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Supreme Court of India
T.V. Ramakrishna Reddy vs M. Mallappa on 7 September, 2021Author: B.R. Gavai
Bench: L. Nageswara Rao, B.R. Gavai, B.V. Nagarathna
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NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5577 OF 2021
[@ Special Leave Petition (C) No.10621 of 2020]
T.V. RAMAKRISHNA REDDY …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
M. MALLAPPA & ANR. …. RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
B.R. GAVAI, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. By the present appeal, the appellantplaintiff
challenges the judgment and order passed by the learned
single judge of the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru
dated 19.3.2020 in R.F.A. No. 123 of 2012 thereby allowing
the appeal filed by the respondent No.1 – M. Mallappa
(defendant No.2) herein.
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3. The facts, in brief, giving rise to the present
appeal are as under:
The plaintiffappellant before this Court filed a
suit for grant of perpetual injunction against the defendants
restraining them or anybody claiming through them from
interfering with the plaintiff’s peaceful possession and
enjoyment of the suit property.
It is the case of the plaintiffappellant that he is
the absolute owner in possession of the suit schedule
property. His case is that he has purchased the suit
schedule property from one Shri K.P. Govinda Reddy
through registered sale deed dated 13.4.1992 and thereafter
he is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit
property. According to him, he has constructed compound
wall of 8 ft. height with hallow bricks. His further case is
that he has constructed a house on the said plot and being
a civil contractor, is using the same for storing building
materials. It is his further case that he has taken loan by
depositing the title deed of the suit property. It is his
further case that since the defendants attempted to
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demolish the compound wall and did not pay heed to the
plaintiff’s request, he was required to file a suit.
The claim of the plaintiffappellant is resisted by
defendant No.1 (respondent No.2 herein) – The Bangalore
Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BDA’)
by filing written statement. It is the defendant No.1’s case
that the suit was not maintainable for want of notice under
Section 64 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act,
1976. It is its further case that the khata issued in the
name of the plaintiffappellant is only a revenue entry and
does not confer any right, title or interest upon the plaintiff
appellant over the suit property.
The defendant No.2M. Mallappa (respondent
No.1 herein) also resisted the claim of the plaintiff
appellant. It is his case that he had purchased the suit
property through registered saledeed dated 5.4.1984 from
one M. Shivalingaiah. It is his case that since the date of
purchase, he was in peaceful possession and enjoyment of
the suit schedule property. It is his further case that the
vendor of the plaintiffappellant had no right, title and
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interest to sell the suit schedule property in favour the
plaintiff. It is his case that entire Survey No.37
admeasuring 1 acre 29 guntas belonged to undivided family
of M. Shivalingaiah and upon partition, the entire land in
the said Survey number came to be allotted to the share of
M. Shivalingaiah. It is his case that M. Shivalingaiah had
sold plots in the said Survey number to different persons
and the suit property was sold to him. It is his further case
that he had made an application to B.D.A. for reconveyance
since the plot was under reconveyance scheme. It is his
case that compound wall was put up by him.
On the basis of the rival pleadings, the learned
trial judge framed the following issues:
“1. Does the plaintiff prove his lawful
possession of the suit property as on the
date of the suit?
2. Does he prove this alleged
interference by the defendants?
3. Is he entitled to a decree of
permanent injunction against
defendants?”
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All the issues came to be answered in favour of
the plaintiffappellant and the suit came to be decreed as
prayed for.
Being aggrieved thereby, defendant No.2 i.e.
respondent No.1 herein filed Regular First Appeal before the
High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru.
The learned single judge of the Karnataka High
Court found that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the suit simpliciter for permanent injunction without
seeking a declaration of title was not tenable and as such,
allowed the appeal and set aside the decree.
Being aggrieved thereby, the present appeal by
way of special leave.
4. We have heard Shri Ajit Bhasme, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffappellant, Shri
Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior Counsel appearing
on behalf of respondent No.1 (defendant No.2) and Shri S.K.
Kulkarni, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the BDA.
5. Shri Ajit Bhasme, learned Senior Counsel
appearing on behalf of the plaintiffappellant would submit
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that the learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court
has grossly erred in interfering with the wellreasoned
judgment and order of the learned trial court. The learned
Senior Counsel would further submit that the learned trial
Court relying upon the voluminous documentary evidence
produced on record by the plaintiffappellant has found the
appellant to be in peaceful possession and rightly decreed
the suit. Relying on the judgment and order of the learned
single judge of the Karnataka High Court dated 10.2.2000
in Writ Petition No.38853 of 1999, the learned Senior
Counsel submitted that possession of the plaintiffappellant
has been found to be lawful by the High Court and as such,
another learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court
has grossly erred in reversing the judgment and order of the
learned trial court decreeing the suit.
6. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior
Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent No.1
(defendant No.2), on the contrary, would submit that the
learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court has rightly
held that the issue involved had to be first decided on the
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basis of title and until the plaintiff’s claim for declaration of
title is decided, the suit simpliciter for permanent injunction
was not tenable.
7. Shri Basava Prabhu S. Patil, learned Senior
Counsel, would further submit that the saledeed of the
defendant No.2 was dated 5.4.1984 whereas the saledeed
on which plaintiffappellant claimed was dated 13.4.1992.
He therefore would submit that no interference is warranted
in the present appeal.
8. The short question that falls for consideration
before us is:
Whether the learned single judge of the High
Court was right in holding that the suit simpliciter for
permanent injunction without claiming declaration of title,
as filed by the plaintiff, was not maintainable?
9. The issue is no more res integra. The position
has been crystalised by this Court in the case of Anathula
Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy (dead) by L.Rs. and others 1
in paragraph 21, which read thus:
1 (2008) 4 SCC 594
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“21. To summarise, the position in regard
to suits for prohibitory injunction relating to
immovable property, is as under:
(a) Where a cloud is raised over the
plaintiff’s title and he does not have posses
sion, a suit for declaration and possession,
with or without a consequential injunction,
is the remedy. Where the plaintiff’s title is
not in dispute or under a cloud, but he is
out of possession, he has to sue for posses
sion with a consequential injunction.
Where there is merely an interference with
the plaintiff’s lawful possession or threat of
dispossession, it is sufficient to sue for an
injunction simpliciter.
(b) As a suit for injunction simpliciter is
concerned only with possession, normally
the issue of title will not be directly and
substantially in issue. The prayer for in
junction will be decided with reference to
the finding on possession. But in cases
where de jure possession has to be estab
lished on the basis of title to the property,
as in the case of vacant sites, the issue of
title may directly and substantially arise for
consideration, as without a finding thereon,
it will not be possible to decide the issue of
possession.
(c) But a finding on title cannot be
recorded in a suit for injunction, unless
there are necessary pleadings and appro
priate issue regarding title (either specific,
or implied as noticed in Annaimuthu The
var [Annaimuthu Thevar v. Alagammal,
(2005) 6 SCC 202] ). Where the averments
regarding title are absent in a plaint and
where there is no issue relating to title, the
court will not investigate or examine or ren
der a finding on a question of title, in a suit
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for injunction. Even where there are neces
sary pleadings and issue, if the matter in
volves complicated questions of fact and
law relating to title, the court will relegate
the parties to the remedy by way of com
prehensive suit for declaration of title, in
stead of deciding the issue in a suit for
mere injunction.
(d) Where there are necessary pleadings
regarding title, and appropriate issue relat
ing to title on which parties lead evidence,
if the matter involved is simple and
straightforward, the court may decide upon
the issue regarding title, even in a suit for
injunction. But such cases, are the excep
tion to the normal rule that question of title
will not be decided in suits for injunction.
But persons having clear title and posses
sion suing for injunction, should not be
driven to the costlier and more cumber
some remedy of a suit for declaration,
merely because some meddler vexatiously
or wrongfully makes a claim or tries to en
croach upon his property. The court should
use its discretion carefully to identify cases
where it will enquire into title and cases
where it will refer to the plaintiff to a more
comprehensive declaratory suit, depending
upon the facts of the case.”
10. It could thus be seen that this Court in
unequivocal terms has held that where the plaintiff’s title is
not in dispute or under a cloud, a suit for injunction could
be decided with reference to the finding on possession. It
has been clearly held that if the matter involves complicated
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questions of fact and law relating to title, the court will
relegate the parties to the remedy by way of comprehensive
suit for declaration of title, instead of deciding the issue in a
suit for mere injunction.
11. No doubt, this Court has held that where there
are necessary pleadings regarding title and appropriate
issue relating to title on which parties lead evidence, if the
matter involved is simple and straightforward, the court
may decide upon the issue regarding title, even in a suit for
injunction. However, it has been held that such cases are
the exception to the normal rule that question of title will
not be decided in suits for injunction.
12. In this background, we will have to consider the
facts of the present case.
13. The plaintiffappellant claims to be the owner of
the suit property on the basis of a saledeed executed by
one K.P. Govinda Reddy in his favour on 13.4.1992. In
turn, according to him, the said property was sold by one
Smt. Varalakshmamma in favour of his vendor K.P. Govinda
Reddy on 26.3.1971. He claims that he had mortgaged the
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suit property for taking loan from one financial institution.
He further claimed that an endorsement was also issued by
the Corporation of City of Bangalore that Khata regarding
the suit property is transferred to the appellant. According
to the plaintiffappellant, when the Bangalore Mahanagar
Palike withdrew the Khata in his favour, he went to the High
Court and succeeded therein.
14. Per contra, the defendant No.2 (respondent No.1
herein) is specifically denying the title of the plaintiff
appellant. He claims to be the owner of the suit property on
the basis of a saledeed dated 5.4.1984 from one M.
Shivalingaiah. He also claims to be in peaceful possession
and enjoyment of the same on the basis of the said sale
deed. It is his case that K.P. Govinda Reddy got the title set
up falsely and created fabricated documents with regard to
possession. It is also his case that compound wall was
constructed by him and not by the plaintiff, as claimed.
15. It could thus clearly be seen that this is not a
case where the plaintiffappellant can be said to have a clear
title over the suit property or that there is no cloud on
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plaintiffappellant’s title over the suit property. The
question involved is one which requires adjudication after
the evidence is led and questions of fact and law are
decided.
16. In that view of the matter, we do not find any
reason to interfere with the judgment and order passed by
the Karnataka High Court.
17. Insofar as the reliance on the order passed by the
learned single judge of the Karnataka High Court dated
10.2.2000 in Writ Petition No.38853 of 1999 is concerned, it
will be relevant to refer to the following observations made
therein:
“3. It is evident from the plain reading
of the above that any entry made in the
Corporation Register by fraud,
misrepresentation or suppression of facts
or by furnishing false, incorrect and
incomplete material could be corrected
within a period of three years from the date
of such recording. The Order in the instant
case was passed admittedly much beyond
the period of limitation prescribed by the
provision extracted above. The same is
therefore unsustainable on that ground
itself. The parties being in litigation before
the Civil Court could upon adjudication of
the controversy regarding the title to the
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property approach the Corporation for any
modification in the entry which is no more
any modification in the entry which is no
more than a fiscal entry relevant only for
purpose of payment of taxes and does not
by itself create or extinguish title to the
property in regard to which it is made. Till
such time the competent Court declared
the 3rd respondent as the true owner of the
property, the Corporation could not on its
own correct the entry after a period of 3
years stipulated under Sec. 114A of the
Act.
4. This writ petition accordingly
succeeds and is hereby allowed. The
impugned order shall stand quashed
reserving liberty for the parties to have the
matter adjudicated upon by the Civil Court
and to approach the Corporation for a fresh
entry/modification of the existing entry to
bring the same in consonance with the
Civil Court’s determination. No costs.”
18. It could thus be clearly seen that the High Court
in the said order has clearly noted that the parties are in
litigation before the Civil Court and that adjudication of
controversy regarding the title of the suit property could be
done only by the Civil Court. The entry with the
Corporation is nothing more than a fiscal entry relevant
only for the purpose of payment of taxes and does not by
itself create or extinguish title to the property. The Court
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observed that till such time the competent Court declared
the third respondent therein as the true owner of the
property, the Corporation could not on its own correct the
entry after a period of 3 years stipulated under Section 114
A of the Act. The High Court has therefore set aside the
order reserving liberty for the parties to have the matter
adjudicated upon by the Civil Court.
19. In that view of the matter, the said judgment and
order would be of no assistance to the case of the plaintiff
appellant.
20. It will also be relevant to refer to the following
observations of this Court in the case of Jharkhand State
Housing Board v. Didar Singh and another2:
“11. It is well settled by catena of judg
ments of this Court that in each and every
case where the defendant disputes the title
of the plaintiff it is not necessary that in all
those cases plaintiff has to seek the relief of
declaration. A suit for mere injunction does
not lie only when the defendant raises a
genuine dispute with regard to title and
when he raises a cloud over the title of the
plaintiff, then necessarily in those circum
2 (2019) 17 SCC 692
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stances, plaintiff cannot maintain a suit for
bare injunction.”
21. In the facts of the present case, it cannot be said
at this stage that the dispute raised by the defendant No.2
with regard to title is not genuine nor can it be said that the
title of the plaintiffappellant over the suit property is free
from cloud. The issue with regard to title can be decided
only after the fullfledged trial on the basis of the evidence
that would be led by the parties in support of their rival
claims.
22. In the result, the appeal is without merit and as
such, dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs.
…….……………………, J.
[L. NAGESWARA RAO]
…….……………………, J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
NEW DELHI;
SEPTEMBER 07, 2021
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