caselaws
Supreme Court of India
Jaibunisha vs Meherban on 18 January, 2022Author: Vineet Saran
Bench: Vineet Saran, B.V. Nagarathna
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NONREPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.76 OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 6329 OF 2020)
JAIBUNISHA …..APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
MEHARBAN & ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)
WITH
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.77 OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO. 1337 OF 2021)
JAIBUNISHA …..APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
JUMMA & ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
NAGARATHNA J.
These appeals have been preferred by the informant
appellant assailing the orders dated 7 th October, 2020 and 17th
November, 2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature at
Allahabad in Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application Nos.
Signature Not Verified 29759 of 2020 and 39886 of 2021 respectively whereby bail has
Digitally signed by
DEEPAK SINGH
Date: 2022.01.18
13:43:59 IST
Reason: been granted to six persons accused in Sardhana P.S. Crime
Case No.955 of 2018.
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2. It is the case of the appellant that she is the mother of the
deceased Yameen. She is stated to be an eyewitness to the attack
on her sons, namely Yameen and Mobin and her husband,
Jamshed. The appellant herein is the person who lodged the
First Information Report being FIR No. 955/2018 for offences
under sections 147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with
section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the ‘IPC’). In all
eleven accused were named in the FIR, being respondent no.1 in
Criminal Appeal No.76/2022, namely Meherban; respondent no.
1 to 5 in Criminal Appeal No.77/2022, namely Jumma,
Hakmeen, Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz, and five more persons
namely, Bhoora, Shahid, Sullad, Yamin and Dev.
3. That FIR No. 955/2018 dated 27th August, 2018 is stated
to have been filed by the appellant herein at around 21:05 hrs in
the night stating that at around 18:00 hrs of the same day the
accused, armed with swords and knives entered appellant’s
house with a common intention to attack and kill Yameen and
Mobin, sons of the appellant and Jamshed, appellant’s husband.
That on entering the house, they started hurling abuses and
attacked the sons and husband of the appellant, attempting to
kill them. The neighbours of the appellant came to their rescue.
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However, as a result of such assault, Yameen died and Mobin
and Jamshed sustained serious injuries. The informant
appellant has further stated that there was a preexisting
dispute between the deceased and Bhoora, one among the
accused, which was settled by the residents of their locality.
However, the accused, in continuation of the said dispute
attacked the sons and the husband of the appellant and killed
one of her sons, namely, Yameen.
4. Appellant’s son, Mobin was medically examined on the date
of the incident and the medical report records that that incised
wounds were found on his hand, which could be caused by a
sharp edged object. The injury report of Jamshed described three
injuries, i.e. an incised wound on the scalp, abrasion and
contusion on the back and arm.
5. After conducting an investigation, the Police filed a
chargesheet only against three accused, namely, Sullad, Bhoora
alias Shadab and Yamin. They were subsequently arrested by
the Police. The accusedrespondents in the instant appeals are
the eight other accused named in the FIR but were not
chargesheeted.
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6. The appellant filed an application under section 319 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as
“CrPC” for the sake of brevity) for summoning the accused
respondents herein who were not charge sheeted by the Police.
The accusedrespondents were summoned by the Additional
Sessions Judge by order dated 21st September, 2019.
7. On the date of commencement of trial before the Additional
District and Sessions Judge, Meerut, the accused Sullad, Bhoora
alias Shadab and Yamin were presented before the Court by the
Police. However, the accusedrespondents summoned under
section 319 of the CrPC, failed to appear before the trial court.
Therefore, the Additional District and Sessions Judge by order
dated 15th October, 2019 issued NonBailable Warrants against
the respondents herein.
8. On the next date fixed for trial, the accusedrespondents
against whom NonBailable Warrants were issued, again failed to
appear before the court and it was reported by the Police that the
said accused were absconding and were not found even at their
residences. The Additional District and Sessions Judge by order
dated 4th November, 2019 issued a proclamation under section
82 of the CrPC against the accusedrespondents.
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9. In the meantime, the accusedrespondents summoned by
the Sessions Court preferred an application under section 482 of
the CrPC before the High Court, praying for an order to quash
the order dated 21st September, 2019 whereby the respondents
had been summoned to appear before the Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Meerut. By order dated 11 th November, 2019,
the High Court dismissed the said application and granted 30
days’ time to the accused to surrender before the Trial Court.
The accusedrespondents assailed the said order by preferring a
Special Leave Petition, being SLP (Crl.) No. 10947/2019, before
this Court, which came to be dismissed by order dated 6 th
December 2019.
10. On 8th January, 2020, the next date on which the sessions
trial was presented, the accusedrespondents once again failed
to appear notwithstanding the direction by this Court to
surrender. Hence the Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut, by
order dated 8th January, 2020, directed that proceedings for
attachment of property of the accusedrespondents be initiated
under section 83 of the CrPC.
11. The accusedrespondents were arrested by the Police on 5 th
February, 2020 and remained in judicial custody till they were
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enlarged on bail by the impugned orders of the High Court dated
7th October, 2020 and 17th November 2020.
12. Accusedrespondent Meherban preferred a bail application
before the Court of the Additional Sessions Judge, Meerut. The
same came to be rejected by order dated 8th July, 2020.
Similarly, the bail applications preferred by accusedrespondents
Jumma, Hakmeen, Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz were also rejected
by a separate order dated 8th July, 2020, having regard to the
seriousness of the offences alleged against the respondents.
13. Accusedrespondent Meherban preferred a bail application
before the High Court and the same was allowed by the
impugned order dated 7th October 2020 with a direction that the
accused be released on bail. Subsequently, the bail application
preferred by the accusedrespondents Jumma, Hakmeen,
Yaseen, Arshad and Firoz was also allowed by the High Court by
impugned order dated 17th November 2020 by relying on the
order granting bail to coaccused Meherban. Being aggrieved, the
appellant has preferred these appeals before this Court.
14. We have heard Sri. Ronak Karanpuria, learned counsel for
the appellant, Ms. Kanishka Prasad, learned counsel for
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accused respondents and Sri. R.K. Raizada, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh and perused
the material on record.
15. The Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
impugned orders of the High Court have been passed without
exercising jurisdiction in a judicious manner. In support of this
contention, it was submitted that the accusedrespondents had
failed to appear before the Trial Court notwithstanding multiple
directions issued by the Trial Court, High Court and even this
Court to that effect. That they were under judicial custody for a
period less than nine months and had earlier absconded but
have now been granted bail by the High Court contrary to the
settled principles of law and the judgments of this Court. That by
directing that the accused be released on bail, the High Court
has invited the risk of them absconding again and that this
would prove to be prejudicial to the investigation and trial.
It was further contended on behalf of the appellant that the
possibility of the accused respondents tampering with evidence
and/or influencing witnesses while on bail, cannot be ruled out.
16. Further it was urged that the High Court has not assigned
reasons for the grant of bail in the instant cases. That the High
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Court could not have granted bail to the accused having scant
regard to the gravity of the offences alleged against them.
According to the learned counsel for the appellant, the High
Court in a very cryptic order de hors any reasoning has granted
bail to the accusedrespondents. It was submitted on behalf of
the mother of the deceased, that the instant appeals may be
allowed by setting aside the impugned orders of the High Court.
In support of his submission, learned counsel for the appellant
has relied upon certain judgments of this Court which shall be
referred to later.
17. Per contra, Ms. Kanishka Prasad, learned counsel for
accused respondents supported the impugned orders and
submitted that the same do not suffer from any infirmity
warranting interference by this Court. That the informant
appellant has narrated an untrue version of events in order to
falsely implicate the accused. The learned counsel for the
respondents has stated that there was a scuffle between the
sons and the husband of the appellant, and the accused
respondents on the day of the alleged incident. That four of the
accused have also been seriously injured as a result of the
attack by appellant’s husband and sons. That an FIR in this
regard had been lodged against the appellant, her sons and
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husband, in connection with which case the said persons have
been granted bail by the competent court. That no prima facie
case has been made out against the accused and this is
evidenced by the fact that they were not chargesheeted.
It has further been submitted that the accused
respondents have no criminal antecedents and therefore, the
High Court acted in accordance with law in enlarging the
accusedrespondents on bail.
It has also been contended that a court deciding a bail
application should avoid elaborate discussion on merits of the
case as detailed discussion of facts at a pretrial stage is bound
to prejudice fair trial.
It was submitted that the allegations against the
respondentaccused are false and hence the impugned orders of
the High Court do not call for any interference in these appeals.
18. Having regard to the contention of Sri. Ronak Karanpuria,
learned counsel for the appellant that the impugned orders
granting bail to the accused respondents are bereft of any
reasoning and they are cryptic and bail has been granted in a
casual manner, we extract those portions of the impugned
orders dated 7th October, 2020 and 17th November, 2020 passed
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by the High Court which provide the “reasoning” of the Court for
granting bail, as under:
Impugned Order dated 7th October, 2020
“Without expressing any opinion on the
merits of the case and considering the
nature of accusation and the severity of
punishment in case of conviction and the
nature of supporting evidence, reasonable
apprehension of tampering of the witnesses
and prima facie satisfaction of the Court in
support of the charge, the applicant is
entitled to be released on bail in this case.
Let the applicant Meharban involved in Case
Crime No. 955 of 2018 under sections 147,
148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506, 34 I.P.C.,
police station Sardhana, District Meerut be
released on bail on his furnishing a personal
bond of Rs. One lac with two sureties (out of
which one should be of his family member)
each in the like amount to the satisfaction of
the court concerned with the following
conditions.
(i) The applicant shall file an undertaking
to the effect that he shall not seek any
adjournment on the dates fixed for
evidence when the witnesses are
present in court. In case of default of
this condition, it shall be open for the
trial court to treat it as abuse of liberty
of bail and pass orders in accordance
with law.
(ii) The applicant shall remain present
before the trial court on each date
fixed, either personally or through his
counsel. In case of his absence,
without sufficient cause, the trial court
may proceed against him under
Section 229A of the Indian Penal
Code.
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(iii) In case, the applicant misuses the
liberty of bail during trial and in order
to secure his presence proclamation
under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and
the applicant fails to appear before the
court on the date fixed in such
proclamation, then, the trial court
shall initiate proceedings against him,
in accordance with law, under Section
174A of the Indian Penal Code.
(iv) The applicant shall remain present, in
person, before the trial court on the
dates fixed for (i) opening of the case,
(ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording
of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
If in the opinion of the trial court
absence of the applicant is deliberate
or without sufficient cause, then it
shall be open for the trial court to treat
such default as abuse of liberty of bail
and proceed against him in accordance
with law.
It is further directed that the identity, status
and residence proof of the sureties be
verified by the authorities concerned before
they are accepted. In case of breach of any of
the above conditions, the trial court will be
liberty to cancel the bail.”
Impugned Order dated 17th November, 2020
“Without expressing any opinion on the
merits of the case and considering the
nature of accusation and the severity of
punishment in case of conviction and the
nature of supporting evidence, reasonable
apprehension of tampering of the witnesses
and prima facie satisfaction of the Court in
support of the charge, the applicant is
entitled to be released on bail in this case.
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Let the applicants Jumma, Hakmeen,
Yaseen, Arshad, and Firoz involved in
aforesaid case crime be released on bail on
his furnishing a personal bond and two
sureties each in the like amount to the
satisfaction of the court concerned with the
following conditions which are being
imposed in the interest of justice:
(i) The applicants shall file an
undertaking to the effect that they
shall not seek any adjournment on the
dates fixed for evidence when the
witnesses are present in court. In case
of default of this condition, it shall be
open for the trial court to treat it as
abuse of liberty of bail and pass orders
in accordance with law.
(ii) The applicants shall remain present
before the trial court on each date
fixed, either personally or through his
counsel. In case of his absence,
without sufficient cause, the trial court
may proceed against him under
Section 229A of the Indian Penal
Code.
(iii) In case, the applicants misuses the
liberty of bail during trial and in order
to secure his presence proclamation
under Section 82 Cr.P.C. is issued and
the applicants fails to appear before
the court on the date fixed in such
proclamation, then, the trial court
shall initiate proceedings against him,
in accordance with law, under Section
174A of the Indian Penal Code.
(iv) The applicants shall remain present, in
person, before the trial court on the
dates fixed for (i) opening of the case,
(ii) framing of charge and (iii) recording
of statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C.
If in the opinion of the trial court
absence of the applicant is deliberate
or without sufficient cause, then it
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shall be open for the trial court to treat
such default as abuse of liberty of bail
and proceed against him in accordance
with law.
(v) The party shall file computer generated
copy of such order downloaded from
the official website of High Court of
Allahabad.
(vi) The computer generated copy of such
order shall be self attested by the
counsel of the party concerned.
(vii) The concerned/Authority/Official shall
verify the authenticity of such
computerized copy of the order from
the official website of High Court of
Allahabad and shall make a
declaration of such verification in
writing.
In view of the extraordinary situation
prevailing in the State due to Covid19, the
directions of this Court dated 6.4.2020
passed in Public Interest Litigation No. 564
of 2020 (In re vs. State of U.P.), shall also be
complied.
The order read thus:
Looking to impediments in arranging
sureties because of lockdown, while invoking
powers under Article 226 and 227 of the
Constitution of India, we deem it appropriate
to order that all the accusedapplicants
whose bail application came to be allowed on
or after 15th March, 2020 but have not been
released due to nonavailability of sureties as
a consequence to lockdown may be released
on executing personal bond as ordered by
the Court or to the satisfaction of the jail
authorities where such accused is
imprisoned, provided the accusedapplicants
undertakes to furnish required sureties
within a period of one month from the date
of his/her actual release.”
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19. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to the
judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to an
accused as under:
a) In Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. vs. Public
Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh (1978) 1
SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content
of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of
liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key
factors that have to be considered while granting bail,
which are extracted as under:
“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the charge is
the vital factor and the nature of the evidence also is
pertinent. The punishment to which the party may
be liable, if convicted or conviction is confirmed, also
bears upon the issue.
8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the
course of justice would be thwarted by him who
seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to be
freed for the time being.
9. Thus the legal principles and practice validate the
Court considering the likelihood of the applicant
interfering with witnesses for the prosecution or
otherwise polluting the process of justice. It is not
only traditional but rational, in this context, to
enquire into the antecedents of a man who is
applying for bail to find whether he has a bad record
– particularly a record which suggests that he is
likely to commit serious offences while on bail. In
regard to habituals, it is part of criminological
history that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict further
about the criminal record of a defendant, is therefore
not an exercise in irrelevance.”
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b) In Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of Delhi & ORS –
(2001) 4 SCC 280 this Court highlighted the aspects
which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an
application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as
follows:
“The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be
exercised on the basis of well settled principles
having regard to the circumstances of each case
and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting
the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment
which conviction will entail, the character,
behavior, means and standing of the accused,
circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the
presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered
with, the larger interests of the public or State
and similar other considerations. It has also to
be kept in mind that for the purposes of
granting the bail the Legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead
of “the evidence” which means the court dealing
with the grant of bail can only satisfy it as to
whether there is a genuine case against the
accused and that the prosecution will be able to
produce prima facie evidence in support of the
charge.”
c) This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay vs. Sudarshan
Singh – (2002) 3 SCC 598, speaking through Banerjee, J.,
emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of
16
bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. This Court
highlighted that bail cannot be granted as a matter of
course, bereft of cogent reasoning.
d) In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias
Pappu Yadav & Anr. – (2004) 7 SCC 528, this Court held
that although it is established that a court considering a
bail application cannot undertake a detailed examination
of evidence and an elaborate discussion on the merits of
the case, the court is required to indicate the prima facie
reasons justifying the grant of bail.
e) In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chaterjee (2010)
14 SCC 496 this Court observed that where a High Court
has granted bail mechanically, the said order would suffer
from the vice of nonapplication of mind, rendering it
illegal. This Court has enumerated the circumstances
under which an order granting bail may be set aside.
f) Another factor which should guide the courts’ decision in
deciding a bail application is the period of custody.
However, as noted in Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj Singh
@ Lalla Bahu & Anr. – (2012) 9 SCC 446, the period of
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custody has to be weighed simultaneously with the totality
of the circumstances and the criminal antecedents of the
accused, if any. Further, the circumstances which may
justify the grant of bail are to be considered in the larger
context of the societal concern involved in releasing an
accused, in juxtaposition to individual liberty of the
accused seeking bail.
g) In Neeru Yadav vs. State of UP & Anr. – (2016) 15 SCC
422, after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court
on the considerations to be placed at balance while
deciding to grant bail, observed through Dipak Misra, J.
(as His Lordship then was) in paragraph18 as under:
18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat
with profit that it is not an appeal for cancellation
of bail as the cancellation is not sought because of
supervening circumstances. The annulment of the
order passed by the High Court is sought as many
relevant factors have not been taken into
consideration which includes the criminal
antecedents of the accused and that makes the
order a deviant one. Therefore, the inevitable result
is the lancination of the impugned order.”
h) In Anil Kumar Yadav v. State (NCT of Delhi) – (2018) 12
SCC 129, this Court, while considering an appeal from an
order of cancellation of bail, has spelt out some of the
significant considerations of which a court must be
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mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so, this
Court has stated that while it is not possible to prescribe
an exhaustive list of considerations which are to guide a
court in deciding a bail application, the primary requisite of
an order granting bail, is that it should result from
judicious exercise of the court’s discretion.
i) Recently in Bhoopendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan &
Anr. – 2021 SCC Online SC 1020, this Court made
observations with respect to the exercise of appellate power
to determine whether bail has been granted for valid
reasons as distinguished from an application for
cancellation of bail. i.e. this Court distinguished between
setting aside a perverse order granting bail visavis
cancellation of bail on the ground that the accused has
misconducted himself or because of some new facts
requiring such cancellation. Quoting Mahipal vs. Rajesh
Kumar (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court observed as under:
“16. The considerations that guide the power of
an appellate court in assessing the correctness of
an order granting bail stand on a different
footing from an assessment of an application for
the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an
order granting bail is tested on the anvil of
whether there was an improper or arbitrary
exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail. The
test is whether the order granting bail is
perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other
hand, an application for cancellation of bail is
generally examined on the anvil of the existence
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of supervening circumstances or violations of the
conditions of bail by a person to whom bail has
been granted.”
j) The most recent judgment of this Court on the aspect of
application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise
of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the
accused is Brijmani Devi v. Pappu Kumar and Anr. –
Criminal Appeal No. 1663/2021, wherein a three Judge
Bench of this Court, while setting aside an unreasoned
and casual order of the High Court granting bail to the
accused, observed as follows:
“While we are conscious of the fact that liberty of
an individual is an invaluable right, at the same
time while considering an application for bail
Courts cannot lose sight of the serious nature of
the accusations against an accused and the facts
that have a bearing in the case, particularly,
when the accusations may not be false, frivolous
or vexatious in nature but are supported by
adequate material brought on record so as to
enable a Court to arrive at a prima facie
conclusion. While considering an application for
grant of bail a prima facie conclusion must be
supported by reasons and must be arrived at
after having regard to the vital facts of the case
brought on record. Due consideration must be
given to facts suggestive of the nature of crime,
the criminal antecedents of the accused, if any,
and the nature of punishment that would follow
a conviction visàvis the offence/s alleged
against an accused.”
20. On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision
arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasijudicial
20
authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this Court
in Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. Vs. Masood
Ahmed Khan & Ors. – (2010) 9 SCC 496, wherein after
referring to a number of judgments this Court summarised at
paragraph 47 the law on the point. The relevant principles for
the purpose of this case are extracted as under:
(a) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant to serve the
wider principle of justice that justice must not only be
done it must also appear to be done as well.
(b) Recording of reasons also operates as a valid restraint on
any possible arbitrary exercise of judicial and quasi
judicial or even administrative power.
(c) Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by
the decisionmaker on relevant grounds and by
disregarding extraneous considerations.
(d) Reasons have virtually become as indispensable a
component of a decisionmaking process as observing
principles of natural justice by judicial, quasijudicial and
even by administrative bodies.
(e) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries committed to
rule of law and constitutional governance is in favour of
reasoned decisions based on relevant facts. This is
virtually the lifeblood of judicial decisionmaking justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.
(f) Judicial or even quasijudicial opinions these days can be
as different as the judges and authorities who deliver
them. All these decisions serve one common purpose
which is to demonstrate by reason that the relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is important
for sustaining the litigants’ faith in the justice delivery
system.
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(g) Insistence on reason is a requirement for both judicial
accountability and transparency.
(h) If a judge or a quasijudicial authority is not candid
enough about his/her decisionmaking process then it is
impossible to know whether the person deciding is faithful
to the doctrine of precedent or to principles of
incrementalism.
(i) Reasons in support of decisions must be cogent, clear and
succinct. A pretence of reasons or “rubberstamp reasons”
is not to be equated with a valid decisionmaking process.
(j) It cannot be doubted that transparency is the sine qua
non of restraint on abuse of judicial powers. Transparency
in decisionmaking not only makes the judges and
decisionmakers less prone to errors but also makes them
subject to broader scrutiny. (See David Shapiro in Defence
of Judicial Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731
37)
(k) In all common law jurisdictions judgments play a vital role
in setting up precedents for the future. Therefore, for
development of law, requirement of giving reasons for the
decision is of the essence and is virtually a part of “due
process”.
Though the aforesaid judgment was rendered in the context
of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order by the
National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, reliance
could be placed on the said judgment on the need to give reasons
while deciding a matter.
21. The Latin maxim “cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex”
meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason of
22
any particular law ceases, so does the law itself”, is also
apposite.
22. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned
orders above. At the outset, we find that the extracted portions
are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning” of the High
court while granting bail. As evident from the judgments of this
Court referred to above, a court deciding a bail application
cannot grant bail to an accused without having regard to
material aspects of the case such as the allegations made
against the accused; severity of the punishment if the allegations
are proved beyond reasonable doubt and would result in a
conviction; reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced by the accused; tampering of the evidence; the
frivolity in the case of the prosecution; criminal antecedents of
the accused; and a prima facie satisfaction of the Court in
support of the charge against the accused.
While we are conscious of the fact that it is not necessary
for a Court to give elaborate reasons while granting bail
particularly when the case is at the initial stage and the
allegations of the offences by the accused may not have been
crystalised as such, an order de hors any reasoning whatsoever
cannot result in grant of bail. If bail is granted in a casual
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manner, the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail
the order before a higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh
vs. State (Delhi Admn.) 1978 CriLJ 129, when bail has been
granted to an accused, the State may, if new circumstances have
arisen following the grant of such bail, approach the High Court
seeking cancellation of bail under section 439 (2) of the CrPC.
However, if no new circumstances have cropped up since the
grant of bail, the State may prefer an appeal against the order
granting bail, on the ground that the same is perverse or illegal
or has been arrived at by ignoring material aspects which
establish a primafacie case against the accused.
23. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider
the facts of the present cases. The allegations against accused
respondents as well as the contentions raised at the Bar have
been narrated in detail above. On a consideration of the same,
the following aspects of the case would emerge:
a) The allegations against the accusedrespondents are under
147, 148, 452, 324, 307, 302, 504, 506 with section 34 of the
IPC, with regard to murder of the deceased, Yameen and
attempt to murder Mobin and Jamshed. Thus the offences
alleged against the accused are of grave and heinous nature
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inasmuch as there was death of appellant’s son and serious
injuries caused to her husband and another son.
b) That allegedly the accusedrespondents attacked with deadly
weapons such as swords and knives.
c) That there was allegedly a preexisting enmity between the
deceased and Bhoora, one of the accused, which apparently
had been settled by the local residents.
d) The accusedrespondents were summoned by the Trial Court
by order dated 21st September, 2019. The accused preferred
an application under section 482 CrPC praying for an order
quashing the order dated 21st September, 2019. By an order
dated 11th November, 2019, the High Court dismissed the said
application and granted 30 days’ time to the accused to
surrender before the Trial Court. The accusedrespondents
assailed the said order by preferring a Special Leave Petition,
being SLP (Crl.) No. 10947/2019, before this Court, which
came to be dismissed by order dated 6th December 2019.
e) The accusedrespondents resisted arrest for a period of
approximately three and a half months as they were
absconding. The accused failed to surrender before the Trial
Court in gross violation of the directions of the Additional
District and Sessions Judge, the High Court and even this
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Court. This is a glaring instance of gross violation of the
courts’ orders and rule of law.
f) The accusedrespondents had preferred applications before the
Additional District and Sessions Judge which came to be
rejected by separate orders dated 8th July, 2020.
g) The chances of the accused absconding are grave having
regard to their previous conduct, if they are on bail. This
would delay commencement and conclusion of the trial and
consequently have an adverse impact on the cause of justice.
h) The propensity of accusedrespondents tampering with the
evidence and influencing the witnesses is an important factor
to be borne in mind in such cases. As a result, the accused
being beneficiaries of the same cannot be ruled out.
i) The High Court in the impugned orders has failed to consider
the aforestated aspects of the case in the context of the grant
of bail and has granted bail to the accused by cryptic orders.
24. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present cases
in light of the judgments cited above, we do not think that these
cases are fit cases for grant of bail to the accusedrespondents,
having regard to the seriousness of the allegations against them
as well as the aforesaid reasons.
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25. The High Court has lost sight of the aforesaid material
aspects of the cases and has, by a very cryptic and casual
orders, de hors any coherent reasoning, granted bail to the
accusedrespondents. We find that the High Court was not right
in allowing the applications for bail filed by the accused
respondents. Hence the impugned orders dated 7 th May, 2020
and 17th November, 2020 are set aside. The appeals are allowed.
26. The accusedrespondents are on bail. Their bail bonds
stand cancelled and they are directed to surrender before the
concerned jail authorities within a period of two weeks from
today.
……………………………J.
(M.R. SHAH)
……………………….…..J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
NEW DELHI;
18TH JANUARY, 2022.
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