not to burden this judgment with further

discussion on this issue. Suffice it to say that there can be no

argument that this Court cannot re-appreciate evidence in its

entirety in the exercise of its review jurisdiction. Furthermore, it

is evident that the reference to “ additional grounds” in the

observations in the order dated 31.10.2018 in Md. Arif @

Ashfaq v. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra) reproduced above

pertains to additional grounds which could have been raised by

the review petitioner before this Court in the exercise of its

review jurisdiction and had not been raised when the review

petition had originally been filed before this Court.

6.4 In fact, a reading of the entire order reveals that the Court

at that juncture was dealing with a criminal miscellaneous

application seeking that the scope of the permission granted by

this Court in Md. Arif @ Ashfaq v. The Registrar, Supreme

Court (supra) to re-hear review petitions dismissed vide

circulation be extended to also include cases where a curative

petition had been dismissed vide circulation after the dismissal

of review, since this category of cases had been specifically

denied the relief of re-hearing by the Court. With particular

regard for the fact that the petitioner therein was the only

person to be denied an open Court hearing due to this

limitation, and in light of the limited grounds on which a

curative petition could be filed, which meant that the rejection

of a review petition could never be completely reconsidered in

curative jurisdiction, this Court in its order dated 31.10.2018

extended the relief of re-hearing to dismissed curative petitions

as well. It was while doing so that the observations that have

been relied upon by learned Counsel for the Petitioner came to

be passed.

6.5 In view of the above discussion, we are constrained to

reject the contention raised by learned Counsel for the

Petitioner that the above observations have created a window

for this Court to re-appreciate the entire evidence on record

while hearing review petitions. The submissions of learned

Counsel for the Petitioner have to be considered keeping the

above discussion in mind.

7. With respect to the evidence for the circumstance of “last

seen”, learned Counsel led us through the evidence of PW-8

Prahlad to point out the inherent improbabilities in his

testimony, pointing out that he had testified that his statement

was recorded by the police on 19.8.2007, whereas the bodies of

the deceased were discovered only on 21.8.2007. She argued

that the Trial Court had erroneously supplied possible reasons

to explain this incongruity, which went to the root of the

matter, since PW-8 is a timeline witness, especially in the

absence of any re-examination in this regard.

7.1 With regard to the evidence of PW-9 Ishwar, one of the

witnesses for the extra-judicial confessions, it was argued that

since his statement was only recorded on 30.11.2007, there

was a high likelihood of concoction of evidence, rendering it

unreliable. She also contended that there was a complete

absence of any semblance of a timeline in PW-9’s testimony,

which also materially contradicted the “last seen” testimony,

inasmuch as PW-9 deposed that he saw the Petitioner with his

wife and children four to five days before the purported extra

judicial confession was made.

7.2 Coming to the second extra judicial confession, learned

Counsel pointed out that the High Court and this Court had

erred in relying on the testimony of PW-6 regarding the

confession made by the Petitioner to her over a mobile phone

conversation, by ignoring the admission to the contrary made

in the cross-examination. The testimony of PW-6 pertaining to

the extra-judicial confession had been correctly discarded by

the Trial Court on this basis. The Trial Court had further found

such testimony unreliable due to non-corroboration by call

records. It was contended that the High Court and this Court

had both overlooked this aspect and wrongly relied on this

extra-judicial confession, and this Court had even gone on to

incorrectly note that the Trial Court had relied on the

confession, which was an error apparent on the face of the


7.3 It was further submitted that PW-13, the Investigation

Officer had deposed that he had not obtained the call records

of PW-9’s mobile (to which the Petitioner had allegedly made

calls and over which he had allegedly made the extra-judicial

confession to PW-6) even though he deposed in the same

breath that he had called for the same but could not obtain

them. In such a situation, the Court was entitled to proceed on

the basis that such evidence had not been adduced even

though it could have been, and on that basis draw an adverse

inference against the prosecution under Section 114 of the

Evidence Act, 1872.

7.4 With respect to the motive, it was submitted that the

motive for the commission of the offence was weak since the

dispute between the Petitioner and the deceased Anita

regarding the Petitioner’s relationship with PW-6 Muktabai had

already been settled.

7.5 She therefore argued that there was no reliable evidence

connecting the Petitioner to the crime, in the absence of direct

or forensic evidence.

7.6 On the aspect of sentencing, learned Counsel argued that

the Petitioner had no previous record of bad behaviour, and

further that the death penalty may not be imposed for a

conviction based solely on circumstantial evidence. It was

further submitted that this Court, while imposing the death

penalty, had travelled beyond the record to observe that the

face of the deceased had been crushed with a stone, which had

unfairly prejudiced the Court.

8. Learned counsel for the Respondent, i.e. the State of

Maharashtra, Mr. Nishant Ramakantrao Katneshwarkar, on the

other hand, argued in favour of the judgments rendered by the

Courts. In particular, he stressed that even if part of the

testimony of PW-6 had been misread by the Courts, her

evidence against the Petitioner remained unshaken on other

aspects, such as motive, since she had deposed that the

Petitioner had admitted to her that he had been harassing

Anita. He also highlighted that as per the Post Mortem Report

(Exh. P-43) of the deceased Anita, as spoken to by the

examining doctor PW-4, the probable cause of her death was

asphyxia due to throttling, and PW-4 had specifically denied the

possibility of self-strangulation.

8.1 On the aspect of sentencing, he argued that in light of the

menace posed to society, even if the death penalty were to be

commuted, a minimum mandatory sentence of 30 years must

be imposed upon the Petitioner.

9. We have perused the record of the case after hearing the

learned Counsel on either side.

10. At the outset, it is important to note that the entire case of

the prosecution is built upon circumstantial evidence. As

already mentioned supra, this Court, in appeal, affirmed the

findings of the Courts below regarding the conviction of the

Petitioner. For the reasons already noted above, we cannot

delve into the submissions of either party that pertain to

appreciation of evidence anew. However, we deem it

appropriate to briefly refer to the evidence on record, i.e. the

circumstance of the Petitioner being last seen with the

deceased as deposed by PW-8, the extra judicial confessions

made to PWs 6 and 9, and the motive of the Petitioner.

11. The “last seen” circumstance is spoken to by PW-8

Prahlad, who deposed that on 19.08.2007, when he was at his

house, the Petitioner along with his wife and four children came

to his house and asked for water, and further that though he

requested the Petitioner to stay back, the Petitioner left with his


12. PW-9 Ishwar’s testimony pertains to an extra judicial

confession, as he deposed that the Petitioner had confessed

before him that he had strangulated the four children and the

deceased Anita to death, and thrown their bodies in the pond,

as Anita was harassing him.

13. The deposition of PW-5, Anusayabai, the mother of the

deceased Anita, as well as that of PW-6 Muktabai, is pertinent

with respect to the motive of the Petitioner to commit the

murders. As per PW-5, her daughter bore two children with her

first husband Anil Gedam, but Anita started living with the

Petitioner after Anil deserted her. PW-5 deposed that the

Petitioner had married PW-6 Muktabai, and that the Petitioner

had committed the murder of Anita and her children on account

of the dispute caused by the Petitioner’s marriage with PW-6.

13.1 PW-6 Muktabai, in her turn, deposed that a few days

after her marriage with the Petitioner, while they were visiting

PW-6’s parental village, Anita had visited them, claiming that

the Petitioner was her husband and they had two children

together, and went to the Police Station with the Petitioner.

However, only Anita returned, saying that the Petitioner had

run away, and subsequently stayed for a few days with PW-6. A

few days after Anita had left, the Petitioner returned to PW-6,

and revealed that Anita was harassing him, also admitting that

he had two children with her. He later got arrested and Anita

got him released. After a few days, Anita again confronted PW-

6 and the Petitioner, who offered to maintain both women, but

Anita was not amenable to the offer. The Petitioner then wrote

PW-6 a divorce, and Anita agreed to pay Rs. 15,000/- to PW-6.

14. We are of the considered opinion that there is no ground

for interference with any finding of the Courts with respect to

the appreciation of the testimony relating to the “last seen”

circumstance, the extra judicial confession made to PW-9, and

the motive of the Petitioner.

14.1 However, crucially, this Court, in appeal, also relied

upon the deposition of PW-6 with respect to the extra-judicial

confession made to her, inasmuch as she deposed in her

examination-in-chief that the Petitioner had confessed to her

over a telephonic call that he had murdered the deceased.

However, it is clear that the Court omitted to appreciate that

PW-6 had admitted in her cross-examination that the Petitioner

had not told her that he had murdered the deceased, which in

fact was a reason for the Trial Court to not rely on her

testimony. Thus, we find substance in the submission of the

learned Counsel for the Petitioner that this Court committed an

error apparent on the face of the record in placing reliance

upon the extra judicial confession allegedly made by the

Petitioner before PW-6, by noting that such evidence had been

relied upon by the Courts below, when in fact it had been

rightly rejected by the Trial Court.

15. There is yet another crucial aspect of the matter that we

must turn our attention to. We find strength in the submission

made by the Counsel for the Petitioner that this Court, in

determining the correctness of the quantum of sentence

assessed by the High Court, while noting that the offence

appeared to be premeditated and well-planned, erroneously

observed that the Petitioner had crushed the face of the

deceased Anita to avoid identification. We find that this

observation is unsupported by the medical evidence on record.

PW-4, the doctor who conducted the post-mortem (at Exh. P-

25) on Anita’s body, only deposed to the presence of contused

lacerated wounds on her face. There is no evidence to the

effect that her face was marred beyond recognition or that

there appeared to be any attempt to do so. We find that this is

yet another error apparent on the face of the record.

16. Having found there have been errors apparent on the face

of the record in the appreciation of evidence by this Court in

appeal, we must now consider the effect thereof on the

conviction as well as on the sentence awarded. We find it

worth repeating that we do not seek to re-appreciate the

evidence on record, and merely wish to determine whether the

evidence as assessed by this Court in appeal, keeping aside the

extra-judicial confession to PW-6, was sufficient to affirm the

finding of guilt and the award of the punishment of death to the


17. As noted previously, the evidence relied upon in the

instant case is purely circumstantial, including the motive to

commit the offence, the circumstance of the deceased being

last seen with the Petitioner, and two extra-judicial confessions.

Thus, keeping aside the extra-judicial confession to PW-6, it is

evident that evidence as to the circumstance of motive, the

“last seen” circumstance as well as one extra-judicial

confession still survive. It is our considered view that the chain

of circumstances establishing the guilt of the Petitioner beyond

reasonable doubt is not materially affected even if we discard

one of the two extra-judicial confessions. Thus, we find that this

Court rightly affirmed the conviction of the Petitioner under

Sections 302 and 201, IPC, and there is no cause for us to

interfere with such finding of guilt in the exercise of our review


18. We must now turn our attention to the question of

whether the evidence on record, apart from the extra-judicial

confession to PW-6 and the observation pertaining to the facial

injuries of the deceased Anita, is sufficient to affirm the death

sentence awarded to the Petitioner.

18.1 At this juncture, it must be noted that though it may

be a relevant consideration in sentencing that the evidence in a

given case is circumstantial in nature, there is no bar on the

award of the death sentence in cases based upon such

evidence (see Swamy Shraddananda v. State of

Karnataka, (2007) 12 SCC 288; Ramesh v. State of

Rajasthan, (2011) 3 SCC 685).

18.2 In such a situation, it is up to the Court to determine

whether the accused may be sentenced to death upon the

strength of circumstantial evidence, given the peculiar facts

and circumstances of each case, while assessing all the

relevant aggravating circumstances of the crime, such as its

brutality, enormity and premeditated nature, and mitigating

circumstances of the accused, such as his socio-economic

background, age, extreme emotional disturbance at the time of

commission of the offence, and so on.

18.3 In this regard, it would also be pertinent to refer to

the discussion in Ashok Debbarma v. State of Tripura,

(2014) 4 SCC 747, where this Court elaborated upon the

concept of “residual doubt”—which simply means that in spite

of being convinced of the guilt of the accused beyond

reasonable doubt, the Court may harbour lingering or residual

doubts in its mind regarding such guilt. This Court noted that

the existence of residual doubt was a ground sometimes urged

before American Courts as a mitigating circumstance with

respect to imposing the death sentence, and noted as follows:

“33. In California v. Brown [93 L Ed 2d 934 : 479
US 538 (1987)] and other cases, the US courts took
the view, “residual doubt” is not a fact about the
defendant or the circumstances of the crime, but a
lingering uncertainty about facts, a state of mind that
exists somewhere between “beyond a reasonable
doubt” and “absolute certainty”. The petitioner’s
“residual doubt” claim is that the States must permit
capital sentencing bodies to demand proof of guilt to
“an absolute certainty” before imposing the death
sentence. Nothing in our cases mandates the
imposition of this heightened burden of proof at
capital sentencing.

34. We also, in this country, as already
indicated, expect the prosecution to prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt, but not with “absolute
certainty”. But, in between “reasonable doubt” and
“absolute certainty”, a decision-maker’s mind may
wander, possibly in a given case he may go for
“absolute certainty” so as to award death sentence,
short of that he may go for “beyond reasonable
doubt”. Suffice it to say, so far as the present case is
concerned, we entertained a lingering doubt as to
whether the appellant alone could have executed the
crime single-handedly, especially when the
prosecution itself says that it was the handiwork of a
large group of people. If that be so, in our view, the
crime perpetrated by a group of people in an
extremely brutal, grotesque and dastardly manner,
could not have been thrown upon the appellant alone
without charge-sheeting other group of persons
numbering around 35. All the element test as well as

the residual doubt test, in a given case, may favour
the accused, as a mitigating factor.” (emphasis

18.4 While the concept of “residual doubt” has

undoubtedly not been given much attention in Indian capital

sentencing jurisprudence, the fact remains that this Court has

on several occasions held the quality of evidence to a higher

standard for passing the irrevocable sentence of death than

that which governs conviction, that is to say, it has found it

unsafe to award the death penalty for convictions based on the

nature of the circumstantial evidence on record. In fact, this

question was given some attention in a recent decision by this

Bench, in Md. Mannan @ Abdul Mannan v. State of Bihar,

R.P. (Crl.) No. 308/2011 in Crl. A. No. 379/2009 (decision dated

February 14, 2019), where we found it unsafe to affirm the

death penalty awarded to the accused in light of the nature of

the evidence on record, though the conviction had been

affirmed on the basis of circumstantial evidence.

18.5 In Md. Mannan (supra), this Court affirmed the

proposition that the quality of evidence is a relevant

circumstance in the sentencing analysis, referring to the

following observations of this Court in Santosh Kumar

Satishbhushan Bariyar v. State of Maharashtra, (2009) 6

SCC 498:

“56. At this stage, Bachan Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 :
1980 SCC (Cri) 580] informs the content of the
sentencing hearing. The court must play a proactive
role to record all relevant information at this stage.
Some of the information relating to crime can be
culled out from the phase prior to sentencing
hearing. This information would include aspects
relating to the nature, motive and impact of crime,
culpability of convict, etc. Quality of evidence
adduced is also a relevant factor. For instance, extent
of reliance on circumstantial evidence or child
witness plays an important role in the sentencing
analysis. But what is sorely lacking, in most capital
sentencing cases, is information relating to
characteristics and socio-economic background of
the offender. This issue was also raised in the 48th
Report of the Law Commission.”
(emphasis added)

18.6 The Court also relied on Ramesh v. State of

Rajasthan (supra) and Ram Deo Prasad v. State of Bihar,

(2013) 7 SCC 725, which follow Bariyar (supra) in this respect,

and referred to Sushil Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi),

(2014) 4 SCC 317, Kalu Khan v. State of Rajasthan, (2015)

16 SCC 492 and Sebastian @ Chevithiyan v. State of

Kerala, (2010) 1 SCC 58, where a similar position has been


18.7 We find it pertinent to observe that the above trend

only affirms the “prudence doctrine” enunciated by this Court

in Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684. In

this regard, we may refer to the following observations made in

Bariyar (supra):

“149. Principle of prudence, enunciated by Bachan
Singh [(1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980 SCC (Cri) 580] is
sound counsel on this count which shall stand us in
good stead—whenever in the given circumstances,
there is difference of opinion with respect to any
sentencing prop (sic)/rationale, or subjectivity
involved in the determining factors, or lack of
thoroughness in complying with the sentencing
procedure, it would be advisable to fall in favour of
the “rule” of life imprisonment rather than invoking
the “exception” of death punishment.”

18.8 The Court in Bariyar (supra) further observed that

the irrevocable punishment of death must only be imposed

when there is no other alternative, and asserted that in cases

resting on circumstantial evidence, the doctrine of prudence

should be invoked:

“167. The entire prosecution case hinges on the
evidence of the approver. For the purpose of
imposing death penalty, that factor may have to be
kept in mind. We will assume that in Swamy
Shraddananda (2), this Court did not lay down a firm
law that in a case involving circumstantial evidence,
imposition of death penalty would not be permissible.
But, even in relation thereto the question which

would arise would be whether in arriving at a
conclusion some surmises, some hypothesis would
be necessary in regard to the manner in which the
offence was committed as contradistinguished from a
case where the manner of occurrence had no role to
play. Even where sentence of death is to be imposed
on the basis of circumstantial evidence, the
circumstantial evidence must be such which leads to
an exceptional case.

168. We must, however, add that in a case of
this nature where the entire prosecution case
revolves round the statement of an approver or is
dependent upon the circumstantial evidence, the
prudence doctrine should be invoked. For the
aforementioned purpose, at the stage of sentencing
evaluation of evidence would not be permissible, the
courts not only have to solely depend upon the
findings arrived at for the purpose of recording a
judgment of conviction, but also consider the matter
keeping in view the evidences which have been
brought on record on behalf of the parties and in
particular the accused for imposition of a lesser
(emphasis added)

18.9 In light of the above discussion, we find it appropriate

to gauge, in the exercise of our review jurisdiction, whether

there is a reasonable probability that this Court, in appeal, on

the strength of the evidence on record as it stands, without the

errors apparent on the face of the record, would have

concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating

circumstances lies in favour of preserving the Petitioner’s life.

Such probability would be sufficient to set aside the sentence of

death affirmed by this Court, in light of the doctrine of

prudence, which really only reflects the dictum of this Court in

Bachan Singh (supra) that the Court must keep in mind while

awarding the punishment of death that the alternative option,

i.e. imposition of life imprisonment, must be unquestionably


19. We make it clear that we do not wish to re-enter into an

appreciation of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances

relied upon by the Courts until this stage to award the death

sentence to the Petitioner. However, before proceeding further,

we would like to briefly revisit the sentencing assessment

already done by this Court in appeal. While arriving at the

conclusion that the instant case fell into the category of the

rarest of rare cases, this Court took into account the

premeditated nature of the crime, and its brutal and barbaric

nature, observing that the same was sufficient to shock the

collective conscience of the society. The Court also opined that

the Petitioner was a menace to society and could not be

reformed, and that lesser punishment would expose society to

peril at his hands.

20. Evidently, even the fact that the evidence was

circumstantial in nature did not weigh very heavily on the

Court’s mind, let alone the strength and nature of the

circumstantial evidence. Be that as it may, we find that the

material on record is sufficient to convince the Court of the

Petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt; however, the nature

of the circumstantial evidence in this case amounts to a

mitigating circumstance significant enough to tilt the balance of

aggravating and mitigating circumstances in the Petitioner’s

favour, keeping in mind the doctrine of prudence. Moreover, it

is also possible that the incorrect observations pertaining to

Anita’s facial injuries further led the Court to conclude in favour

of imposing the death sentence on the Petitioner. Thus, we are

of the considered opinion that there was a reasonable

probability that this Court would have set aside the sentence of

death in appeal, since the only surviving evidence against the

Petitioner herein pertains to his motive to commit the crime,

the circumstance of “last seen” and a solitary extra-judicial

confession. In other words, it cannot be said that the

punishment of life imprisonment is unquestionably foreclosed

in the instant case, in spite of the gravity and barbarity of the


21. We are thus compelled to conclude that the award of the

death penalty in the instant case, based on the evidence on

record, cannot be upheld.

22. At the same time, we conclude that a sentence of life

imprisonment simpliciter would be inadequate in the instant

case, given the gruesome nature of the offence, and the

menace posed to society at large by the Petitioner, as evinced

by the conduct of the Petitioner in jail. As per the report

submitted in pursuance of the order of this Court dated

31.10.2018, it has been brought on record that the conduct of

the Petitioner in jail has been unsatisfactory, and that he gets

aggressive and indulges in illegal activities in prison,

intentionally abusing prisoners and prison staff and provoking

fights with other prisoners. Two FIRs have also been registered

against the Petitioner for abusing and threatening the

Superintendent of the Nagpur Central Prison.

22.1 As this Court has already held in a catena of

decisions, by way of a via media between life imprisonment

simpliciter and the death sentence, it may be appropriate to

impose a restriction on the Petitioner’s right to remission of the

sentence of life imprisonment, which usually works out to 14

years in prison upon remission. We may fruitfully refer to the

decisions in Swamy Shraddhananda (2) v. State of

Karnataka, (2008) 13 SCC 767 and Union of India v. V.

Sriharan, (2016) 7 SCC 1, in this regard. We therefore direct

that the Petitioner shall remain in prison for the remainder of

his life.

23. In light of the above discussion, the review petitions are

allowed to the extent that the sentence of death awarded to

the Petitioner is commuted to imprisonment for the remainder

of his life sans any right to remission.

(N.V. Ramana)

(Mohan M. Shantanagoudar)

(Indira Banerjee)

New Delhi;
October 01, 2019.



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