Manoj Kumar Khokhar vs The State Of Rajasthan on 11 January, 2022

caselaws

Supreme Court of India
Manoj Kumar Khokhar vs The State Of Rajasthan on 11 January, 2022Author: B.V. Nagarathna

Bench: M.R. Shah, B.V. Nagarathna

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.36 OF 2022
(ARISING OUT OF SLP(CRL.) NO.4062 OF 2020)

MANOJ KUMAR KHOKHAR …..APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF RAJASTHAN & ANR. ….RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

NAGARATHNA J.

This appeal has been preferred by the

informant­appellant assailing Order dated 7th May, 2020

passed by the High Court of Judicature of Rajasthan, at

Jaipur, in S.B. Criminal Miscellaneous Bail Application No.

3601/2020, whereby bail has been granted to the accused

who is the second respondent in the instant appeal, in

connection with FIR No. 407/2019 Police Station Kalwar.

Signature Not Verified 2. According to the appellant, he is the son of the deceased,
Digitally signed by R
Natarajan

Ram Swaroop Khokhar and is the person who lodged the First
Date: 2022.01.11
16:35:07 IST
Reason:

Information Report being FIR No. 407/2019 on 8 th December,

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2019 for the offence of murder of his father, under Section

302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as

“IPC” for the sake of brevity) against the second respondent­

accused herein viz. Ram Narayan Jat.

3. The said FIR dated 8th December, 2019 had been lodged by

the appellant herein between 23:00 hrs and 23:30 hrs in the

night stating that earlier on that day, at about 16:00 hrs, his

father, aged about 55 years, was attacked by the respondent­

accused, at the Lalpura Pachar bus stand, with the intention

of killing him. That the respondent­accused pinned the

deceased to the ground, sat on his chest and forcefully

strangled him, thereby causing his death. Some associates of

the respondent­accused who were present at the spot of the

incident, helped him in attacking and killing the deceased.

The informant­appellant further stated in the FIR that there

was a pre­existing rivalry between the respondent­accused,

his brothers namely, Arjun, Satyanarayn and Okramal and

the deceased. That the deceased had previously informed the

appellant and certain family members about such rivalry and

had communicated that he was apprehensive about his safety

owing to the same. That even on the day of the incident, the

respondent­accused along with one of his brothers, Okramal

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had gone to the appellant’s house in the morning and had

abused the deceased. The report of the post­mortem

examination conducted on 9th December, 2019 has recorded

that the deceased had died as a result of “asphyxia due to

ante mortem strangulation.”

4. The respondent­accused was arrested in connection with

the said FIR No. 407/2019 on 10 th December, 2019 and was

sent to judicial custody. The respondent­accused remained

under judicial custody for a period of nearly one year and five

months till he was granted bail by the High Court vide

impugned order.

5. A charge sheet was submitted by the police before the

Court of the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Jaipur after

conducting an investigation in relation to the aforesaid FIR.

The Additional Metropolitan Magistrate by Order dated 12 th

March, 2020 took cognizance of the offence and committed

the case to the District and Sessions Court for trial and

adjudication.

6. The respondent­accused had earlier preferred applications

seeking bail, under Section 437 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (for short, the “CrPC”) before the Court of

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Additional Metropolitan Magistrate No.9, Jaipur Metropolitan,

Jaipur, on two occasions. The same came to be rejected by

orders dated 23rd January, 2020 and 6th March, 2020. The

accused had also preferred a bail application under Section

439 of the CrPC which was rejected by the Additional

Sessions Judge No.5, Jaipur Metropolitan by order dated 12 th

March, 2020 having regard to the gravity of the offences

alleged against the accused. The respondent­accused

preferred another bail application before the High Court and

by the impugned order dated 7th May, 2020, the High Court

has enlarged him on bail. Being aggrieved by the grant of bail

to the respondent­accused, the informant­appellant has

preferred the instant appeal before this Court.

7. We have heard Sri. Basant R., learned Senior Counsel for

the appellant and Sri. Aditya Kumar Choudhary, learned

Counsel for respondent­accused and have perused the

material on record.

8. Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant submitted that

the deceased had been elected in 2015 as the Deputy

Sarpanch of Mandha Bhopawaspachar village, Jhotwara

Tehsil, Jaipur, Rajasthan. That he was elected to such post

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despite opposition from the accused and his family. That the

family of the accused exercised significant influence in the

village and were trying to dissuade the deceased from

contesting the election to the post of Sarpanch, to be held in

February 2020. Owing to such political enmity, the

respondent­accused along with his brothers Arjun,

Satyanarayn and Okramal had gone to the appellant’s house

in the morning on 8th December, 2019 and abused the

deceased and later on the same day, the deceased was killed.

According to the appellant, the deceased was suffering from

54% permanent physical impairment of both his legs and had

therefore been overpowered by the respondent­accused who

had pinned him to the ground, sat on his chest and throttled

his neck, resulting in his death.

9. Further it was urged that the High Court has not exercised

its discretion judiciously in granting bail to the respondent­

accused. That the High Court has not taken into

consideration the gravity of the offence alleged and the grave

manner in which the offence was committed against a person

incapable of defending himself owing to physical impairment.

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10. It was submitted that the factum of previous enmity

between the family of the accused and the deceased has not

been taken into consideration by the High Court in the

context of the allegations against the accused with regard to

the grant of bail. That the possibility of respondent­accused, a

person exercising high political influence in Bhopawaspachar

village, absconding or threatening the witnesses or the family

of the deceased, thereby having a bearing on the trial, if

released on bail could not be ruled out. That the police were

initially reluctant to even register an FIR against the

respondent­accused. In fact, the accused was arrested by the

police on 10th December, 2019 only as a result of the protest

(dharna) carried out by the family members of the deceased

outside the police station. It was contended that the accused,

being a very influential person in the village, could influence

the course of trial by tampering with evidence and influencing

the witnesses.

According to the learned Senior Counsel for the

appellant, the High Court has not assigned reasons for grant

of bail in the instant case wherein commission of a heinous

crime has been alleged against the accused, for which, the

accused, if convicted, could be sentenced to life imprisonment

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or even death penalty. That the High Court in a very cryptic

order, de hors any reasoning has granted bail to the

respondent­accused. It was urged that the grant of bail to the

respondent­accused was contrary to the settled principles of

law and the judgments of this Court. It was submitted on

behalf of the appellant, who is the son of the deceased, that

this appeal may be allowed by setting aside the impugned

order.

11. In support of his submissions, learned Senior Counsel for

the appellant placed reliance on certain decisions of this

Court which shall be referred to later.

12. Per contra, Sri. Aditya Kumar Choudhary, learned

counsel for respondent­accused submitted that the impugned

order does not suffer from any infirmity warranting any

interference by this Court. That the informant­appellant has

narrated an untrue version of events in order to falsely

implicate the accused. Existence of past enmity between the

families of the deceased and the accused has been

categorically denied. It has been stated that the two families

maintained cordial relations, which fact is evidenced by the

findings in the charge sheet dated 7 th February 2020, which

records that the deceased and the respondent­accused

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belonged to the same village and they used to play cards

together at the Lalpura bus stand every day since their

retirement and there is no evidence which is suggestive of

enmity between them. That the sudden scuffle between the

deceased and the accused on 8th December, 2019 was an

isolated incident and was not in connection with or in

continuation of any pre­existing dispute between them.

It was further submitted that there was a considerable

and unexplained delay by the informant­appellant in lodging

the FIR which is proof of the fact that the same was lodged as

an afterthought and therefore does not bring out the true

narration of facts. In support of his submission as to the false

nature of the appellent’s version of the incident, learned

counsel for the respondent­accused has relied on the

statements of the eye­witnesses to the incident stating that

there was a sudden scuffle between the deceased and the

respondent­accused on the date of the incident and the

accused throttled the neck of the deceased. After being

separated, the deceased sat on a bench in the bus­stop but

later became unconscious and was immediately taken to the

hospital where he died. It has further been stated by an eye­

8
witness, namely, Mangalchand that the brothers of accused

were not present at the time of the incident.

Learned counsel for the respondent­accused referred to

Niranjan Singh and Anr. vs. Prabhakar Rajaram Kharote

and Ors, [1980] 2 SCC 559 to contend that a court deciding

a bail application should avoid elaborate discussion on merits

of the case as detailed discussion of facts at a pre­trial stage

is bound to prejudice fair trial.

Further, learned counsel for the respondent­accused

submitted that the investigation in relation to FIR No.

407/2019 is complete in all respects and charge sheet has

been submitted. Therefore, there arises no question as to

influencing any witness or tampering with the evidence. That

the accused has deep roots in society and will therefore not

attempt to abscond. Also, the accused has no criminal

antecedents and the incident in question occurred as a result

of a sudden scuffle and therefore, prima facie, offence under

section 300 of the IPC has not been made out against the

accused. Hence, the impugned order granting bail to the

respondent­accused does not call for interference by this

Court.

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13. Having regard to the contention of Sri. Basant R., learned

Senior Counsel for the informant­appellant that the impugned

order granting bail to the respondent­accused is bereft of any

reasoning and that such order is casual and cryptic, we

extract the portion of the impugned order dated 7th May, 2020

passed by the High Court which is the “reasoning” of the

Court for granting bail, as under:

“I have considered the submissions and
perused the challan papers and the post­
mortem report, but without expressing any
opinion on the merits and demerits of the case,
I deem it appropriate to enlarge the accused­
petitioner on bail.

Therefore, this bail application is allowed and it
is directed that accused­petitioner namely, Ram
Narayan Jat S/o Shri Bhinva Ram shall be
released on bail under section 439 Cr.P.C. in
connection with aforesaid FIR, provided he
furnishes a personal bond in the sum of Rs.
50,000/­ together with one surety in the like
amount to the satisfaction of the concerned
Magistrate with the stipulation that he shall
comply with all the conditions laid down under
Section 437 (3) Cr.P.C.”

14. Before proceeding further, it would be useful to refer to

the judgments of this Court in the matter of granting bail to

an accused as under:

a) In Gudikanti Narasimhulu & Ors. vs. Public

Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh ­­ (1978) 1

SCC 240, Krishna Iyer, J., while elaborating on the content

10
 of Article 21 of the Constitution of India in the context of

liberty of a person under trial, has laid down the key

factors that have to be considered while granting bail,

which are extracted as under:

“7. It is thus obvious that the nature of the
charge is the vital factor and the nature of the
evidence also is pertinent. The punishment to
which the party may be liable, if convicted or
conviction is confirmed, also bears upon the
issue.

8. Another relevant factor is as to whether the
course of justice would be thwarted by him who
seeks the benignant jurisdiction of the Court to
be freed for the time being.

9. Thus the legal principles and practice
validate the Court considering the likelihood of
the applicant interfering with witnesses for the
prosecution or otherwise polluting the process
of justice. It is not only traditional but rational,
in this context, to enquire into the antecedents
of a man who is applying for bail to find
whether he has a bad record – particularly a
record which suggests that he is likely to
commit serious offences while on bail. In regard
to habituals, it is part of criminological history
that a thoughtless bail order has enabled the
bailee to exploit the opportunity to inflict
further about the criminal record of a
defendant, is therefore not an exercise in
irrelevance.”

b) In Prahlad Singh Bhati vs. NCT of Delhi & ORS –

(2001) 4 SCC 280 this Court highlighted the aspects

which are to be considered by a court while dealing with an

application seeking bail. The same may be extracted as

follows:

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 “The jurisdiction to grant bail has to be
exercised on the basis of well settled principles
having regard to the circumstances of each case
and not in an arbitrary manner. While granting
the bail, the court has to keep in mind the
nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in
support thereof, the severity of the punishment
which conviction will entail, the character,
behavior, means and standing of the accused,
circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused, reasonable possibility of securing the
presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable
apprehension of the witnesses being tampered
with, the larger interests of the public or State
and similar other considerations. It has also to
be kept in mind that for the purposes of
granting the bail the Legislature has used the
words “reasonable grounds for believing”
instead of “the evidence” which means the court
dealing with the grant of bail can only satisfy it
as to whether there is a genuine case against
the accused and that the prosecution will be
able to produce prima facie evidence in support
of the charge.”

c) This Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay vs. Sudarshan

Singh – (2002) 3 SCC 598, speaking through Banerjee, J.,

emphasized that a court exercising discretion in matters of

bail, has to undertake the same judiciously. In highlighting

that bail cannot be granted as a matter of course, bereft of

cogent reasoning, this Court observed as follows:

“3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary
order — but, however, calls for exercise of such
a discretion in a judicious manner and not as a
matter of course. Order for bail bereft of any
cogent reason cannot be sustained. Needless to
record, however, that the grant of bail is
dependent upon the contextual facts of the
matter being dealt with by the court and facts,
however, do always vary from case to case.

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 While placement of the accused in the society,
though may be considered but that by itself
cannot be a guiding factor in the matter of
grant of bail and the same should and ought
always to be coupled with other circumstances
warranting the grant of bail. The nature of the
offence is one of the basic considerations for the
grant of bail — more heinous is the crime, the
greater is the chance of rejection of the bail,
though, however, dependent on the factual
matrix of the matter.”

d) In Kalyan Chandra Sarkar vs. Rajesh Ranjan alias

Pappu Yadav & Anr. – (2004) 7 SCC 528, this Court

held that although it is established that a court

considering a bail application cannot undertake a detailed

examination of evidence and an elaborate discussion on

the merits of the case, the court is required to indicate the

prima facie reasons justifying the grant of bail.

e) In Prasanta Kumar Sarkar vs. Ashis Chaterjee ­­

(2010) 14 SCC 496 this Court observed that where a High

Court has granted bail mechanically, the said order would

suffer from the vice of non­application of mind, rendering it

illegal. This Court held as under with regard to the

circumstances under which an order granting bail may be

set aside. In doing so, the factors which ought to have

13
 guided the Court’s decision to grant bail have also been

detailed as under:

“It is trite that this Court does not, normally,
interfere with an order passed by the High
Court granting or rejecting bail to the accused.
However, it is equally incumbent upon the High
Court to exercise its discretion judiciously,
cautiously and strictly in compliance with the
basic principles laid down in a plethora of
decisions of this Court on the point. It is well
settled that,
among other circumstances, the factors to be
borne in mind while considering an application
for bail are: (i) whether there is any prima facie
or reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had committed the offence; (ii) nature
and gravity of the accusation; (iii) severity of the
punishment in the event of conviction; (iv)
danger of the accused absconding or fleeing, if
released on bail; (v) character, behaviour,
means, position and standing of the accused;
(vi) likelihood of the offence being repeated; (vii)
reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being
influenced; and (viii) danger, of course, of
justice being thwarted by grant of bail.”

f) Another factor which should guide the courts’ decision in

deciding a bail application is the period of custody.

However, as noted in Ash Mohammad vs. Shiv Raj

Singh @ Lalla Bahu & Anr. – (2012) 9 SCC 446, the

period of custody has to be weighed simultaneously with

the totality of the circumstances and the criminal

antecedents of the acused, if any. Further, the

circumstances which may justify the grant of bail are to be

14
 considered in the larger context of the societal concern

involved in releasing an accused, in juxtaposition to

individual liberty of the accused seeking bail.

g) In Neeru Yadav vs. State of UP & Anr. – (2016) 15 SCC

422, after referring to a catena of judgments of this Court

on the considerations to be placed at balance while

deciding to grant bail, observed through Dipak Misra, J.

(as His Lordship then was) in paragraphs 15 and 18 as

under:

“15. This being the position of law, it is clear as
cloudless sky that the High Court has totally
ignored the criminal antecedents of the
accused. What has weighed with the High Court
is the doctrine of parity. A history­sheeter
involved in the nature of crimes which we have
reproduced hereinabove, are not minor offences
so that he is not to be retained in custody, but
the crimes are of heinous nature and such
crimes, by no stretch of imagination, can be
regarded as jejune. Such cases do create a
thunder and lightening having the effect
potentiality of torrential rain in an analytical
mind. The law expects the judiciary to be alert
while admitting these kind of accused persons
to be at large and, therefore, the emphasis is on
exercise of discretion judiciously and not in a
whimsical manner.

xxx

18. Before parting with the case, we may repeat
with profit that it is not an appeal for
cancellation of bail as the cancellation is not
sought because of supervening circumstances.
The annulment of the order passed by the High
Court is sought as many relevant factors have

15
 not been taken into consideration which
includes the criminal antecedents of the
accused and that makes the order a deviant
one. Therefore, the inevitable result is the
lancination of the impugned order.”

h) In Anil Kumar Yadav vs. State (NCT of Delhi) – (2018)

12 SCC 129, this Court, while considering an appeal from

an order of cancellation of bail, has spelt out some of the

significant considerations of which a court must be

mindful, in deciding whether to grant bail. In doing so,

this Court has stated that while it is not possible to

prescribe an exhaustive list of considerations which are to

guide a court in deciding a bail application, the primary

requisite of an order granting bail, is that it should result

from judicious exercise of the court’s discretion. The

findings of this Court have been extracted as under:
“17. While granting bail, the relevant
considerations are: (i) nature of seriousness of
the offence; (ii) character of the evidence and
circumstances which are peculiar to the
accused; and (iii) likelihood of the accused
fleeing from justice; (iv) the impact that his
release may make on the prosecution witnesses,
its impact on the society; and (v) likelihood of
his tampering. No doubt, this list is not
exhaustive. There are no hard­and­fast rules
regarding grant or refusal of bail, each case has
to be considered on its own merits. The matter
always calls for judicious exercise of discretion
by the Court.”

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i) In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Vishanbhai Hirabhai

Makwana Makwana (Koli) and Ors., (2021) 6 SCC 230

this Court after referring to a catena of judgments

emphasized on the need and importance of assigning

reasons for the grant of bail. This Court categorically

observed that a court granting bail could not obviate its

duty to apply its judicial mind and indicate reasons as to

why bail has been granted or refused. The observations of

this Court have been extracted as under:
“35. We disapprove of the observations of the
High Court in a succession of orders in the
present case recording that the Counsel for the
parties “do not press for a further reasoned
order”. The grant of bail is a matter which
implicates the liberty of the Accused, the interest
of the State and the victims of crime in the
proper administration of criminal justice. It is a
well settled principle that in determining as to
whether bail should be granted, the High Court,
or for that matter, the Sessions Court deciding
an application Under Section 439 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure would not launch upon a
detailed evaluation of the facts on merits since a
criminal trial is still to take place. These
observations while adjudicating upon bail would
also not be binding on the outcome of the trial.
But the Court granting bail cannot obviate its
duty to apply a judicial mind and to record
reasons, brief as they may be, for the purpose of
deciding whether or not to grant bail. The
consent of parties cannot obviate the duty of the
High Court to indicate its reasons why it has
either granted or refused bail. This is for the
reason that the outcome of the application has a
significant bearing on the liberty of the Accused
on one hand as well as the public interest in the
due enforcement of criminal justice on the other.
The rights of the victims and their families are at

17
 stake as well. These are not matters involving the
private rights of two individual parties, as in a
civil proceeding. The proper enforcement of
criminal law is a matter of public interest. We
must, therefore, disapprove of the manner in
which a succession of orders in the present
batch of cases has recorded that counsel for the
“respective parties do not press for further
reasoned order”. If this is a euphemism for not
recording adequate reasons, this kind of a
formula cannot shield the order from judicial
scrutiny.

36. Grant of bail Under Section 439 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure is a matter involving the
exercise of judicial discretion. Judicial discretion
in granting or refusing bail­as in the case of any
other discretion which is vested in a court as a
judicial institution­is not unstructured. The duty
to record reasons is a significant safeguard
which ensures that the discretion which is
entrusted to the court is exercised in a judicious
manner. The recording of reasons in a judicial
order ensures that the thought process
underlying the order is subject to scrutiny and
that it meets objective standards of reason and
justice.”

j) Recently in Bhoopendra Singh vs. State of Rajasthan

& Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 1279 of 2021), this Court

made observations with respect to the exercise of appellate

power to determine whether bail has been granted for valid

reasons as distinguished from an application for

cancellation of bail. i.e. this Court distinguished between

setting aside a perverse order granting bail vis­a­vis

cancellation of bail on the ground that the accused has

misconducted himself or because of some new facts

18
 requiring such cancellation. Quoting Mahipal vs. Rajesh

Kumar ­ (2020) 2 SCC 118, this Court observed as

under:
“16. The considerations that guide the power of
an appellate court in assessing the correctness
of an order granting bail stand on a different
footing from an assessment of an application for
the cancellation of bail. The correctness of an
order granting bail is tested on the anvil of
whether there was an improper or arbitrary
exercise of the discretion in the grant of bail.
The test is whether the order granting bail is
perverse, illegal or unjustified. On the other
hand, an application for cancellation of bail is
generally examined on the anvil of the existence
of supervening circumstances or violations of
the conditions of bail by a person to whom bail
has been granted.”

k) Learned counsel for the accused­respondent has relied

upon the decision of this Court in Myakala

Dharmarajam and Ors. vs. The State of Telangana

and Ors. – (2020) 2 SCC 743 to contend that elaborate

reasons need not be assigned for the grant of bail. What is

of essence is that the record of the case ought to have

been perused by the court granting bail. The facts of the

said case are that a complaint was lodged against fifteen

persons for offences under Sections 148, 120B, 302 read

with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. The

accused therein moved an application seeking bail before

the Principal Sessions Judge, who, after perusal of the

19
case diary, statements of witnesses and other connected

records, released the accused on bail through an order

which did not elaborately discuss the material on record.

The High Court cancelled the bail bond on the ground that

the Principal Sessions Judge had not discussed the

material on record in the order granting bail. In an appeal

preferred by the accused before this Court, the order

granting bail was restored and the following observations

were made as to the duty of the court to record reasons

and discuss the material on record before granting bail:
“10. Having perused the law laid down by this
Court on the scope of the power to be exercised
in the matter of cancellation of bails, it is
necessary to examine whether the order passed
by the Sessions Court granting bail is perverse
and suffers from infirmities which has resulted
in the miscarriage of justice. No doubt, the
Sessions Court did not discuss the material on
record in detail, but there is an indication from
the orders by which bail was granted that the
entire material was perused before grant of bail.
It is not the case of either the complainant­
Respondent No. 2 or the State that irrelevant
considerations have been taken into account by
the Sessions Court while granting bail to the
Appellants. The order of the Sessions Court by
which the bail was granted to the Appellants
cannot be termed as perverse as the Sessions
Court was conscious of the fact that the
investigation was completed and there was no
likelihood of the Appellant tampering with the
evidence.

11. The petition filed for cancellation of bail is
both on the grounds of illegality of the order
passed by the Sessions Court and the conduct
of the Appellants subsequent to their release

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 after bail was granted. The complaint filed by
one Bojja Ravinder to the Commissioner of
Police, Karimnagar is placed on record by
Respondent No. 2. It is stated in the complaint
that the Appellants were roaming freely in the
village and threatening witnesses. We have
perused the complaint and found that the
allegations made therein are vague. There is no
mention about which Accused out of the 15
indulged in acts of holding out threats to the
witnesses or made an attempt to tamper with
the evidence.

12. After considering the submissions made on
behalf of the parties and examining the material
on record, we are of the opinion that the High
Court was not right in cancelling the bail of the
Appellants. The orders passed by the Sessions
Judge granting bail cannot be termed as
perverse. The complaint alleging that the
Appellants were influencing witnesses is vague
and is without any details regarding the
involvement of the Appellants in threatening the
witnesses. Therefore, the Appeals are allowed
and the judgment of the High Court is set
aside.”

However, we are of the view that the said decision is

not applicable to the facts of the instant case for the

following reasons:
Firstly, this Court in the aforecited decision restored

the order granting bail to the accused on the ground that

although no discussion was made by the Sessions Court as

to the material on record, in the order granting bail, it was

apparent in the order of the Sessions Court whereby bail

was granted, that the decision to grant bail was arrived at

after perusal of the entire material on record. While the

21
 material may not have been specifically referred to, the

order granting bail was indicative of the fact that it had

been arrived at after thorough consideration thereof.

However, in the instant case, no such indication can be

observed in the impugned orders of the High Court which

would be suggestive of the fact that the material on record

was perused before deciding to grant bail.
Secondly, the case referred to by the accused

concerned an offence which was allegedly committed by

fifteen persons. The complainant therein had not

specifically assigned roles to each of such fifteen persons. It

was thus found that the allegations being vague, no prima

facie case could be made out, justifying the grant of bail to

the accused therein. However, in the instant case, only one

accused has been named by the appellant­informant and

the role attributed to him is specific. Therefore, the facts of

the case relied upon, being significantly different from the

one before us, we find that the judgment relied upon by the

learned counsel for the respondent­accused would be of no

assistance to his case.

l) The most recent judgment of this Court on the aspect of

application of mind and requirement of judicious exercise

22
 of discretion in arriving at an order granting bail to the

accused is in the case of Brijmani Devi vs. Pappu

Kumar and Anr. – Criminal Appeal No. 1663/2021

disposed of on 17th December, 2021, wherein a three­

Judge Bench of this Court, while setting aside an

unreasoned and casual order of the High Court granting

bail to the accused, observed as follows:

“While we are conscious of the fact that
liberty of an individual is an invaluable right, at
the same time while considering an application
for bail Courts cannot lose sight of the serious
nature of the accusations against an accused
and the facts that have a bearing in the case,
particularly, when the accusations may not be
false, frivolous or vexatious in nature but are
supported by adequate material brought on
record so as to enable a Court to arrive at a
prima facie conclusion. While considering an
application for grant of bail a prima facie
conclusion must be supported by reasons and
must be arrived at after having regard to the
vital facts of the case brought on record. Due
consideration must be given to facts suggestive
of the nature of crime, the criminal antecedents
of the accused, if any, and the nature of
punishment that would follow a conviction vis­
à­vis the offence/s alleged against an accused.”

15. On the aspect of the duty to accord reasons for a decision

arrived at by a court, or for that matter, even a quasi­judicial

authority, it would be useful to refer to a judgment of this

Court in Kranti Associates Private Limited & Anr. vs.

Masood Ahmed Khan & Ors. – (2010) 9 SCC 496, wherein

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after referring to a number of judgments this Court

summarised at paragraph 47 the law on the point. The

relevant principles for the purpose of this case are extracted

as under:

“(a) Insistence on recording of reasons is meant
to serve the wider principle of justice that
justice must not only be done it must also
appear to be done as well.

(b) Recording of reasons also operates as a
valid restraint on any possible arbitrary
exercise of judicial and quasi­judicial or even
administrative power.

(c) Reasons reassure that discretion has been
exercised by the decision­maker on relevant
grounds and by disregarding extraneous
considerations.

(d) Reasons have virtually become as
indispensable a component of a decision­
making process as observing principles of
natural justice by judicial, quasi­judicial and
even by administrative bodies.

(e) The ongoing judicial trend in all countries
committed to rule of law and constitutional
governance is in favour of reasoned decisions
based on relevant facts. This is virtually the
lifeblood of judicial decision­making justifying
the principle that reason is the soul of justice.

(f) Judicial or even quasi­judicial opinions
these days can be as different as the judges and
authorities who deliver them. All these
decisions serve one common purpose which is
to demonstrate by reason that the relevant
factors have been objectively considered. This is
important for sustaining the litigants’ faith in
the justice delivery system.

(g) Insistence on reason is a requirement for
both judicial accountability and transparency.

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 (h) If a judge or a quasi­judicial authority is not
candid enough about his/her decision­making
process then it is impossible to know whether
the person deciding is faithful to the doctrine of
precedent or to principles of incrementalism.

(i) Reasons in support of decisions must be
cogent, clear and succinct. A pretence of
reasons or “rubber­stamp reasons” is not to be
equated with a valid decision­making process.

(j) It cannot be doubted that transparency is
the sine qua non of restraint on abuse of
judicial powers. Transparency in decision­
making not only makes the judges and
decision­makers less prone to errors but also
makes them subject to broader scrutiny. (See
David Shapiro in Defence of Judicial
Candor [(1987) 100 Harvard Law Review 731­
37)

(k) In all common law jurisdictions judgments
play a vital role in setting up precedents for the
future. Therefore, for development of law,
requirement of giving reasons for the decision is
of the essence and is virtually a part of “due
process”.

Though the aforesaid judgment was rendered in the

context of a dismissal of a revision petition by a cryptic order

by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission,

reliance could be placed on the said judgment on the need to

give reasons while deciding a matter.

16. The Latin maxim “cessante ratione legis cessat ipsa lex”

meaning “reason is the soul of the law, and when the reason

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of any particular law ceases, so does the law itself”, is also

apposite.

17. We have extracted the relevant portions of the impugned

order above. At the outset, we observe that the extracted

portions are the only portions forming part of the “reasoning”

of the High court while granting bail. As noted from the

aforecited judgments, it is not necessary for a Court to give

elaborate reasons while granting bail particularly when the

case is at the initial stage and the allegations of the offences

by the accused would not have been crystalised as such.

There cannot be elaborate details recorded to give an

impression that the case is one that would result in a

conviction or, by contrast, in an acquittal while passing an

order on an application for grant of bail. However, the Court

deciding a bail application cannot completely divorce its

decision from material aspects of the case such as the

allegations made against the accused; severity of the

punishment if the allegations are proved beyond reasonable

doubt and would result in a conviction; reasonable

apprehension of the witnesses being influenced by the

accused; tampering of the evidence; the frivolity in the case of

the prosecution; criminal antecedents of the accused; and a

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prima facie satisfaction of the Court in support of the charge

against the accused.

18. Ultimately, the Court considering an application for bail

has to exercise discretion in a judicious manner and in

accordance with the settled principles of law having regard to

the crime alleged to be committed by the accused on the one

hand and ensuring purity of the trial of the case on the other.

19. Thus, while elaborate reasons may not be assigned for

grant of bail or an extensive discussion of the merits of the

case may not be undertaken by the court considering a bail

application, an order de hors reasoning or bereft of the

relevant reasons cannot result in grant of bail. In such a case

the prosecution or the informant has a right to assail the

order before a higher forum. As noted in Gurcharan Singh

vs. State (Delhi Admn.) ­ 1978 CriLJ 129, when bail has

been granted to an accused, the State may, if new

circumstances have arisen following the grant of such bail,

approach the High Court seeking cancellation of bail under

section 439 (2) of the CrPC. However, if no new circumstances

have cropped up since the grant of bail, the State may prefer

an appeal against the order granting bail, on the ground that

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the same is perverse or illegal or has been arrived at by

ignoring material aspects which establish a prima­facie case

against the accused.

20. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we shall now consider

the facts of the present case. The allegations against

respondent­accused as well as the contentions raised at the

Bar have been narrated in detail above. On a consideration of

the same, the following aspects of the case would emerge:

a) The allegation against the respondent­accused is under

section 302 of the IPC with regard to the murder of the

deceased Ram Swaroop Khokhar, the father of the

informant­appellant who was a disabled person. Thus, the

offence alleged against the respondent­accused is of a

grave nature.

b) The accusation against the accused is that he overpowered

the deceased who was suffering from impairment of both

his legs, pinned him to the ground, sat on him and

throttled his neck. As per the postmortem report, the cause

of death was ante­mortem strangulation.

c) It is also the case of the appellant that the respondent­

accused is a person exercising significant political

influence in the Bhopawaspachar village and that owing to

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 the same, the informant found it difficult to get an FIR

registered against him. That the accused was arrested only

following a protest outside a police station demanding his

arrest. Thus, the possibility of the accused threatening or

otherwise influencing the witnesses, if on bail, cannot be

ruled out.

d) That the respondent­accused had earlier preferred

applications seeking bail, under section 437 of the CrPC

before the Court of the Additional Metropolitan Magistrate,

Jaipur, on two occasions. The same came to be rejected by

orders dated 23rd January, 2020 and 6th March, 2020. The

accused had also preferred a bail application under section

439 of the CrPC which was rejected by the Additional

Sessions Judge, Jaipur Metropolis by order dated 12 th

March, 2020 having regard to the gravity of the offences

alleged against the accused.

e) The High Court in the impugned order dated 7 th May, 2020

has not considered the aforestated aspects of the case in

the context of the grant of bail.

21. Having considered the aforesaid facts of the present case

in light of the judgments cited above, we do not think that

this case is a fit case for grant of bail to the respondent­

29
accused, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations

against him. Strangely, the State of Rajasthan has not filed

any appeal against the impugned order.

22. The High Court has lost sight of the aforesaid material

aspects of the case and has, by a very cryptic and casual

order, de hors coherent reasoning, granted bail to the

accused. We find that the High Court was not right in

allowing the application for bail filed by the respondent­

accused. Hence the impugned order dated 7 th May, 2020 is

set aside. The appeal is allowed.

23. The respondent accused is on bail. His bail bond stands

cancelled and he is directed to surrender before the

concerned jail authorities within a period of two weeks from

today.

……………………………J
M.R. SHAH

……………………….…..J
B.V. NAGARATHNA

NEW DELHI;
11th JANUARY, 2022.

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