THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI

SECOND APPEAL No.216 of 2020 

JUDGMENT: 

The above second appeal is filed by the defendant against  the judgment and decree dated 27.02.2020 in A.S.No.41 of 2019  on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Razole, confirming the  judgment and decree dated 31.08.2018 in O.S.No.71 of 2013 on  the file of Junior Civil Judge, Razole. 

2. For the sake of convenience and brevity, the parties herein  are referred to as they are arrayed in the O.S.No.71 of 2013. 

3. The plaintiffs, sisters, filed suit O.S.No.71 of 2013 to  declare their title and for recovery of possession etc. In the  plaint, it was contended interalia that the plaint schedule  property originally belonged to Chelliboina Somalamma, mother  of plaintiffs; that Somalamma executed a registered gift  settlement deed dated 10.09.2003 reserving life interest and  vested remainder to the plaintiffs; that Somalamma died on  28.12.2012 and hence the schedule property devolved upon the  plaintiffs being vested remainder holders; that during the life  time of Somalamma, she allowed the defendant to cultivate  plaint schedule property; that after death of Somalamma, the  plaintiffs demanded the defendant to deliver the plaint schedule  property and at that point of time, defendant pleaded that he  purchased the schedule property from Somalamma; that  defendant might have obtained the document by  misrepresentation and taking advantage of innocence of 

Somalamma and the said document does not bind the plaintiffs;  that all the efforts made by the plaintiffs to take delivery went  futile; that the plaintiffs got issued a legal notice dated  22.02.2013, however defendant refused to receive the same and  hence, filed the suit. 

4. Defendant filed written statement and contended interalia that he is the bonafide purchaser of plaint schedule property  under a registered sale deed dated 26.03.2011; that by virtue of  sale deed, he came into possession of the property; that  plaintiffs being cousins of defendant are aware of the sale deed;  that plaintiffs obtained document dated 10.09.2003 by playing  undue influence with a promise to maintain their mother till her  last breath; that since the plaintiffs failed to keep up the  promise, deceased Somalamma revoked the gift deed through a  registered revocation deed dated 08.02.2011 and eventually  prayed the Court to dismissed the suit. 

5. During the trial, 1st plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and got examined P.Ws.2 and 3. Exs.A-1 to A-4 were marked.  On behalf of defendant, defendant examined himself as D.W.1,  got examined D.W.2 and Exs.B-1 & B-2 were marked.  

6. Trial Court by judgment and decree dated 31.08.2018  decreed the suit with costs and declared the title of the plaintiffs  and directed the defendant to deliver vacant possession of  property within three months, failing which the plaintiffs are 

also granted liberty to get the property delivered through  process of Court. 

7. Aggrieved by the said judgment and decree,  appellant/defendant filed A.S.No.41 of 2019. First Appellate  Court being final factfinding Court vide judgment dated  27.02.2020, dismissed the appeal confirming the judgment and  decree of the trial Court. Aggrieved by the said judgment and  decree, the present second appeal is filed. 

8. Heard Sri Tata Singaiah Goud, learned counsel for  appellant. 

9. Learned counsel for the appellant would contend that the  registered gift settlement deed dated 10.09.2003 was revoked by  the executant by revocation deed dated 10.02.2011 and hence,  the plaintiffs cannot maintain the suit for declaration. He would  further contend that the registered gift settlement deed dated  10.09.2003 is a conditional gift and since the respondents/  plaintiffs failed to comply with the condition, the deceased  Somalamma revoked the gift by revocation deed dated  10.02.2011 and the same was registered vide document No.351  of 2011. He would also contend that the appellant/ defendant  is a bonafide purchaser of the property and hence, the suit filed  by the plaintiffs is liable to be dismissed. It is further contended  that delivery of property is sine qua non for valid gift deed under  Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short “TP 

Act”). Thus, it was prayed the Court to set allow the second  appeal by setting aside the judgements of Courts below. 

10. The following are substantial questions of law arise for  consideration in the second appeal:  

1) Whether delivery of property is sine qua non under  Sec 123 of T.P. Act for a valid gift deed?  

2) Whether a registered gift deed can be revoked/ cancelled without the consent of donee? If so, such  unilateral cancellation deed binds the donee?  

3) Whether Ex.A-1 Gift Deed is a conditional Gift Deed and non-consideration of Ex.A-1 vitiated the  Judgements of the Courts below?  

4) Whether the defendant is a bonafide purchaser?  

11. Undisputed facts are that Smt.Somalamma executed a  registered gift deed in favour of plaintiffs on 10.09.2003  reserving life interest to herself and vested reminder to the  donee under Ex.A-1. The gift deed was revoked by way of Ex.B-2  registered revocation deed dated 08.02.2011. Later, defendant  purchased the property under Ex.B-1 registered sale deed dated 

26.03.2011. 

12. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that delivery  of property is sine qua non for valid gift deed under Sec 123 of  TP Act. Since the property is not delivered, though the  nomenclature document Ex.A-1 is described as gift deed, it is  not a gift deed and hence unilateral cancellation of same is  valid.

13. Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads  thus: 

122. “Gift” defined.—“Gift” is the transfer of certain  existing moveable or immoveable property made  voluntarily and without consideration, by one person,  called the donor, to another, called the donee, and  accepted by or on behalf of the donee.  

Acceptance when to be made.—Such acceptance  

must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while  he is still capable of giving. If the donee dies before  acceptance, the gift is void. 

Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 reads  thus: 

123. Transfer how effected.— For the purpose of making  a gift of immovable property, the transfer must be  effected by a registered instrument signed by or on behalf  of the donor, and attested by at least two witnesses. 

For the purpose of making a gift of movable  

property, the transfer may be effected either by a  registered instrument signed as aforesaid or by delivery. Such delivery may be made in the same way as  

goods sold may be delivered. 

14. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Renikuntla Rajamma Vs.  K.Sarwanamma1, held that “transfer of possession” of the  property covered by the registered instrument of the gift duly  signed by the donor and attested as required is not a sine qua  non for the making of a valid gift under the provisions of the TP  Act. It was further observed that the recitals in the gift deed  also prove transfer of absolute title in the gifted property from  the donor to the donee. What is retained is only the right to use  

1(2014) 9 SCC 445

the property during the lifetime of the donor which does not in  any way affect the transfer of ownership in favour of the donee  by the donor. 

15. In Nakka Parthasarathy Vs. Nakka Krishnaveni and  Ors2, the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held that  when once the gift is voluntarily made without there being any  coercion or undue influence the acceptance of the gift by the  donee would be complete even though the deed of gift is not  delivered to the donee and the gift property continues to be in  the donor’s possession. 

16. In view of ratio laid down in Rajamma’s case and Nakka  Parthasarathy’s case, the contention of the learned counsel for  the appellant that delivery of property is not sine qua non for a  valid gift deed is without merit and falls to ground. Under  Ex.A-1, life interest was retained by donor and vested remainder  to the donees. Pleadings and evidence on record manifest that  donor voluntarily executed the gift deed without undue  influence or coercion and the same was accepted by plaintiffs.  

17. According to learned counsel for the appellant, gift under  Ex.A-1 is conditional one and since the respondents/ plaintiffs  failed to comply with the said condition, it was revoked by the  executant. A perusal of gift settlement deed dated 10.09.2003  does not indicate any such condition imposed by the donor.  The recitals in the document are to the effect that respondents  

are the daughters of executants and out of love and affection,    

22013 (5) ALD 711

since the executant promised earlier to deliver some property in  their favour, she executed the document out of free will and  volition. Thus, the contention of learned counsel for appellant  that Ex.A-1 is a conditional gift is not true and correct and  hence the same was rejected.  

18. Ex.B-2, Revocation deed dated 08.02.2011 was executed  nearly after 7½ years after execution of Ex.A-1 registered Gift  settlement deed. A perusal of recitals in revocation/cancellation  deed shows that it was cancelled unilaterally without notice to  donees. Immediately after cancellation i.e. 1½ months after  cancellation deed, sale deed was executed in favour of  appellant/defendant. According to the appellant, appellant and  respondents are cousins and the appellant is aware of the  execution of registered gift settlement deed in favour of  respondents. A careful perusal of the material on record shows that appellant/defendant is aware of execution of gift deed in  favour of plaintiffs.  

19. Cancellation of gift deed unilaterally by donor is contrary  to the Rules under the Registration Act. Thus, cancellation does  not affect the right of the respondents/plaintiffs.  

20. In Kolli Rajesh Chowdary Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh3,  while dealing with the aspect whether registration of deed of  cancellation unilaterally is violative of principles of natural  justice and also contrary to the Rule 26(i)(k)(i), Hon’ble Court  

held that deed of cancellation/deed of revocation is declared as    

32019(3)ALD229

null and void and it is of no effect. There cannot be a unilateral  cancellation of registered document and that a cancellation deed  cancelling a registered document can be registered only after the  same is cancelled by a competent Civil Court, after notice to the  parties concerned, and that in the absence of any declaration by  a competent Court or notice to parties, the execution of deed of  cancellation as well as its registration are wholly void and  nonest. 

21. In view of ratio laid down in the above decision, revocation  deed executed by late Somalamma after 7½ years of execution of  gift settlement deed is not valid in the eye of law. As a  consequence, the appellant will not get better title under Ex.B-1  sale deed. The latin maxim nemo dat quad non habit squarely  apply to the facts of the case, means No person can convey  better title than what he has. Vendor of the appellant upon  execution of Ex A-1 lost title to the property, except enjoyment  during her lifetime. Cancellation of document is not valid and it  being non-est, it will not inure to the benefit of appellant/ defendant.  

22. Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title  over the plaint schedule property? 

23. To prove Ex.A-1 registered gift settlement deed, the 1st plaintiff examined herself as P.W.1 and got examined the  attestors of Ex.A-1 as P.Ws.2 and 3. The attestors P.Ws.2 and 3  categorically deposed that they were present at the time of 

execution of Ex.A-1 gift deed and after completion of execution  of Ex.A-1, both of them signed on it. Since the execution of  Ex.A-1 is duly proved, this Court is of the opinion that Ex.A-1  being gift/settlement deed reserving life interest with the mother  and vested remainder to daughter, after the death of mother, the  respondents/plaintiffs are being vested remind holder became  owners of the property. Since the appellant/defendant disputed  the title of the plaintiffs, they were constrained to file the suit for  declaration and proved due execution of Ex.A-1. The evidence  on record is unimpeachable and hence plaintiffs prove their title  to the property and hence they are entitled for declaration.  Thus, this Court holds that plaintiffs are owners of plaint  schedule property.  

24. It is also pertinent to mention here that appellant/  defendant pleaded that respondents/plaintiffs obtained Ex.A-1  by playing undue influence with their mother with a promise to  maintain her till her last breath. In fact, a perusal of Ex.A-1, no  recital was incorporated in Ex.A-1 that the respondents/  plaintiffs have to take care of their mother. In fact, the recitals  are to the effect that out of love and affection, the document was  executed. Apart from that Somalamma also blessed with three  sons and they are solvent persons. According to D.W.1, none of  the sons of Somalamma come forward to purchase the property after execution of deed of revocation. He further deposed that  he did not enquire about the encumbrances over the property at  the time of purchase. Any prudent purchaser normally enquires 

10 

before purchase of the property. He further deposed that he  knew about execution of Ex.A-1 by his vendor in favour of the  plaintiffs. However, he deposed that his vendor informed two  months prior to bargain about the cancellation of gift deed  executed in favour of plaintiffs. The deposition of appellant  makes the thing more than discernable that the appellant is  aware of execution of gift deed in favour respondents herein.  Thus, in the opinion of this Court the appellant/defendant  cannot be termed as bonafide purchaser.  

25. It is the case of plaintiffs/respondents that Somalamma  continued to be in possession of property during her lifetime  and after death of Somalamma, the appellant/defendant came  into possession of the property. The appellant/defendant  contended that he came into possession of the property after  execution of Ex.B-1 sale deed. Since the title of  respondents/plaintiffs is declared, the appellant/defendant is  not entitled to continue in possession of the property.  Possession of appellant over the schedule property is not legal.  Since this Court came to conclusion that respondent/plaintiffs  are owners of the schedule property, they are entitled to recover  the property from appellant/defendant.  

26. Whether this Court can interfere with concurrent findings  of the facts recorded by Courts below under Section 100 of CPC.

11 

27. Dealing with the scope of Section 100 of CPC, the Hon’ble  Apex Court in Kulwant Kaur and Ors vs. Gurdial Singh Mann  (Dead) By Lrs. and Ors.4 held as follows:  

“Section 100 of CPC introduced a definite restriction on  to the exercise of jurisdiction in a second appeal so far as  the High Court is concerned. Needless to say that the  Code of Civil Procedure Amendment Act, 1976  introduced such an embargo for such definite objectives  and since we are not required to further probe on that  score, we are not detailing out, but the fact remains that  while it is true that in a second appeal a finding of fact  even if erroneous will generally not be disturbed but  where it is found that the findings stands vitiated on  wrong test and on the basis of assumptions and  conjectures and resultantly there is an element of  perversity involved therein, the High Court in our view  will be within its jurisdiction to dealt with the issue. This  is, however, only in the event such a fact is brought to  light by the High Court explicitly and the judgment  should also be categorical as to the issue of perversity  vis-à-vis the Concept of justice. Needless to say however,  that perversity itself is a substantial question worth  adjudication what is required is a categorical finding on  the part of the High Court as to perversity.” 

28. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Yadavarao Dajiba Shrawane  Vs. Nanilal Harakchand Shah (Dead) and Ors.5 held thus: 

“From the discussions in the judgment it is clear that the  High Court has based its findings on the documentary  evidence placed on record and statements made by some  witnesses which can be construed as admissions or  conclusions. The position is well settled that when the 

judgment of the final Court of fact is based on mis interpretation of documentary evidence or on  consideration of inadmissible evidence or ignoring  

4 (2001) 4 SCC 262 

5 2002 (6) SCC 404

12 

material evidence the High Court in second appeal is  entitled to interfere with the judgment. The position is  also well settled that admission of parties or their  witnesses are relevant pieces of evidence and should be  given due weightage by Courts. A finding of fact ignoring  such admissions or concessions is vitiated in law and  can be interfered with by the High Court in second  appeal. Since the parties have been in litigating terms for  several decades the records are voluminous. The High  Court as it appears from the judgment has discussed the  documentary evidence threadbare in the light of law  relating to their admissibility and relevance.” 

29. In Leela Soni vs. Rajesh Goyal6, the Hon’ble Apex Court  held thus: 

“21. It will be apt to refer to Section 103 of C.P.C.  which enables the High Court to determine the issues of  fact:  

“103. Power of High Court to determine issue of  

fact.- In any second appeal, the High Court may, if the  evidence on the record is sufficient, determine any issue  necessary for the disposal of the appeal,  

(a) which has not been determined by the Lower  

Appellate Court or both by the Court of first instance and  the Lower Appellate Court, or  

(b) which has been wrongly determined by such  

court or courts by reason of a decision on such question  of law as is referred to in section 100.”  

22. The section, noted above, authorizes the High  Court to determine any issue which is necessary for the  disposal of the second appeal provided the evidence on  record is sufficient, in any of the following two situations  : (1) when that issue has not been determined both by  the trial court as well as the Lower Appellate Court or by  the Lower Appellate Court; or (2) when both the trial  court as well as the Appellate Court or the Lower  

6 2001 (7) SCC 494

13 

Appellate Court has wrongly determined any issue on a  substantial question of law which can properly be the  subject matter of second appeal under Section 100 of  C.P.C.” 

30. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Ishwar Dass Jain (Dead) Thr.  Lrs Vs. Sohan Lal (Dead) By Lrs7, held thus: 

“It is essential for the High Court to formulate a  substantial question of law under section 100 CPC, after  the 1976 amendment and it is not permissible to reverse  the judgment of the first appellate Court without doing  so.” 

31. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Hero Vinoth Vs. Seshammal8,  held thus: 

19. It is not within the domain of the High Court to  investigate the grounds on which the findings were arrived  at, by the last court of fact, being the first appellate court. It  is true that the lower appellate court should not ordinarily  reject witnesses accepted by the trial court in respect of  credibility but even where it has rejected the witnesses  accepted by the trial court, the same is no ground for  interference in second appeal when it is found that the  appellate court has given satisfactory reasons for doing so. In  a case where from a given set of circumstances two  inferences of fact are possible, one drawn by the lower  appellate court will not be interfered by the High Court in  second appeal. Adopting any other approach is not  permissible. The High Court will, however, interfere where it  is found that the conclusions drawn by the lower appellate  court were erroneous being contrary to the mandatory  provisions of law applicable or its settled position on the  basis of pronouncements made by the Apex Court, or was  based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at by ignoring material evidence.  

It was furthermore held: 

23. To be “substantial” a question of law must be debatable,  not previously settled by law of the land or a binding  precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision    

7 2000 (1) SCC 434 

8AIR 2009 SC 1481

14 

of the case, if answered either way, insofar as the rights of  the parties before it are concerned. To be a question of law  “involving in the case” there must be first a foundation for it  laid in the pleadings and the question should emerge from  the sustainable findings of fact arrived at by court of facts  and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a  just and proper decision of the case. An entirely new point  raised for the first time before the High Court is not a  question involved in the case unless it goes to the root of the  matter. It will, therefore, depend on the facts and  circumstance of each case whether a question of law is a  substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the  paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a  judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do  justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding  prolongation in the life of any lis. (See Santosh Hazari v.  Purushottam Tiwari MANU/SC/0091/2001). 

24. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC, relevant for  this case, may be summerized thus:- 

 (i) … 

(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case  

involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere  question of law. A question of law having a material bearing  on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to  which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a  substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific  provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from  binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue. A  substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary  situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account  of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the  court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting  contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases,  the substantial question of law arises not because the law is  still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a  material question, violates the settled position of law.” 

32. In the light of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court  on the scope of interference by the High Court in second appeal,  this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 100 of  CPC has to confine to the substantial question of law involved in  the appeal. This Court cannot re-appreciate the evidence and 

15 

interfere with the concurrent findings of the Court below where  the Courts below have exercised the discretion judicially.  Further the existence of substantial question of law is the sine  qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction. This Court cannot  substantiate its own opinion unless the findings of the Court are  manifestly perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. 

33. The findings of the fact recorded by the Courts below are  based on oral and documentary evidence on record. This Court  may not substitute its opinion when Courts below recorded  findings basing on evidence and documents. Thus, this Court is  of view of that no questions of law muchless substantial  questions of law involved in the above appeal. Hence, the  appeal is liable to be dismissed, however, without costs. 

34. Accordingly, the second appeal is dismissed at admission  stage. No order as to costs. 

As a sequel, all the pending miscellaneous applications  shall stand closed.  

_________________________ 

SUBBA REDDY SATTI, J 

13th April, 2022 

PVD

16 

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE SUBBA REDDY SATTI  

SECOND APPEAL No.216 of 2020 

13th April, 2022 

PVD

Comments

Leave a Reply

Sign In

Register

Reset Password

Please enter your username or email address, you will receive a link to create a new password via email.