caselaws
Supreme Court of India
Commissioner Of Central Excise, … vs M/S. Indorama Synthetics (I) Ltd on 21 August, 2015Bench: A.K. Sikri, Rohinton Fali Nariman
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1834 OF 2006
|COMMISSIONER OF CENTRAL EXCISE, | |
|NAGPUR-I |…..APPELLANT(S) |
|VERSUS | |
|M/S. INDORAMA SYNTHETICS (I) LTD. |…..RESPONDENT(S) |
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
The respondent (hereinafter referred to as the ‘assessee’)
is engaged in the manufacture of polyester chips, polyester staple fibre,
polyester filament yarn and other goods. It had been clearing the same on
payment of central excise duty. The period involved in this appeal is 1999-
2002. During this period, the goods that were cleared as ‘deemed exports’
to advance licence holders were at a price lower than what was being
charged to the other buyers who did not hold an advance licence. As per
the Commissioner of Central Excise, Nagpur-I (hereinafter referred to as
the ‘Revenue’), it found that the reason for selling the goods to the
aforesaid particular class of buyers at a lesser price was that the
assessee had received ‘additional consideration’ and, therefore, its
inclusion was necessitated having regard to the formula provided for
arriving at the ‘transaction value’ contained in the statutory scheme.
We would narrate the details of purported ‘additional consideration’ at a
later point of time at an appropriate stage. However, we may point out
here that on surrender of advance licence with the aforesaid buyers, the
assessee could receive drawback from the Government/Director General of
Foreign Trade (DGFT) as per the Export-Import (EXIM) Policy and this was
stated to be the additional consideration. Suffice it to point out at this
juncture that the Revenue issued five separate show cause notices asking
the assessee to pay the differential duty as the said additional
consideration was to be included while arriving at the ‘transaction value’
of the said goods in terms of Section 4 of the Central Excise Act, 1944
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) read with Rule 6 of the Central
Excise Valuation (Determination of Price of Excisable Goods) Rules, 2000
(hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules’). The assessee challenged the
stand of the Revenue by filing replies. After examining the matter, the
Commissioner took the view that price was not the sole consideration
flowing from the buyer to the assessee. Not only such buyers, who were
sold the goods at a lower price, were ‘related persons’, even the goods
were sold at depressed price. Therefore, the Commissioner confirmed the
demand of differential duty as mentioned in the show cause notices and also
levied penalties and interest. The assessee challenged the order of the
Commissioner by filing appeal before the Custom Excise & Service Tax
Appellate Tribunal (for short, the ‘Tribunal’) taking the plea that
‘additional consideration’ under Section 4 of the Act refers only to the
additional consideration flowing from the buyer to the assessee and in the
present case no such additional consideration flew from the advance licence
buyers of the ‘deemed exports’. The Tribunal, in arriving at this
conclusion, relied upon its own decision in the case of IFGL Refractories
Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhubaneswar-II[1] wherein it was
held that statutory benefits allowed by statutory authorities cannot be
considered as additional consideration flowing to a manufacturer from the
buyer. In the opinion of the Tribunal, the drawback was received from the
Government and not from the buyers and, therefore, such drawback could not
be treated as additional consideration for the purpose of arriving at
‘transaction value’ as per the definition thereof under Section 4 of the
Act.
Pertinently, the decision of the Tribunal in IFGL’s case stands overruled
by this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhubaneswar – II v. IFGL
Refractories Ltd.[2] In the said case, this Court has held such a
consideration, namely, duty drawback, to be the ‘additional consideration’
inasmuch as the benefit of duty drawback accruing to the seller was the
result of surrender of advance licence by the buyers. The discussion and
the rationale which goes into forming the aforesaid opinion is contained in
para 9 of the judgment, which reads as under:
“9. Ultimately it was agreed that M/s. Visakhapatnam will surrender its
advance licences and in lieu thereof the respondents will get the advance
intermediate licences. Thus, without the advance licences of M/s.
Visakhapatnam Steel Plant, being made available to the respondents, the
prices would have been as were quoted earlier. It is only because of the
advance licences being surrendered by M/s. Visakhapatnam Steel Plant and in
lieu thereof advance intermediate licences being made available to the
respondents that the respondents could offer lower prices. The
surrendering of licences by M/s. Visakhapatnam Steel Plant and as a result
thereof the respondents getting the licences had nothing to do with any
Import and Export Policy. It was directly a matter of contract between the
two parties. This resulted in additional consideration by way of “advance
intermediate licence” flowing from M/s. Visakhapatnam Steel Plant to the
respondents. The value received therefrom is includible in the price. The
Tribunal was wrong in stating that such an arrangement can never be placed
upon the platform of additional consideration. In so stating the Tribunal
has ignored and/or lost sight of the fact that it was in pursuance of the
contract of sale between the respondents and M/s. Visakhapatnam Steel Plant
that the licences were made available to the respondents. The Export and
Import Policy had nothing to do with the arrangements/contract under which
the licences flowed from the buyer to the seller. At the cost of
repetition it must be mentioned that had the respondents had advance
intermediate licence on their own i.e. without M/s. Visakhapatnam Steel
Plant having to surrender its licences for the purposes of the contract,
then the reasoning of the Tribunal may have been correct. But here, in
pursuance of the contract of sale, there is directly a flow of additional
consideration from the buyer to the seller. The value thereof has to be
added to the price. We are thus unable to accept the broad submission that
where parties take advantage of policies of the Government and the benefits
flowing therefrom, then such benefit cannot be said to be an “additional
consideration”.
In a matter like this, this Court could simply follow the aforesaid
judgment and set aside the order of the Tribunal, allowing this appeal.
However, Mr. V. Lakshmikumaran, learned counsel appearing for the assessee,
made a fervent and passionate plea that the aforesaid judgment of this
Court in IFGL’s[3] case needs re-consideration. He, thus, pleaded for
referring the matter to a larger Bench. Detailed and elaborate submissions
were made in this direction which were stoutly refuted by the learned
counsel for the Revenue. We may immediately record that the assessee’s
counsel has not succeeded in persuading us to refer the matter to a larger
Bench. Hereinafter, we record our reasons for taking this view. For this
purpose, we may first state at this stage the mechanism that goes into
getting the benefit of duty drawback in the kitty of the assessee.
As mentioned above, the assessee had been selling polyester staple fiber to
two classes of domestic buyers, in addition to exporting the same in the
international market. One of the category of domestic buyers were those
who were having advance licence and the other category without any such
licence. The assessee had issued two different price lists. Those buyers
who had advance licence but agreed to surrender the said licence, were
offered price of ?37.50 per kg. Other category, with no such licence, were
sold the goods at ?50 per kg. As per the assessee, it was exporting
polyester staple fiber during the relevant period at an average price of
?36 per kg against its own advance licence for exports.
Advance licence is issued under the EXIM Policy. The holder of the advance
licence could procure imported raw material against the said licence for
manufacture of finished goods. However, as per para 7.7 of the EXIM Policy
1997-2002, the advance licence holder intending to source the materials
from indigenous source in lieu of direct import had the option to source
them against advance release orders denominated in foreign exchange/Indian
rupees. In such a case, the licence was to be invalidated for direct
import and permission in the form of ARO was to be issued entitling the
supplier of the goods the benefits of deemed export. Para 10.2 of the EXIM
Policy laid down the categories of supply which would be recorded as
‘deemed exports’ under the policy. The first such clause (a) was ‘supply
of goods against advance licence/DFRC under the duty exemption/ remission
scheme. Under para 10.3, benefits for deemed exports were specified.
Advance licence for intermediate supply/deemed export was specified as one
of the benefits for deemed exports.
The advance licence holder category buyers got their licences
invalidated/surrendered. Thereafter, DGFT issued licence in favour of the
assessee herein permitting it to procure the goods duty free from
indigenous manufacturers and on the supply of this material to such buyers,
treating the same as ‘deemed exports’, thereby earning the benefits of duty
drawback. Para 7.11 of the EXIM Policy facilitated this process and it
reads as under:
“7.11 Advance Licence for Intermediate Supplies – The Advance Licence
for intermediate supply shall be considered by the licensing authority
concerned. The Advance Licence for intermediate supply shall be issued
after making the licence invalid for direct import of items to be supplied
by the intermediate manufacture. In such cases, a copy of the invalidation
letter will be given to the licence holder and copy thereof will be sent to
the intermediate supplier as well as the licensing authority of the
intermediate supplier as well as the licensing authority of the
intermediate supplier. The licencee in such case has an option either to
supply the intermediate product to holder of Advance Licence for physical
exports/deemed exports or to export directly.”
The aforesaid narratives would demonstrate that the assessee could get the
duty drawback and it could happen when advance licence holder category of
buyers got their advance licences invalidated thereby surrendering the
benefits accrued under such advance licence. Issue for consideration is as
to whether it would constitute ‘additional consideration’ received by the
assessee as per the definition of ‘transaction value’ contained in Section
4 of the Act read with Rule 6 of the Rules. We, therefore, shall reproduce
the relevant portion of the provisions of Section 4 which existed at the
material time, which read as under:
“4. Valuation of excisable goods for purposes of charging of duty of
excise. – (1) Where under this Act, the duty of excise is chargeable on
any excisable goods with reference to their value, then, on each removal of
the goods, such value shall –
(a) in a case where the goods are sold by the assessee, for delivery at
the time and place of the removal, the assessee and the buyer of the goods
are not related and the price is the sole consideration for the sale, be
the transaction value.
xx xx xx
(d) “transaction value” means the price actually paid or payable for the
goods, when sold, and includes in addition to the amount charged as price,
any amount that the buyer is liable to pay to, or on behalf of, the
assessee, by reason of, or in connection with the sale, whether payable at
the time of the sale or at any other time, including, but not limited to,
any amount charged for, or to make provision for, advertising or publicity,
marketing and selling organization expenses, storage, outward handling,
servicing, warranty, commission or any other matter; but does not include
the amount of duty of excise, sales tax and other taxes, if any, actually
paid or actually payable on such goods.”
As is clear from the reading of the aforesaid provision, the duty of excise
is chargeable on the excisable goods with reference to the value of such
goods. Generally, the price of the goods, i.e. the price at which such
goods are ordinarily sold by the assessee to a buyer is to be the value of
the goods. This value is called the ‘transaction value’. The Central
Government has also framed the Rules which, inter alia, lay down the
provisions for determination of value. Rule 6 thereof, with which we are
specifically concerned, reads as under:
“RULE 6. Where the excisable goods are sold in the circumstances specified
in clause (a) of sub section (1) of section 4 of the Act except the
circumstance where the price is not the sole consideration for sale, the
value of such goods shall be deemed to be the aggregate of such transaction
value and the amount of money value of any additional consideration flowing
directly or indirectly from the buyer to the assessee.
Explanation. – For removal of doubts, it is hereby clarified that the
value, apportioned as appropriate, of the following goods and services,
whether supplied directly or indirectly by the buyer free of charge or at
reduced cost for use in connection with the production and sale of such
goods, to the extent that such value has not been included in the price
actually paid or payable, shall be treated to be the amount of money value
of additional consideration flowing directly or indirectly from the buyer
to the assessee in relation to sale of the goods being valued and
aggregated accordingly, namely:
(i) value of materials, components, parts and similar items relatable to
such goods;
(ii) value of tools, dies, moulds, drawings, blue prints, technical maps
and charts and similar items used in the production of such goods;
(iii) value of material consumed, including packaging materials, in the
production of such goods;
(iv) value of engineering, development, art work, design work and plans
and sketches undertaken elsewhere than in the factory of production and
necessary for the production of such goods.”
Even when these goods are sold by the assessee at different prices to
different classes of buyers (not being related persons), each such price is
to be deemed to be the normal price of such goods in relation to each class
of buyers. However, as per the definition of ‘transaction value’ contained
in this very section, i.e. Section 4(3)(d), certain charges can be added to
the price at which the goods are actually sold, under certain
circumstances. These include the provision for advertising or publicity,
marketing and selling organization expenses, storage, outward handling,
servicing, warranty commission etc. In the present case, we are not
concerned with this aspect. However, Rule 6 of the Rules specifies that if
the goods are sold in the circumstances specified in clause (a) of sub-
section (1) of Section 4, then the value of such goods shall be deemed to
be the aggregate of such transaction value plus the ‘amount of money value
of any additional consideration flowing directly or indirectly from the
buyer to the assessee’. The implication of this Rule is that any form of
additional consideration which flows from the buyer to the assessee,
monitory value thereof is to be included while arriving at the transaction
value. It is not necessary that such an additional consideration is to
flow directly and even indirect consideration is includible. It is in this
context we have to examine as to whether the consideration in the form of
drawback, which accrued in favour of the assessee, could be connected with
the buyer. To put it otherwise, though the immediate source of the duty
drawback is the Government, whether its flow can be traced back to the
buyer? If it is so, it ay become a case of indirect consideration coming
from the buyer and can be added to the transaction value.
In the case of IFGL[4], this Court has given the answer in the affirmative
to the aforesaid issue. It is also conceded by the learned counsel
appearing for the assessee that the said judgment was rendered on almost
identical fact situation. That is why the endeavour of Mr. Lakshmikumaran
is to impress upon us to take a different view. He sought to discredit the
opinion of the Court in the said case by arguing that the advance licence
for intermediate supply was granted by the DGFT to the assessee under the
EXIM Policy and it had nothing to do with the buyer. He conceded that it
could happen only after buyers got their advance licences invalidated. But
his explanation was that it was not necessary that such a licence could be
issued to the assessee merely because the advance licence in favour of the
buyer was invalidated. He emphasized that DGFT could still refuse to issue
the advance licence for intermediate supply to the assessee.
This argument does not convince us at all. Fact remains that the issuance
of advance licence for intermediate supply to the assessee was facilitated
as a result of surrender of advance licence in favour or the buyer by the
buyer. Thus, getting the licence invalidated for direct import of items in
favour of the buyer was the trigger point for issuance of the advance
licence for intermediate supply in favour of the assessee. Possibility of
refusal on the part of DGFT to issue licence in favour of the assessee is
only in the realm of conjecture. Fact is that the assessee got the licence
and it became possible only on account of sacrifice made by the buyers.
Further, what is important is that the buyers got their advance licences
for direct import in their favour invalidated with the sole purpose of
purchasing the polyester staple fiber from the assessee at lesser price,
i.e. ?37.50 per kg. Therefore, the argument of the assessee that benefit
in the form of imports without payment of duty flows to the assessee only
pursuant to and based on licence issued by DGFT to the assessee and does
not flow from the invalidation letter received by the customer from DGFT is
too ingenuous an argument to be accepted.
Another argument which was advanced by the learned counsel for the assessee
was that discounted price is charged from the advance licence holder
category of buyers by the assessee because of saving in customs duty on
inputs due to statutory notification with consequent reduction in cost of
production and, therefore, it is not a consideration flowing from a buyer.
In this behalf, the submission was that the customs duty, otherwise
leviable on the inputs going into the manufacture of polyester staple
fiber, is exempted by the statutory notification issued by the Central
Government, being Notification No. 31/1997-CUS, and it is because of the
benefit availed by the assessee under this Notification that it is able to
effect supply of polyester staple fiber on discounted price to an ultimate
exporter holding advance licence. Therefore, the additional discount
offered to a customer, who is the exporter, is never an additional
consideration.
The aforesaid argument of the learned counsel for the assessee may appear
to be impressive, when taken in isolation i.e. without having regard to all
the attending facts. However, when the argument is tested keeping in view
the entirety of the circumstances, as already taken note of above, the
hollowness of this argument stands exposed, inasmuch as, this argument
glosses over the fundamental fact that the assessee had been able to get
the benefit of Notification No. 31/1997-CUS based on licence issued by DGFT
in its favour and the raison d’etre for issuance of said licence by the
DGFT to the assessee was invalidation of the advance licence by the buyers.
Therefore, the source or gangotri from where the benefit has ultimately
reached the assessee is the advance licences which were held by the buyers
and their act of invalidation made it possible to flow down the benefit so
as to reach the stream of the assessee.
Yet another argument which was raised by Mr. Lakshmikumaran was that
carving out this category of buyers, namely, those who are/were the holders
of advance licence, to be eligible for purchase at a discounted price was
only a ‘condition for sale of goods’ put forth by the assessee. He
submitted that ‘it was not a consideration for sale of goods’. He, thus,
drew distinction between condition for sale and consideration for sale of
goods and in support of this submission referred to the celebrated and
classic judgment of the English Court in Thomas v. Thomas[5]. This judgment
has been analysed by Chitty on Contracts (31st Edition – Volume I) and Mr.
Lakshmikumaran made the said analysis as part of his submission. That was
a case where a testator, shortly before his death, expressed a desire that
his widow should, during her life, have the house in which he lived, or
£100. After his death, his executors ‘in consideration of such desire’
promised to convey the house to the widow during her life or for so long as
she should continue a window, ‘provided nevertheless and it is hereby
further agreed’ that she should pay £1 per annum towards the ground rent,
and keep the house in repair. In an action by the widow for breach of this
promise, the consideration for it was stated to be the widow’s promise to
pay and repair. An objection that the declaration omitted to state part of
the consideration, viz. the testator’s desire, was rejected. Patteson, J.
said: ‘Motive is not the same thing with consideration. Consideration
means something which is of value in the eye of the law moving from the
plaintiff’. Commenting upon the aforesaid remarks, Chitty observes:
“This remark should not be misunderstood: a common motive for making a
promise is the desire to obtain the consideration; and an act or
forbearance on the part of the promisee may (unless the court is prepared
to “invent” a consideration) fail to constitute consideration precisely
because it was not the promisor’s motive to secure it. What Patteson J.
meant was that a motive for promising did not amount to consideration
unless two further requirements were satisfied, viz: (i) that the thing
secured in exchange for the promise was “of some value in the eye of the
law”; and (ii) that it moved from the plaintiff. Consideration and motive
are not opposites; the former concept is a subdivision of the latter. The
consideration for a promise is (unless the consideration is nominal or
invented) always a motive for promising; but a motive for making a promise
is not necessarily consideration for it in law. Thus the testator’s desire
in Thomas v. Thomas was a motive for the executors’ promise but not part of
the consideration for it. The widow’s promise to pay and repair was
another motive for the executors’ promise and did constitute the
consideration for that promise.”
From this very judgment, Chitty also explains the distinction between
consideration and condition. According to him, the plaintiff’s remaining a
widow was not part of the consideration but a condition of her entitlement
to enforce the executor’s promise. This case is contrasted with another
judgment in Re Soames[6]. The discussion in this behalf reads as under:
“On the other hand, in Re Soames A promised £3,000 to B if B would set up a
school in the running of which A was to have an active part. It was held
that, by establishing the school, B had provided consideration for A’s
promise. It seems that the distinction between consideration and condition
depends, in such cases, on whether “a reasonable man would or would not
understand that the performance of the condition was requested as the price
or exchange for the promise.” In Thomas v. Thomas the executors had not
requested the plaintiff to remain a widow; while in Re Soames a request by
A that B should establish the school could be inferred from A’s expressed
intention to participate in its management. This distinction is further
illustrated by Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. where the claimant
provided consideration for the defendants’ promise by using the smoke-ball;
but her catching influenza was a condition of her entitlement to enforce
that promise.”
We are afraid, such a distinction between consideration and condition, as
sought to be drawn by the learned counsel for the assessee, would not apply
to the instant case. It was possible if the transaction between the buyers
and the assessee was seen in isolation. However, in the present case, it
needs to be emphasized at the cost of repetition that the resultant effect
of invalidating the advance licence by the buyer was issuance of licence
for intermediate supply in favour of the assessee and the said licence
enured certain benefits in favour of the assessee. In the present case, on
these facts, we have to simply see as to whether the definition of
‘transaction value’, as contained in Section 4 of the Act read with Rule 6
of the Rules, would encompass this benefit as amounting to additional
consideration. Our conclusion is that it would come within the ambit of
additional consideration indirectly flowing from the buyers to the
assessee. Therefore, the instant case is more akin to the decision in Re
Soames[7].
At this stage, we would like to recall the following findings arrived at by
the Commissioner, which are not upset by the Tribunal in the impugned
decision or even disputed by the assessee:
(a) The assessee had supplied goods to a particular type of buyers at much
lower price than the price charged from the general buyers in the normal
course of trade as it had obtained the facility of invalidating of advance
licences from such buyers and procured imported raw material (duty free)
against such licences for manufacturing of finished goods. It is,
therefore, alleged that the assessee and the buyers had mutuality of
interest in the business of each other and there was a flow back and the
price was not the sole consideration for sale in these cases in accordance
with the provisions of Section 4(1)(a) of the Act.
(b) Therefore, they were related persons in terms of provisions of the
erstwhile Section 4(4)(c), presently Section 4(3)(b)(iv) of the Act.
(c) It is observed that para 7.7 of the EXIM Policy on Advance Release
Order speaks of mutuality of interest as the assessee had procured duty
free imported raw materials against invalidation of advance licence of the
consignees and in turn it sold the finished goods to the said consignees at
lower prices as compared to other normal buyers. Thus, the price was not
the only consideration.
(d) Once the advance licence is invalidated, the said clearance to the
buyers who were earlier holding the said licences need not be treated as
deemed export and rightly the assessee had cleared the said goods to such
buyers on payment of excise duty, but at lower value than the clearance
made to the normal buyers. Thus, the assessee appeared to have derived
double benefits in these transactions, i.e. (i) enhanced sale and paid less
duty on lower value; and (ii) imported duty free raw materials.
(e) In this case, the right to procure duty free imported raw material is
being transferred to supplier by the buyer. This indicates the flow back
of additional considerations from the buyer of the said goods to the
seller, which is the assessee.
On the facts of this case, we are of the opinion that the Commissioner has
rightly come to the conclusion with regard to the fact that additional
monetary consideration, in addition to the price being paid for the goods,
i.e. transfer of advance import licence in favour of the seller by the
buyer enabling the seller of the goods to effect duty free import of the
raw materials and bringing down the cost of production/procurement, is a
consideration, the monetary value of which has to be considered under the
provisions of the Rules, i.e. Rule 6 thereof.
Thus, we do not see any reason to deviate from the decision rendered by
this Court in IFGL’s[8] case.
Before we part with, one more aspect to which our attention was drawn by
Mr. Lakshmikumaran needs to be addressed. Referring to another judgment of
this Court in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore v. Mazagon Dock
Ltd.[9], a vain attempt was made to show that this judgment was contrary to
the decision rendered by this Court in IFGL’s[10] case. We do not find it
to be so. Interestingly, the Hon’ble Judges {S.N. Variava and Dr. AR
Lakshmanan, JJ.} who comprised the Bench that decided IFGL’s case were the
same who rendered the judgment in Mazagon Dock Ltd.’s case. Another
pertinent factor which is to be taken note of is that the two decisions
were rendered within a short gap of a fortnight. The decision in Mazagon
Dock Ltd. was rendered on July 28, 2005 whereas IFGL’s case was decided on
August 09, 2005. Thus, at the time of pronouncing of the judgment in
IFGL’s case, the same very Bench was conscious of its judgment given
immediately before in Mazagon Dock Ltd.
A reading of the judgment in Mazagon Dock Ltd.’s case would reveal that in
the said case subsidy of 20% was received by the assessee therein from the
Government, which was sought to be included by the Revenue as ‘additional
consideration’ to arrive at the transaction value for the purpose of
central excise. The Court held that this subsidy was not received from the
buyer either directly or indirectly and, therefore, could not be included
in the price of goods qua purpose of excise. On the facts of that case,
the Court found that the respondent in the said case had entered into
contract with Oil & Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) for manufacture
and supply of jack-up rigs. For such a contract, as per the policy of the
Government, 20% subsidy was to be received from the Government and 10% from
ONGC. As far as 10% subsidy received from ONGC is concerned, the same was
also to be includible in the transaction value as additional consideration
flowing from the buyer. However, 20% subsidy from the Government was under
the Government’s own scheme with no role of ONGC (buyer in the said case).
Obviously, it could not be said that this subsidy had any flow from the
ONGC either directly or indirectly. The said judgment, therefore, has no
bearing on the present matter.
In view of the foregoing, we are of the considered opinion that this case
is squarely covered by the judgment of this Court in IFGL’s[11] case. We,
thus, allow this appeal, set aside the decision of the Tribunal and restore
the order passed by the Commissioner. In the facts and circumstances of
this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
………………………………………J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
………………………………………J.
(ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN)
NEW DELHI;
AUGUST 21, 2015.
———————–
[1]
2001 (134) ELT 230
[2] (2005) 6 SCC 713
[3] Note 2 above
[4] Note 2 above
[5] (1842) 2 QB 851
[6] (1897) 13 TLR 439
[7] Note 6 above.
[8] Note 2 above
[9] 2005 (187) ELT 3 (SC) :: 2005 (127) ECR 268 (SC)
[10] Note 2 above
[11] Note 2 above
Comments