1 Cr. Appeal (SJ).1675 of 2003 

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI 

Cr. Appeal (SJ) No.1675 of 2003 

(Against the Judgment of Conviction and order of sentence dated  20.11.2003 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-V,  Deoghar in S.T. No.281 of 2001, arising out of Madhupur P.S. Case No.191  of 2000, corresponding to G.R. No.435 of 2000.) 

1. Ganesh Choudhary 

2. Akhileshwar Choudhary … Appellants 

Versus 

The State of Jharkhand … Respondent 

 — 

 CORAM: HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR  — 

For the Appellants : Mrs. Jasvindar K. Mazumdar, Advocate For the informant 

& injured persons : Mr. Vikash Kumar, Advocate 

For the State : Mr. Md. Hatim, A.P.P.  

Reserved on: 17.11.2021 Pronounced on: 04.02.2022 

This appeal is preferred against the Judgment of Conviction  and order of sentence dated 20.11.2003 passed by the learned  Additional Sessions Judge, FTC-V, Deoghar in S.T. No.281 of 2001,  arising out of Madhupur P.S. Case No.191 of 2000, corresponding to  G.R. No.435 of 2000, whereby and where under the appellant No.1  Ganesh Choudhary is convicted for the offence punishable under  Section 324 of IPC and appellant No.2 Akhileshwar Choudhary is  convicted for the offence punishable under Section 326 of IPC and  further the appellant No.1 was sentenced to undergo rigorous  imprisonment for three years and appellant No.2 was sentenced for  seven years and also a fine of Rs.2,000/- and in case of default of  fine, he will have to undergo further imprisonment of six months. 

2. Briefly stating the prosecution story as unfolded in the written  application dated 12.10.2000 by the informant Rohit Chodhary (PW 6) addressed to Officer In-charge of Madhupur Police Station,  Deoghar, is as under: 

The informant Rohit Choudhary stated that on 12.10.2000 at  7.30 A.M., one Laxman Choudhary armed with lathi, Baikunth  Chaudhary armed with lathi, Ganesh Choudhary (Appellant no.1)  armed with sword, Kamdeo Chaudhary armed with Bhala, Damodar  

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Choudhary armed with lathi, Akhileshwar Chaudhary (Appellant  no.2) armed with Sabbal and Sachidanand armed with Lathi arrived  on plot No.90 area 34 dismal belonging to Nakul Hazam and with  the help of labourers started tilling it. Upon objection from Nakul  Hazam, the aforementioned persons assaulted him (Nakul Hazam)  with lathi, fist and slap then Nakul Hazam fled away from there and  reached in front of his (informant) door, behind whom all the  aforesaid persons chasing him also reached there. He (informant)  tried to intervene asking as to why they were assaulting the poor,  upon which the appellant no. 2 Akhileshwar Chaudhary became  angry and abused him and also assaulted him by a heavy iron,  Sabbal (rod with sharp end) on his right leg due to which his right leg  was fractured and he fell down. Thereafter all the accused persons  started assaulting him by lathi. Having seen his brother being  assaulted, his own brother P.W.1 Krishundeo Chaudhary tried to  save him, but the appellant no.1 Ganesh Chaudhary with an  intention to kill him, assaulted him by sword on his left side of the  head and blood started oozing out from the wound by which he fell  unconscious and others continued to assault him and presuming  him to be dead, they fled away.  

3. On the basis of the aforesaid written application submitted by  the informant PW – 6, a formal FIR was drawn vide Madhupur P.S.  case No.191 of 2000 , District – Deoghar, registered under Sections  147, 148, 149, 341, 323, 324, 325 and 307 of IPC and investigation of  the case commenced. After completion of the investigation, the  charge-sheet was submitted, the case was committed to the Court of  Sessions and thereafter the charges were framed against the  appellants and after the trial, both the appellants named above were  convicted and sentenced by the impugned judgment of conviction  and order of sentence, which is under challenge.  

4. Heard the learned defence counsel appearing on behalf the  appellants, the learned counsel Sri Vikash Kumar appearing on  behalf of the injured persons including informant and the learned  APP appearing on behalf of the State.  

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5. The learned defence counsel instead of arguing the case on  merit submitted on behalf of the appellants that during the  pendency of this appeal, one I.A.(Cr.) No.7698 of 2018 has been filed  jointly on behalf of the appellants and injured-informant P.W.6, his  injured brother Krishnadeo Chaudhary P.W.1 and Nakul Hazam  P.W.2 at whose agricultural field the dispute arose for the  compromise of this case in appeal and therefore in the light of the  said compromise, it is urged on behalf of the appellants to allow this  appeal and in support of his contentions, the learned defence  counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and the learned  counsel appearing on behalf injured-informant P.W.6, his injured  brother Krishnadeo Chaudhary P.W.1 and Nakul Hazam P.W.2  relied upon the rulings of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of  Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of Punjab & Another reported in  (2014) 6 SCC 466 and in the case of Yogendra Yadav & Ors. Vs.  State of Jharkhand & Anr. reported in (2014) 9 SCC 653. 

6. On the other hand, learned APP appearing on behalf of the  State without disputing the factum of compromise, vehemently  opposed the contentions and submitted that there is no legal point  to interfere in the impugned judgment of conviction and order of  sentence as the same is based on cogent and reliable evidences and  the learned court below has rightly appreciated evidences available  on record and opposed such a recourse raised jointly by the  appellants and injured-informant P.W.6, his injured brother  Krishnadeo Chaudhary P.W.1 and Nakul Hazam P.W.2 in the light  of the non-compoundable offences punishable under sections 324  and 326 of the IPC under which the appellants have been convicted.  

Appraisal & Findings 

7. Having heard the learned counsels for the respective parties  perused the material available on record including the lower court  records. 

8. Both the appellants namely Ganesh Choudhary and Akhileshwar  Choudhary have been found guilty and convicted for the offences  punishable under sections 324 & 326 of the IPC respectively. Now it  

4 Cr. Appeal (SJ).1675 of 2003 

is found that informant-injured people and the defence side want to  bear good relations and maintain peace despite the fact that the  offences under which they have been convicted are non compoundable offences within the meaning of Section 320 of Cr.P.C.  The learned counsels appearing on behalf the appellants and the  informant victim side jointly submitted that by virtue of filing a joint  compromise application vide I.A. (Cr.) No.7698 of 2018 in this appeal  they have resolved their dispute as the offences had arisen out of  landed properties dispute between them and all the injured victims  namely injured-informant P.W.6, his injured brother Krishnadeo  Chaudhary P.W.1 and Nakul Hazam P.W.2 and the accused appellants have compromised the dispute and all of them wanted to  compound the appeal as they want to live peacefully. 

9. In view of the aforesaid facts the question before this court is as  to whether this court can compound the offences under sections 326  and 324 of IPC which are non-compoundable. At the outset this  court proceeds to comprehend a few rulings of Hon’ble Supreme  Court as to whether this court taking into the consideration the  amenable and distinctive facts and circumstances of the present case  can compound the offences punishable under sections 324 and 326 of  the IPC which are non-compoundable within the meaning of section  320 of the Cr.P.C. to prevent the abuse of the process of court and/or  to secure the ends of justice. 

10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Gian Singh vs.State of Punjab  (2012)10 SCC 303 laid down following principles: 

 “58. Where the High Court quashes a criminal proceeding having  regard to the fact that the dispute between the offender and the  victim has been settled although the offences are not compoundable,  it does so as in its opinion, continuation of criminal proceedings  will be an exercise in futility and justice in the case demands that  the dispute between the parties is put to an end and peace is  restored; securing the ends of justice being the ultimate guiding  factor.” 

59.xxx xxx xxx 

5 Cr. Appeal (SJ).1675 of 2003 

 60.xxx xxx xxx 

“61. …the power of the High Court in quashing a  criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its  inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power  given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under  Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide  plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be  exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power  viz.:  

 (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of  the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the  criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be  exercised where the offender and the victim have settled  their dispute would depend on the facts and  circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed.  However, before exercise of such power, the High Court  must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.  Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like  murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even  though the victim or victim’s family and the offender have  settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature  and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any  compromise between the victim and the offender in relation  to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of  Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants  while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any  basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such  offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly  and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different  footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the  offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,  partnership or such like transactions or the offences  arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the  family disputes where the wrong is basically private or  personal in nature and the parties have resolved their  entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may  quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because  

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of the compromise between the offender and the victim,  the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and  continuation of the criminal case would put the accused  to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice  would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal  case despite full and complete settlement and  compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court  must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the  interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or  continuation of the criminal proceeding would  tantamount to abuse of process of law despite  settlement and compromise between the victim and the  wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it  is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the  answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High  Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal  proceeding.” 

11. These principles are subsequently reiterated in a number of  cases. In State of Madhya Pradesh vs. Laxmi Narayan & Ors. (2019)  5 SCC 688 elaborating the principle the Hon’ble Supreme Court  observed in para 15 as under:  

“15.1. That the power conferred under Section 482 of the Code  to quash the criminal proceedings for the non-compoundable  offences under Section 320 of the Code can be exercised  having overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil  character, particularly those arising out of commercial  transactions or arising out of matrimonial relationship or  family disputes and when the parties have resolved the entire  dispute amongst themselves;  

15.2. Such power is not to be exercised in those  prosecutions which involved heinous and serious offences  of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc.  Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious  impact on society; 

15.3. Similarly, such power is not to be exercised for the  offences under the special statutes like the Prevention of  Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants  while working in that capacity are not to be quashed merely on  the basis of compromise between the victim and the offender;  

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15.4. xxx xxx xxx  

15.5. While exercising the power under Section 482 of the Code  to quash the criminal proceedings in respect of non compoundable offences, which are private in nature and do  not have a serious impact on society, on the ground that  there is a settlement/compromise between the victim and  the offender, the High Court is required to consider  the antecedents of the accused; the conduct of the  accused, namely, whether the accused was absconding  and why he was absconding, how he had managed  with the complainant to enter into a compromise, etc.” 

12. Further in the case of Yogendra Yadav & Ors. Vs. State of  Jharkhand & Anr. reported in (2014) 9 SCC 653 recapitulating the  Gian Singh’s case Principle (Supra) it has been observed as under :  

“4. ———- Needless to say that offences which are non compoundable cannot be compounded by the court. Courts  draw the power of compounding offences from Section 320 of  the Code. The said provision has to be strictly followed (Gian  Singh v. State of Punjab [(2012) 10 SCC 303). However, in a  given case, the High Court can quash a criminal proceeding  in exercise of its power under Section 482 of the Code having  regard to the fact that the parties have amicably settled their  disputes and the victim has no objection, even though the  offences are non-compoundable. In which cases the High  Court can exercise its discretion to quash the proceedings will  depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Offences  which involve moral turpitude, grave offences like rape,  murder, etc. cannot be effaced by quashing the proceedings  because that will have harmful effect on the society. Such  offences cannot be said to be restricted to two individuals or  two groups. If such offences are quashed, it may send wrong  signal to the society. However, when the High Court is  convinced that the offences are entirely personal in nature  and, therefore, do not affect public peace or tranquillity and  where it feels that quashing of such proceedings on account of  compromise would bring about peace and would secure ends  

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of justice, it should not hesitate to quash them. In such cases,  the prosecution becomes a lame prosecution. Pursuing such a  lame prosecution would be waste of time and energy. That  will also unsettle the compromise and obstruct restoration of  peace. 

13. As a matter of fact from the aforesaid propositions of law  as propounded by the Hon’ble Supreme court in Gian Singh’s  case (Supra), Laxmi Narayan’s case (Supra), and Yogender  Yadav’s Case (Supra) it is now well settled that the offences  which are non-compoundable cannot be compounded by a  criminal Court under the section 320 of the Cr.P.C. In spite of  that there is an scope of compounding the offences by invoking  inherent powers of the High Court vested in it under section 482  of Cr.P.C. in aid to prevent abuse of the process of any court  and/or to secure the ends of justice by taking into consideration  the circumstances surrounding the incident, the manner and  mode under which the compromise has been arrived at between  the parties , and further due consideration to the nature and  seriousness of the offence, in addition to the conduct of the  accused, before and after the incident. But such power is to be  exercised very carefully, diligently and cautiously as observed  by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narinder Singh & Ors. Vs. State of  Punjab & Anr. reported in (2014) 6 SCC 466, as follows :  

“22. Thus, we find that in certain circumstances, this Court  has approved the quashing of proceedings under Section 307  IPC whereas in some other cases, it is held that as the offence is  of serious nature such proceedings cannot be quashed. Though  in each of the aforesaid cases the view taken by this Court may  be justified on its own facts, at the same time this Court owes  an explanation as to why two different approaches are adopted  in various cases. The law declared by this Court in the form of  judgments becomes binding precedent for the High Courts and  the subordinate courts, to follow under Article 141 of the  Constitution of India. Stare decisis is the fundamental  

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principle of judicial decision-making which requires  “certainty” too in law so that in a given set of facts the course  of action which law shall take is discernible and predictable.  Unless that is achieved, the very doctrine of stare decisis will  lose its significance. The related objective of the doctrine of  stare decisis is to put a curb on the personal preferences and  priors of individual Judges. In a way, it achieves equality of  treatment as well, inasmuch as two different persons faced  with similar circumstances would be given identical treatment  at the hands of law. It has, therefore, support from the human  sense of justice as well. The force of precedent in the law is  heightened, in the words of Karl Llewellyn, by “that curious,  almost universal sense of justice which urges that all men are  to be treated alike in like circumstances”. 

23. As there is a close relation between equality and justice, it  should be clearly discernible as to how the two prosecutions  under Section 307 IPC are different in nature and therefore are  given different treatment. With this ideal objective in mind, we  are proceeding to discuss the subject at length. It is for this  reason we deem it appropriate to lay down some distinct,  definite and clear guidelines which can be kept in mind by the  High Courts to take a view as to under what circumstances it  should accept the settlement between the parties and quash the  proceedings and under what circumstances it should refrain  from doing so. We make it clear that though there would be a  general discussion in this behalf as well, the matter is  examined in the context of the offences under Section 307  IPC.” 

24. xxx xxx xxx 

25. xxx xxx xxx 

26. Having said so, we would hasten to add that though it is a  serious offence as the accused person(s) attempted to take the  life of another person/victim, at the same time the court cannot  be oblivious to hard realities that many times whenever there  is a quarrel between the parties leading to physical commotion  

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and sustaining of injury by either or both the parties, there is a  tendency to give it a slant of an offence under Section 307 IPC  as well. Therefore, only because FIR/charge-sheet incorporates  the provision of Section 307 IPC would not, by itself, be a  ground to reject the petition under Section 482 of the Code and  refuse to accept the settlement between the parties. We are,  therefore, of the opinion that while taking a call as to whether  compromise in such cases should be effected or not, the High  Court should go by the nature of injury sustained, the portion  of the bodies where the injuries were inflicted (namely,  whether injuries are caused at the vital/delicate parts of the  body) and the nature of weapons used, etc. On that basis, if it  is found that there is a strong possibility of proving the charge  under Section 307 IPC, once the evidence to that effect is led  and injuries proved, the Court should not accept settlement  between the parties. On the other hand, on the basis of prima  facie assessment of the aforesaid circumstances, if the High  Court forms an opinion that provisions of Section 307 IPC  were unnecessarily included in the charge-sheet, the Court can  accept the plea of compounding of the offence based on  settlement between the parties. 

14. In the backdrop of well defined limit and boundary for  compounding the offences which are non-compoundable in nature,  it is manifest that responsive justice is the genesis of delivering  justice. In a society governed by rule of law, just and fair  expectations of law abiding citizen are the essence of justice delivery  system. In a criminal case where offences are of pure personal  nature, not heinous or brutal and not adversely affecting the society  at large being a private nature and the parties concerned have  willingly and voluntarily settled their differences amicably, it would  be in the fitness of things that non-compoundable offences can be  allowed to be compounded, of course with righteousness and  probity irrespective of the fact that the trial has already been  concluded and the post conviction compromise has taken place at  

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the appellate stage.  

15. In the present case it is found that there is a long history of  enmity between the parties including prosecution and defence. It is  a personal nature of dispute between the parties arising out of the  landed properties of one Nakul Hazam pertaining to plot no.90  measuring an area of 34 decimals. In the purported dispute three  persons were injured namely informant P.W.6, his brother  Krishnadeo Chaudhary P.W.1 and one Nakul Hazam P.W.2. It is  found that during the pendency of this appeal a joint compromise  application has been filed vide the I.A.(Cr.) No. 7698 of 2018 by all  the three injured persons namely injured-informant P.W.6, his  injured brother Krishnadeo Chaudhary P.W.1 and Nakul Hazam  P.W.2 at one hand and by the appellants namely Ganesh  Choudhary and Akhileshwar Choudhary on the other hand supported with affidavits by each of the parties. From perusal of  this joint interlocutory application on behalf of the appellants,  informant and injured persons, it is found that in this joint  compromise petition, it has been stated that during the pendency of  this case, the informant, injured persons as well as appellants have  entered into a compromise and all the parties concerned have  mutually settled their dispute once and for all and they wanted to  maintain good and healthy relations being neighbours. Further, it is  found that on the intervention of close relatives and well-wishers of  both the parties including the appellants and informant people  compromised the matter amongst themselves and now the  informant and injured persons do not want to proceed with the  instant appeal. Under such circumstances it is evident that a mutual  compromise has taken place between both the parties with respect  to a dispute which is purely a personal nature of dispute between  them inasmuch as neither public policy is involved nor any trace of  brutality or ruthlessness in the purported offence nor affecting the  peace ,tranquillity and conscious of the society and therefore it is a  fit case, where this Court can allow the instant appeal be  compounded taking into consideration the mutual compromise  

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between both the parties as they have settled their entire disputes  and differences amicably to dispel their misunderstanding without  any coercion and threat as the present joint compromise petition  has been filed through the aforesaid interlocutory application  willingly and voluntarily by both the parties. Further it is found  that the incident took place more than 20 years back and both the  parties being neighbours are living in a harmonious atmosphere  and hence for the ends of justice let the offences punishable under  sections 324 and 326 be compounded under the circumstances of  the present case. As a consequence the Judgment of Conviction and  order of sentence dated 20.11.2003 passed by the learned Additional  Sessions Judge, FTC-V, Deoghar in S.T. No.281 of 2001, arising out  of Madhupur P.S. Case No.191 of 2000, corresponding to G.R.  No.435 of 2000, is hereby set-aside and this appeal is allowed as  compounded. Since the appellants are on bail, they are discharged  from the liability of the bail bonds. 

16. In result this appeal is allowed as above. 

17. The I.A. (Cr.) No. 7698 of 2018 also stands disposed off.  

18. Let the Lower Court Record be sent back forthwith to the  concerned court below along with the copy of this judgment. 

(Navneet Kumar, J.) 

Jharkhand High Court, Ranchi, 

Dated the 04/02/2022/NAFR 

R.Kumar/- 

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