HIGH COURT OF MEGHALAYA AT SHILLONG 

WP(C) No. 444 of 2020 

Date of order: 22.03.2022 

Union of India & Ors. Vs. No. 5450016 Dharamvir Singh Coram: 

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjib Banerjee, Chief Justice 

Hon’ble Mr. Justice W. Diengdoh, Judge 

Appearance: 

For the Petitioner/Appellant(s) : Dr. N. Mozika, Sr. Adv. with Ms. L. Jana, Adv. 

For the Respondent(s) : Ms. P. Agarwal, Adv. 

i) Whether approved for Yes/No reporting in Law journals etc.: 

ii) Whether approved for publication Yes/No in press: 

JUDGMENT: (per the Hon’ble, the Chief Justice) (Oral) 

The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution is directed against  an order of March 15, 2019 passed by the Guwahati Bench of the Central  Administrative Tribunal on the respondent’s petition before it. The  respondent had challenged a punishment order of removal from service  handed down to him by communication of March 25, 2016. The final order  in the disciplinary proceedings also found that the period during which the  respondent was absent would be treated as unauthorised absence from duty  and the salary and emoluments paid would be recovered. 

2. By the order of March 15, 2019, the Tribunal held “that though a  semblance of disciplinary proceedings was attempted … but no proper  inquiry was actually conducted.” According to the Tribunal, the respondent  herein was not given any opportunity to defend himself nor furnished the  record of pleadings on which the charge was founded. In such  circumstances, the operative part of the order, found at paragraph 12 thereof,  recorded as follows: 

“12. … As such, we found that the inquiry purported to have been  conducted by the respondent authorities was highly vitiated, bad in  law and liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the Disciplinary  

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Authority’s order No. 112015/A (Discp)/HT-21Sect/2016 dated  25.03.2016 is hereby set aside and quashed. The applicant may be  reinstated with immediate effect with all consequential benefits.  The period of absence, however, may be settled by granting him  leave as admissible to the applicant.” 

3. Ordinarily, when an order of punishment passed on the culmination  of any disciplinary proceedings is challenged, there are, primarily, three  avenues open to the forum looking into the validity of the action or the punishment awarded: the challenge may be repelled; or, the punishment may  be undone or reduced; or, the proceedings may be quashed in full or in part, 

with or without liberty to start afresh or from a specified stage. 4. It is the third limb that was resorted to in this case and, without the  order expressly providing otherwise, the implication thereof is that the  proceedings stand quashed without the employer having any authority to  revive the same. Such a drastic order may be passed, but only upon the forum  recording a satisfaction that the very show-cause notice on the basis of which  the disciplinary proceedings were initiated was bad. Judicial precedents instruct that it is a tall order for a show-cause notice to be quashed, just like  an FIR may be quashed only in the rare case when no ingredients of any  offence is made out therein. 

5. The order speaks of procedural lapses that resulted in serious  prejudice and the respondent herein not being afforded an opportunity to  adequately defend himself. The order does not refer to the proceedings being  bad ab initio. There is no observation as to the mendacity of the show-cause  notice issued or the charges forwarded or the statement of imputation of  conduct pertaining thereto. Indeed, it appears that what the Tribunal  intended was to only quash and set aside the order of punishment and not  quash the proceedings; but it failed to expressly give leave for the employer  to continue with the disciplinary proceedings from the show-cause stage or  from any other subsequent stage. 

6. Accordingly, the order dated March 15, 2019 passed by the Tribunal  is modified by not interfering with that part thereof that quashed the penalty  and the final order passed in the disciplinary proceedings, but by granting leave to the writ petitioner-employer to continue with the proceedings from 

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the stage of the reply to the charges having been filed by the respondent. If  no reply was used, the respondent will be entitled to furnish his reply within a fortnight of the employer calling upon him to do so. The further  proceedings will be conducted by affording a reasonable opportunity to the  respondent to defend himself and any report furnished in course thereof or  order passed therein should not be unduly influenced by the order of the  Tribunal.  

7. The entire exercise should be completed by the employer by August  31, 2022 and the respondent will not be entitled to seek any adjournment in  course of the proceedings. 

8. WP(C) No. 444 of 2020 is disposed of. 

9. There will be no order as to costs. 

(W. Diengdoh) (Sanjib Banerjee) Judge Chief Justice 

Meghalaya 

22.03.2022 

 Sylvana PS” 

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