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Supreme Court of India
Arun Singh vs State Of U.P. on 10 February, 2020Author: Krishna Murari
Bench: Navin Sinha, Krishna Murari
1
REPORTABLE
IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.__250_ OF 2020
ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL) NO. 5224 OF 2017
Arun Singh & Others …….. Appellant(s)
VERSUS
State of U.P. through its Secretary & Another …..… Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
KRISHNA MURARI, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal is directed against the impugned judgment and order dated
24.11.2016 passed by the High Court1 dismissing the petition filed by the
appellants under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (in short ‘the
CrPC) challenging the charge sheet filed against them. The High Court while
rejecting Section 482 CrPC petition directed the accused appellants to
surrender before the Court concerned within 30 days from the date of order
and in case they do so within the stipulated period and apply for bail the same
was liable to be considered and decided in view of law laid down by full
bench of High Court in case of Amrawati & another versus State of U.P. 2
affirmed by this court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh versus State of U.P.3
Signature Not Verified
______________________________
Digitally signed by
RAJNI MUKHI
1
Date: 2020.02.10
15:44:16 IST High Court of Judicature at Allahabad
Reason:
2
2004 (57) ALR 290
3
2009 (3) ADJ 322 (SC)
2
3. Shorn of unnecessary details the brief facts which led to the filling of
this appeal can be summarised as under:-
Respondent No. 2 lodged First Information Report with Police
Station Izzat Nagar, District Bareilly under Section 493 I.P.C. read
with Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act against the appellants
herein which was registered as case crime No. 431 of 2014. The
allegations made in the F.I.R. were that Respondent No.-2 approached
Appellants with the proposal of marriage of his daughter Jyoti with
Appellant No.-1. On 30th June, 2013 the appellants visited the house
of Respondent No.-2 and after meeting his daughter the proposal was
finalised. On 21.07.2013, ring ceremony was performed and date of
marriage was scheduled for 19.11.2013. Thereafter, Appellant No.-2
started visiting the house of complainant/respondent no.-2. frequently
and misleading his daughter Jyoti that now since the marriage is
finalised and only ceremony of ‘feras’ remains to be performed took
her for outings on various occasions. On 16.08.2013 appellant No.-2
induced Jyoti to his room and established physical relationship with
her. However, subsequently thereto the appellant started making
demand of dowry of Rs. 5 Lakh. A complaint in this regard was made
before Mahila Thana but no action was taken. On coming to know that
marriage of Appellant No.-2 was settled with some other girl for a
handsome amount of dowry, the First Information Report was being
lodged.
3
4. The matter was investigated by the concerned Police Station and a
charge sheet was filed against the appellants, which was challenged before the
High Court by way of petition under Section 482 CrPC.
5. The case set up by the appellants before the High Court was that
behaviour of the complainant and his family members changed after the date
of marriage was fixed and they refused to share the expenses of marriage,
which was settled between the parties to be shared equally. Further, a demand
of Rs. 10 Lakhs was made from the appellants with a threat to implicate them
in a false case in case the demand was not fulfilled. It was further pleaded that
Appellant No.-2 made an application under Section 156(3) CrPC before the
ACJM against the complainant and his other family members. During the
pendency of proceedings under Section 156(3) CrPC a complaint was made by
Respondent No.-2 in the Mahila Thana. The inspector incharge of Mahila
Thana summoned both the parties where the dispute between them was
compromised. In view of the compromise arrived, the appellants did not press
the application under Section 156 (3) CrPC. However, the Complainant-
Respondent No.-2 filed the First Information Report after about 10 months of
the compromise.
6. The High Court finding that there was no justification for quashing the
charge sheet dismissed the petition.
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7. Learned counsel for the appellant vehemently contended that the High
Court has failed to appreciate and consider that the fresh criminal action can
not be launched on the basis of the same cause of action, which was already
settled 10 months back by way of compromise which was acted upon by both
the parties.
8. Learned counsel further submits that the High Court has failed to
consider and appreciate that the allegations as contained in the First
Information Report even if taken on the face value and assumed to be correct
in entirety, do not prima-facie disclose commission of any offence, much less
a cognizable offence. It is also submitted on behalf of the appellants that the
High Court did not appreciate and consider the fact at all that the allegations in
the F.I.R., prima-facie, do not constitute commission of any offence and
dismissed the 482 petition without adverting itself to this aspect of the matter.
9. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the arguments advanced on
behalf of appellants submitted that the First Information Report was filed
under Section 493 of the Indian Penal Code (in short the “I.P.C.”) read with
Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act and both the aforesaid offences are
non-compoundable in nature and thus could not have been compromised. The
allegations made in the First Information Report were found to be
substantiated on investigation and thus a charge sheet filed by the Police and
the High Court rightly dismissed the petition for quashing of the same.
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10. We have considered the rival submissions and perused the facts on
record.
11. The offence under Section 493 is non-compoundable. Similarly, the
offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is also non-
compoundable, in view of Section 8(2) of the said Act, which provides that
every offence under this Act, shall be non-bailable and non-compoundable.
12. Though the offence in question are non-compoundable but the power
of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC of the Court to quash the
proceedings in such offences is well recognised by various decision of this
court and the issue is no longer res integra. Reference may be made to the
observations of Three Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh versus State
of Punjab.4
“Quashing of offences or criminal proceedings on the ground of
settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as
compounding of the offence. They are different and not
interchangeable. Strictly speaking the power of compounding of
offence given to a Court under Section 320 is materially different
from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in
exercise of the inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offence,
power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions
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4
(2012) 10 SCC 303
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contained in Section 320 and the Court is guided solely and
squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion
by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal
proceedings or criminal complaint is guided by the material on
record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise
of power although the ultimately consequence may be acquittal or
dismissal of indictment.
B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant, Manoj Sharma and Shiji to illustrate
the principle that High Court may quash the criminal proceedings or
F.I.R. or complaint in exercise of its inherent power under Section
482 of the Code and Section 320 does not limit or effect the powers
of the High Court under Section 482. Can it be said that by
quashing criminal proceedings in B.S. Joshi, Nikhil Merchant,
Manoj Sharma and Shiji this Court has compounded the non-
compoundable offences indirectly? We do not think so. There does
exists the distinction between compounding of an offence under
Section 320 and quashing of a criminal case by a High Court in
exercise of inherent power under Section 482. The two powers are
distinct and different although the ultimate consequence may be the
same viz. acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the indictment.
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13. Another Three Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir &
Others versus State of Gujarat & Others.5 After analysing the
precedents on, the above issue has summarised the broad principles in
paragraph 15 of the reports as under:-
15. “The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on
the subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:-
(i) Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the
High Court to prevent an abuse of the process of
any court or to secure the ends of justice. The
provision does not confer new powers. It only
recognises and preserves powers which inhere in
the High Court;
(ii) The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High court
to quash a First Information Report or a criminal
proceeding on the ground that a settlement has
been arrived at between the offender and the victim
is not the same as the invocation of jurisdiction
for the purpose of compounding an offence.
While compounding an offence, the power of the
court is governed by the provisions of Section 320
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The
Power to quash Under Section 482 is attracted
even if the offence is non-compoundable.
(iii) In forming an opinion whether a
criminalproceeding or complaint should be
quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction Under
Section 482, the High Court must evaluate whether
the ends of justice would justify the exercise of the
inherent power;
(iv)
While the inherent power of the High Court has a
wide ambit and plenitude it has to be exercised; (i)
to secure the ends of justice or (ii) to prevent an
abuse of the process of any court;
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(2017) 9 SCC 641
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(v) The decision as to whether a complaint or First
Information Report should be quashed on the
ground that the offender and victim have settled the
dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and
circumstances of each case and no exhaustive
elaboration of principles can be formulated;
(vi) In the exercise of the power Under Section 482 and
while dealing with a plea that the dispute has
been settled, the High Court must have due regard
to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous
and serious offences involving mental depravity
or offences such as murder, rape and dacoity
cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim
or the family of the victim have settled the
dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not
private in nature but have a serious impact upon
society. The decision to continue with the trial in
such cases is founded on the overriding element of
public interest in punishing persons for serious
offences;
(vii) As distinguished from serious offences, there may
be criminal cases which have an overwhelming or
predominant element of a civil dispute. They stand
on a distinct footing in so far as the exercise of the
inherent power to quash is concerned;
(viii) Criminal cases involving offences which arise from
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or
similar transactions with an essentially civil
flavour may in appropriate situations fall for
quashing where parties have settled the dispute;(ix) In such a case, the High Court may quash the
criminal proceeding if in view of the
compromise between the disputants, the possibility
of a conviction is remote and the continuation of
a criminal proceeding would cause oppression and
prejudice; and
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(x) There is yet an exception to the principle set out in
propositions (viii) and (ix) above. Economic
offences involving the financial and economic well
being of the state have implications which lie
beyond the domain of a mere dispute between
private disputants. The High Court would be
justified in declining to quash where the offender is
involved in an activity akin to a financial or
economic fraud misdemeanour. The consequences
of the act complained of upon the financial or
economic system will weigh in the balance.”
14. In another decision in the case of Narinder Singh Vs. State of
Punjab6 it has been observed that in respect of offence against the society
it is the duty to punish the offender. Hence, even where there is a
settlement between the offender and victim the same shall not prevail
since it is in interests of the society that offender should be punished
which acts as deterrent for others from committing similar crime. On the
other hand, there may be offences falling in the category where the
correctional objective of criminal law would have to be given more
weightage than the theory of deterrent punishment. In such cases, the
court may be of the opinion that a settlement between the parties would
lead to better relations between them and would resolve a festering
private dispute and thus may exercise power under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing the proceedings or the complaint or the FIR as the case may be.
15. Bearing in mind the above principles which have been laid down,
we are of the view that offences for which the appellants have been
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6
(2014) 6 SCC 466
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charged are infact offences against society and not private in nature. Such
offences have serious impact upon society and continuance of trial of such
cases is founded on the overridding effect of public interests in punishing
persons for such serious offences. It is neither an offence arising out of
commercial, financial, mercantile, partnership or such similar transactions or
has any element of civil dispute thus it stands on a distinct footing. In such
cases, settlement even if arrived at between the complainant and the accused,
the same cannot constitute a valid ground to quash the F.I.R. or the charge
sheet.
16. Thus the High Court cannot be said to be unjustified in refusing to
quash the charge sheet on the ground of compromise between the parties.
17. The next issue which arises for consideration is whether the allegations
made in the F.I.R constitute commission of an offence. As already stated
hereinabove, the appellants have been charged with Section 493 of the Indian
Penal Code and Section 3 read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act.
Section 493 reads as under:-
“Cohabitation caused by a man deceitfully inducing a belief
of lawful marriage. – Every man who by deceit causes any
woman who is not lawfully married to him to believe that she is
lawfully married to him and to cohabit or have sexual
intercourse with him in that belief, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend
to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
18. A plain reading of the Section goes to show that in order to constitute
an offence under this Section, it has to be demonstrated that a man has
deceitfully caused any woman, who is not lawfully married to him, to believe
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that she is lawfully married wife and thereby co-habit with him. In other
words, the accused must induce a woman, not lawfully married to him, to
believe that she is married to him and as a result of such mis-representation,
woman should believe that she was lawfully married to the man and thus there
should be co-habitation or sexual intercourse.
19. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Ram Chandra Bhagat
Vs. State of Jharkhand7 after analysing the provisions of Section 493 of I.P.C,
has observed as under:-
“Upon perusal of Section 493 IPC, to establish that a
person has committed an offence under the said section, it
must be established that a person had deceitfully induced a
belief to a woman, who is not lawfully married to him, that
she is a lawfully married wife of that person and thereupon
she should cohabit or should have had sexual intercourse
with that person. Looking at the aforestated section, it is
clear that the accused must induce a woman, who is not
lawfully married to him, to believe that he is married to her
and as a result of the aforestated representation, the
woman should believe that she was lawfully married to him
and there should be cohabitation or sexual intercourse as a
result of the deception.”
“If a woman is induced to change her status from that of an
unmarried to that of a married woman with all the duties
and obligations pertaining to the changed relationship and
that result is accomplished by deceit, such woman within
the law can be said to have been deceived and the offence
under Section 493 IPC is brought home. Inducement by a
person deceitfully to a woman to change her status from
unmarried woman to a lawfully married woman and on
that inducement making her cohabit with him in the belief
that she is lawfully married to him is what constitutes an
offence under Section 493. The victim woman has been
induced to do that which, but for the false practice, she
would not have done and has been led to change her social
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(2013) 1 SCC 562
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and domestic status. The ingredients of Section 493 can be
said to be fully satisfied when it is proved – (a) deceit
causing a false belief of existence of a lawful marriage, and
(b) cohabitation or sexual intercourse with the person
causing such belief. It is not necessary to establish the
factum of marriage according to personal law but the proof
of inducement by a man deceitfully to a woman to change
her status from that of an unmarried to that of a lawfully
married woman and then make that woman cohabit with
him establishes an offence under Section 493 IPC.”
20. The essence of an offence under Section 493 IPC is, therefore,
practice of deception by a man on a woman as a consequence of which the
woman is led to believe that she is lawfully married to him although she is not
and then make her cohabit with him.
21. Deceit can be said to be a false statement of fact made by a person
knowingly and recklessly with the intent that it shall be acted upon by another
who on believing the same after having acted thereupon suffers an injury. It is
an attempt to deceive and includes such declaration and statement that
misleads others or causes him to believe which otherwise is false and
incorrect.
22. In other words, to constitute an offence under Section 493 I.P.C., the
allegations in the FIR must demonstrate that appellant had practiced
deception on the daughter of the complainant causing a false belief of
existence of lawful marriage and which led her to cohabit with him.
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23. From a perusal of the F.I.R., we do not find that allegations made
therein can be said to constitute any offence under Section 493 IPC. There are
no allegation of any inducement or any deceit to make the victim believe that
she was lawfully married to the appellant, which mislead her to have sexual
intercourse with the accused appellant no.1. Only allegations in the First
Information Report in this regard are that “after the marriage was settled, the
appellant no.1 started visiting the house of the complainant frequently and
would mislead and instigate his daughter that relation is final and only ‘Feras’
remains to be performed. On the fateful day, i.e., 16.08.2013, the appellant
no.1 took leave and enticed and instigated his daughter took her to his room
and promising that she is being his wife established physical relations.”
24. A perusal of the averments would go to show that ingredients to
constitute an offence under Section 493 I.P.C. are missing from the
averments. The allegations do not even prima-facie, cull out any inducement
of belief in the victim that she is lawfully married to the appellant no.1 and on
account of this deceitful misstatement, the victim co-habited with the accused.
Since the essential ingredients to constitute an offence under Section 493
I.P.C. are missing from the allegations made in the F.I.R., offence under the
said Section can not be said to be made out against the appellants.
25. It is also to be taken note that whatever the allegations, in this regard,
have been made only against the accused-appellant no. 1 which also do not
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constitute an offence and there are no allegations in this regard in respect of
other five accused-appellants.
26. The High Court having failed to advert itself to the aforesaid aspects
discussed hereinabove and to that extent, the judgment is not liable to be
sustained.
27. The other charge against the appellants are under Section 3/4 of the
Dowry Prohibition Act. The said sections read as under:-
“Section 3 -Penalty for giving or taking dowry.— [1] If
any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or
takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be
punishable [with imprisonment for a term which shall not
be less than [five years], and with fine which shall not be
less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the
value of such dowry, whichever is more:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special
reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than [five
years].
[(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in
relation to,—
(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to
the bride (without any demand having been made in that
behalf): Provided that such presents are entered in a list
maintained in accordance with the rules made under this
Act;
(b) presents which are given at the time of marriage to
the bridegroom (without any demand having been made
in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in a list
maintained in accordance with the rules made under this
Act:
Provided further that where such presents are made by or
on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride,
such presents are of a customary nature and the value
thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial
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status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such
presents are given.]
Section 4- Penalty for demanding dowry—If any person
demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other
relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the
case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with
imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six
months, but which may extend to two years and with fine
which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
Provided that the court may, for adequate and special
reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a
sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six
months.”
28. The allegations in the First Information Report in respect of Section
3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are very specific. The relevant allegations
are being reproduced hereunder :-
“Not only this applicant also finalised Barat Ghar OM
Lawn for marriage party and made advance payment of
Rs.20,000/- but Arun along with his parents and all the
opposite parties stick to their demand of Rs. 5 Lakhs cash.
Applicant is a poor employee. He showed his inability to
pay such a huge amount. But despite a very humble
request and praying opposite parties could not be
persuaded and they made demand for Rs.5 Lakh in full
Panchayat….”
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29. A reading of the above provisions shows that essential ingredients of
the offence under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act are that the
persons accused should have made demand directly or indirectly from the
parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or a bridegroom as the case
may be any dowry and/or abets the giving and taking of dowry. The
allegations of the F.I.R. quoted hereinabove clearly go to show that a demand
of dowry of Rs.5 Lakhs was made by the appellants from the complainants
and thus it can not be said that no offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act are
made out against the appellants. There being direct allegations of demand of
Dowry in the First Information Report, the allegations prima-facie constitute a
commission of an offence under the Dowry Prohibition Act and thus the
charges leveled against the appellants under Section 3/4 of the said Act, are
not liable to be quashed.
30. In view of the above facts and discussions, we are of the considered
view that insofar as offence under Section 493 I.P.C. is concerned, since F.I.R.
does not disclose the commission of any offence under the said Section and
thus continuance of the criminal prosecution under said section would amount
to abuse of process of the Court and the order of the High Court to that extent
is liable to be set aside. However, insofar as offence against the appellants
under Section 3/4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act is concerned, since the
allegations disclose the commission of cognizable offence in the F.I.R., it is
not a fit case to exercise power under Section 482 Cr.PC and to quash criminal
proceedings against the appellants for the said offence.
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31. As a result of our aforesaid discussion, the charge sheet insofar as
Section 493 I.P.C is concerned stands quashed. However, in respect of charge
sheet under Section 3 read with Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, the
Appeal stands dismissed.
……………………………J.
(NAVIN SINHA)
……………………………J.
(KRISHNA MURARI)
NEW DELHI;
10th FEBRUARY, 2020.
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