caselaws
Supreme Court of India
Indian Bank vs Manilal Govindji Khona on 3 February, 2015Bench: V. Gopala Gowda, C. Nagappan
NON REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.1416 OF 2015
(Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 12513 of 2013)
INDIAN BANK ………APPELLANT
Vs.
MANILAL GOVINDJI KHONA ………RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.
Leave granted.
The appellant in this appeal has challenged the judgment and order dated
29.08.2012 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, passed in Writ
Petition No. 3652 of 2012, whereby the High Court allowed the writ petition
and Misc. Application No. 7 of 2012 for condonation of delay in filing
Misc. Application (L) No. 34 of 2012 filed by the respondent before the
Debt Recovery Tribunal(for short “DRT”) and quashing the orders dated
10.04.2012 and 22.02.2012 passed by the Debt Recovery Appellate
Tribunal(for short “DRAT”), Mumbai, in Misc. Appeal No.35 of 2012 and the
DRT respectively.
The brief facts of the case are stated hereunder in a nutshell :-
A Civil Suit No. 2636 of 1987 was filed by the appellant-Bank before
the High Court of Judicature at Bombay against the respondent on 07.09.1987
for recovery of Rs.69,50,213.59 with interest @ 18.5% p.a. with quarterly
rests and enforcement of the mortgage. The High Court vide its order dated
09.12.1996 passed a consent decree in the Civil Suit for the suit amount
together with concessional rate of interest at 12% p.a. which was to be
paid by the respondent to the Bank on or before 31.05.1997. On 31.05.1997,
the respondent tendered the amount in terms of the decree dated 09.12.1996,
which was refused by the appellant. The respondent moved Chamber Summons
No.1066 of 1997, inter alia, for recording the payment of decreetal amount
tendered on 31.05.1997. On 01.08.1997, the respondent applied for ad
interim relief in terms of the above Chamber Summons. However, by the order
dated 01.08.1997, the High Court was pleased to decline to grant ad interim
relief but adjourned the said Chamber Summons for recording evidence to
establish the fact that the respondent had tendered the payment of the
decreetal amount on or before 31.05.1997. Being aggrieved by the same, the
respondent preferred Appeal No.960 of 1997 before the Division Bench of the
High Court. By an order dated 05.12.1997, the said appeal was dismissed and
the S.L.P filed by the respondent was also dismissed by this Court on
23.03.1998.
Thereafter, the High Court directed the Court Receiver by its order dated
03.12.1999, to sell the mortgaged property of the respondent and permitted
the appellant-Bank to participate in the auction, and the Court Receiver
issued notices for auctioning the mortgaged property. The auction was held
on 06.05.2000 at which the appellant-Bank purchased the mortgaged property
for Rs.2,00,00,000/-, the sale of which was approved by the High Court vide
its order dated 21.07.2000. The Court Receiver issued the Sale Certificate
on 18.4.2002 and the same was registered in the name of the appellant-Bank.
Thereafter, a series of applications and proceedings were initiated by the
respondent before the DRT, DRAT and different High Courts and Civil Courts
seeking various reliefs against the appellant-Bank. After the period of 7
years of the issuance of the recovery certificate in favour of the
appellant-Bank, the respondent moved a Misc. application before the
Recovery Officer to set aside the sale of the mortgaged property which was
dismissed on 2.12.2011 by DRT-II, Mumbai. The respondent moved an
application for rectification of recovery certificate dated 29.11.2004
along with an application for condonation of delay in filing the Misc.
application for rectification of recovery certificate dated 29.11.2004 and
an application seeking interim orders in respect of the property which was
sold in the public auction by the Court Receiver. The DRT dismissed the
interim application by its order dated 30.01.2012. The DRT-II further
rejected the condonation of delay application filed by the respondent by
its order dated 22.02.2012. The respondent aggrieved by the above said
order filed an appeal before the DRAT and the same was dismissed vide order
dated 10.04.2012. The respondent further chose to challenge the order of
DRAT before the High Court in W.P.No.3652 of 2012 urging various grounds
and prayed to quash the same and pass appropriate order in the light of the
facts and circumstances of the case. On 29.8.2012, the High Court after
hearing the learned counsel for the parties has allowed the writ petition
by setting aside the orders of the DRT and the DRAT and condoned the delay
in filing Misc. Application (L) No. 34 of 2012 filed by the respondent and
restored the Misc. application filed by him before the DRT-II, Mumbai to
its file and directed it to decide the same on its own merits in accordance
with law afresh in the light of the law declared by this Court and the High
Court on the subject matter.
As the issue before us is with regard to the condonation of delay in filing
the Misc. Application by the respondent and allowing the same in the writ
petition filed by the respondent which is under challenge in this appeal at
the instance of the appellant-Bank by urging various legal grounds, we will
deal with this aspect of the case only, in this judgment. On 25.01.2012,
the respondent filed Misc. Application (L) No.34 of 2012 before DRT-II,
Mumbai for avoiding the sale and seeking rectification of Recovery
Certificate and decree dated 9.12.1996, passed by the High Court. The
filing of that Misc. application was delayed by 23 days. Therefore, the
respondent filed Misc. Application No. 7 of 2012 for condonation of delay
in filing the Misc. Application(L) No.34 of 2012 before the DRT-II, which
application was dismissed by its order dated 22.02.2012, by declining to
exercise its discretionary power to condone the delay in filing such Misc.
application by the respondent. Being aggrieved of the said order, the
respondent filed Misc. Appeal No. 35 of 2012 before the DRAT questioning
the correctness of the above order and prayed to set aside the same and
allow the application by condoning the delay in filing that application
before the DRT. The DRAT vide its order dated 10.4.2012 dismissed the
appeal holding that the same is barred by limitation and no proper and
satisfactory explanation was assigned by the respondent.
Being aggrieved of the same, the respondent approached the High Court by
filing Writ Petition No.3652 of 2012 questioning the correctness of the
order dated 10.04.2012 passed by the DRAT urging various grounds with a
prayer to set aside the above said order. The High Court after hearing the
parties vide its order dated 29.08.2012 has held that the order passed by
the DRT-II in dismissing the application of the respondent without deciding
the issue i.e. whether the public auction of the sale of the mortgaged
property conducted by the Court Receiver as per the direction of the High
Court, after the execution proceedings initiated by the appellant-Bank
against the respondent stood transferred to the DRT in view of Section 31
of DRT Act as the DRT came into existence on 16.07.1999, as per the
notification issued by the Central Government, is not legal and valid in
law. The sale of the property of the respondent has affected his rights as
the same is in contravention of the provisions of the DRT Act and the
relevant rules applicable for sale of the property which go to the root of
the matter and therefore, he has prayed to set aside the order dated
10.04.2012 passed by the DRAT along with the order passed by the DRT on the
Misc. Application No.7 of 2012 seeking for condonation of delay in filing
Misc. Application(L) No.34 of 2012 and requested to restore the same to its
original file of the DRT, Mumbai and also further directed it to decide the
same on its own merits keeping in view the law declared by the High Court
as well as this Court. The appellant-Bank was aggrieved by the above said
judgment and order it has filed this appeal questioning the correctness of
the same by urging various grounds in support of its case.
The learned Solicitor General Mr. Ranjit Kumar appearing on behalf of the
appellant and Mr. Rafeeq P., the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondent, have made elaborate submissions in support of the respective
claim and counter claim of the parties.
The learned Solicitor General has placed reliance upon Article 127 of the
Schedule of Part I of the Limitation Act, 1963, in support of his
contention that the period of 60 days is prescribed in Limitation Act, 1963
for filing Misc. application and a period of one year under Article 99 of
the Schedule of Part IX of the said Act is stipulated for filing a suit
from the date of sale of the property for setting aside the order of the
sale of the mortgaged property. He submits that the provisions of the
Limitation Act are applicable to the DRT proceedings as well, in view of
the relevant provisions of Section 24 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks
and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for short “the Act of 1993”). The
learned Solicitor General has made submission that the orders of the DRT
and DRAT in dismissing the condonation of delay application and
consequently, the Miscellaneous application are erroneously set aside in
the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court as they are barred
by limitation under the aforesaid Articles of the Schedule referred to
supra as the said applications are filed beyond the prescribed period of
limitation under the aforesaid provisions of the Limitation Act. In support
of his submissions, he has placed reliance upon the Constitution Bench
judgment of this Court in Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu & Ors.[1]
which decision is followed by this Court in another case viz. Annapurna v.
Mallikarjun & Anr.[2]. He has further contended that the decree was passed
by the Bombay High Court in the original suit proceedings way back on
9.12.1996 in favour of the appellant-Bank against the respondent for
recovery of the debt amount due from him. The sale of the property of the
respondent was conducted by the Court Receiver, who was appointed by the
High Court in the execution proceedings initiated by the appellant-Bank by
issuing notices on 08.09.1998 and 07.12.1998 for conducting the sale in
public auction of the said mortgaged property of the respondent. The DRT,
Mumbai was established on 16.07.1999 pursuant to the notification issued by
the Central Government under the provisions of the Act of 1993. Further, it
has been contended by him that although, the DRT was empowered to appoint
the Court Receiver for conducting the sale of the mortgaged property in
public auction, there was no adequate infrastructure provided by the
Central Government to the DRT to take possession and charge of the
properties from the Court Receiver of the High Court at the time the
property was ordered to be sold in public auction by the Court Receiver.
The jurisdiction of the High Court with regard to the recovery of debt has
been transferred to the DRT in view of Section 31 of the DRT Act with
effect from 16.7.1999, it was not in a position to take possession of the
mortgaged properties from the Court Receiver of the High Court and manage
the same as there was no infrastructure provided to it by the Central
Government. Since the above assets which were in custody and possession of
the Court Receiver in respect of which securities were created in favour of
the banks and financial institutions and therefore, the same should not
have been permitted to be dissipated by the High Court and therefore, the
High Court has rightly permitted the Court Receiver to sell the mortgaged
property of the respondent in public auction pursuant to the decree passed
by it in favour of the appellant-Bank.
Further, it is contended by the learned Solicitor General that the power
conferred upon the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution of
India is exercised by it even after the DRT was established permitting the
Court Receiver of the High Court to conduct the sale of the property of
respondent in public auction to recover the decreetal money in favour of
the appellant-Bank in terms of the judgment and decree passed by it for the
reason the DRT had no infrastructure to receive the possession of the
property from Court Receiver and sell the same. Therefore, he has submitted
that the High Court could not have found fault with its earlier order in
permitting the Court Receiver to sell the mortgaged property in public
auction to recover the decreetal amount by the Bank by way of sale of the
mortgaged property. The learned Solicitor General has further contended
that the mortgaged property sold by the Court Receiver in the public
auction as per the order passed by the Bombay High Court, could not have
been interfered with by the DRT-II and the DRAT on the Misc. application
filed by the respondent along with the condonation of delay application.
Therefore, he has submitted that the impugned order passed by the High
Court is liable to be set aside in this appeal as the same is not in
accordance with law.
It has been further contended by him that the order dated 3.12.1999 passed
by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Bombay directing the Court
Receiver to proceed with the sale of the mortgaged property of the
respondent in the execution proceedings pursuant to the decree passed by it
with the respondent’s consent and therefore, it is not permissible for him
at the belated stage to turn around and contend that the execution of the
decree and sale of the property by the Court Receiver in the public auction
is not legal and valid. Further, the High Court has exercised its power in
issuing the direction to the Court Receiver for conducting the sale of the
property through public auction on the basis of the judgment of Bombay High
Court in the case of Industrial Credit & Investment Corporation of India
Ltd. v. Patheja Brothers Forgings And Stampings Ltd. & Ors.[3] in which it
has examined the provisions of Section 3 of the Act of 1993, wherein it has
held that after 16.7.1999, in several proceedings, the parties have
challenged the power of the Court Receiver to manage the properties in view
of the DRT Act and therefore, the Court Receiver had no authority to act in
the matter. The High Court held that the Court Receiver, who is appointed
prior to the cut-off date and pending proceedings before the High Court
stands transferred to the DRT by virtue of the provision under Section 31
of the DRT Act as he had the power to sell the properties. It is urged by
him that it has been held by the High Court in the above referred case that
there is no question of conducting de novo proceedings. It is submitted by
him that in view of the above said statement of law laid down by the Bombay
High Court it has passed an order dated 03.12.1999 in exercise of its power
traceable to Article 227 of the Constitution of India, in the execution
proceedings, wherein it has directed the Court Receiver to take steps to
recover the decreetal amount from the respondent by selling the mortgaged
property in public auction and therefore, the same cannot be interfered
with by the DRT in the Misc. Applications filed by the respondent.
On the other hand, it has been contended by the learned counsel on behalf
of the respondent that the Court Receiver had no jurisdiction to sell the
property by way of execution of the decree after the DRT has come into
existence by placing the reliance upon the above case. It has been further
contended by him that the suit proceedings of the Bank stood transferred
automatically to the DRT by operation of law. Further, reliance was also
placed by him on behalf of the respondent upon the case of Raghunath Rai
Bareja & Anr. v. Punjab National Bank & Ors.[4] in support of his legal
contention that in view of Section 31 of the DRT Act, the Court Receiver
had no jurisdiction to sell the mortgaged property by way of execution of
the decree in the public auction as directed by the High Court after the
DRT was established by way of notification, pursuant to the DRT Act. Thus,
even if the direction was given by the Bombay High Court to the Court
Receiver, to execute the decree and sell the mortgaged property, he should
not have executed the same in view of Section 31 of the DRT Act, as the
execution proceedings were automatically transferred to the DRT. Therefore,
the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent has contended that the
order dated 03.12.1999 passed by the High Court in directing the Court
Receiver to proceed with the sale of the mortgaged property in execution of
the order/decree dated 09.12.1996 is null and void ab initio in law and
therefore, the same is wholly unsustainable in law. He has placed reliance
upon the cases of this Court which will be adverted in the later portion of
the judgment that the question of limitation does not arise at all in fling
application for setting aside the sale as the same is vitiated and void ab
initio in law.
The said rival legal contentions are examined by us very carefully with a
view to find out as to whether the impugned judgment and order warrant
interference keeping in view the interpretation of the provisions of the
DRT Act and the constitutional validity of the Act of 1993, which has been
upheld by this Court in the case of George v. State of Kerala[5] and the
other decisions of this Court referred to supra upon which reliance is
placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent.
The learned Solicitor General appearing for the appellant has placed
reliance on the following judgments of this Court, upon which the High
Court has relied viz. State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Ballabh Das & Co. &
Ors.[6] and Punjab National Bank, Dasuya v. Chajju Ram & Ors.[7] in holding
that the High Court has no jurisdiction to pass orders and give directions
to the Court Receiver for sale of the property in public auction after the
establishment of the DRT Act. He has submitted that the said decisions are
distinguishable from the facts of this case that the properties alongwith
the property of the respondent were in possession and custody of the Court
Receiver and the same could not have been transferred by him to the DRT for
want of infrastructure, to be provided by the Central Government to it
after it was established. With regard to the above legal contentions, it
would be necessary for this Court to extract relevant paragraph 9 from the
case of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur vs. Ballabh Das & Co. & Ors.
(supra), for the purpose of examining the relevance and validity of the
submissions made by the learned Solicitor General, as the same would be
applicable to the fact situations of the respondent. The learned counsel
for the respondent has also strongly relied upon the same which reads thus:
“9. ……As the suits were filed by the Bank before establishment of the
Tribunal and were pending in the civil court when the Tribunal came to be
established under the Act, Section 31 became applicable to those suits and
they shall have to be treated as transferred to the Tribunal on and from
the date the Tribunal was established. Section 31 of the Act makes it clear
that the transfer is automatic because of the operation of law and,
therefore, the Bank was really not required to file applications. Those
applications should have been really treated as applications for forwarding
the records of the suits to the Tribunal….”
(emphasis laid by this Court)
Further, it would be relevant for us to extract the paragraph 7 from the
case of Punjab National Bank, Dasuya v. Chajju Ram & Ors. (supra), wherein
this Court has held as under:-
“7. Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that the use of the
words “cause of action” in Section 31 indicated that it is only pending
suits which could be tr[pic]ansferred. We are unable to agree with this
submission. The words “cause of action” are preceded by the words “being a
suit or proceeding”. Section 31 contemplates not only the transfer of a
suit but also transfer of a proceeding which may be other than a suit, like
an execution application……..”
(emphasis laid by this Court)
In view of the law laid down by this Court in the above cases upon which
strong reliance is placed by the learned counsel for the respondent, the
submission made by the learned Solicitor General to distinguish the same on
facts cannot be accepted by us as the same is contrary to the law laid down
by this Court.
The other contention of the learned Solicitor General that the sale of the
mortgaged property made by the Court Receiver in favour of the appellant-
Bank by way of execution of the decree dated 09.12.1996 passed by the High
Court and issuance of the sale certificate in favour of the appellant-Bank
and handing over of the possession of the schedule property to it on
08.08.2000, and the Miscellaneous Application filed by the respondent
before the DRT seeking the relief as stated above, cannot be entertained
and accepted by us in view of the above referred cases upon which strong
reliance placed by the learned counsel on behalf of the respondent. The
contention urged on the question of limitation by the learned Solicitor
General on behalf of the appellant-Bank placing reliance upon the decisions
of this Court in the cases of Dadi Jagannadham and Annapurna (supra) are
wholly inapplicable to the fact situation of the case on hand in view of
the decision of the three Judge Bench judgment of this Court in Sushil
Kumar Mehta v. Gobind Ram Bohra[8]. In this case, this Court has dealt with
regard to the Limitation Act, in exercise of its power under Article 136 of
the Constitution after examining the fact situation in the above said case
in support of the proposition of law that a decree, which is passed by the
court without jurisdiction is a nullity in the eye of law and the same
cannot be allowed to operate and such decree is executed during pendency of
the Special Leave Petition before this Court, in such cases it would grant
relief to the aggrieved party, who has suffered from injustice by setting
aside the execution order and further held that defect of jurisdiction of
the court cannot be cured by consent or waiver of the parties. In the said
case this Court has elaborately considered the relevant factual and legal
aspect of the case and has laid down the law at paragraph 10, after
referring to its earlier decision of a Four Judge Bench of this Court
speaking through Venkatarama Ayyar, J. in Kiran Singh v. Chaman Paswan
(1955) 1 SCR 117, which would be worthwhile to be extracted as under:-
“10…….It is a fundamental principle well established that a decree
passed by a court without jurisdiction is a nullity, and that its
invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be
enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in
collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary
or territorial, or whether it is in respect of the subject matter of the
action, strikes at the very authority of the court to pass any decree, and
such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties. If the question
now under consideration fell to be determined only on the application of
general principles governing the matter, there can be no doubt that the
District Court of Monghyr was coram non judice, and that its judgment and
decree would be nullities.”
(emphasis laid by this Court)
Further, vide paragraphs 16 and 17 in Sushil Kumar Mehta (supra), this
Court held as under:-
“16. In Ledgard v. Bull, (1886) 11 App Cas 648, the Privy Council laid
down that where the original court in a suit was inherently lacking
jurisdiction, and was incompetent to try the same, on its transfer by
consent of parties, to a court with jurisdiction such consent did not
operate as a waiver of the plea of want of jurisdiction.
17. In Barton v. Fincham, (1921) 2 KB 291, 299, wherein it was held
that:
“… the court cannot give effect to an agreement whether by way of
compromise or otherwise, inconsistent with the provisions of the Act.”
In view of the aforesaid legal principle laid down by this Court after
referring to its earlier decision, Privy Council judgment and also the
Kings Bench decision, we are of the view that the decree which is sought to
be executed by the Court Receiver as per the order dated 3.12.1999 passed
by the High Court, giving directions to him to sell the mortgaged property
of the respondent in the execution proceedings of the decree and the
subsequent proceedings of the Court Receiver, including the confirmation of
the sale and the issuance of the sale certificate in favour of the
appellant-Bank is void ab initio in law. In view of the law laid down by
this Court in the cases referred to supra, the contentions urged by the
learned Solicitor General on behalf of the appellant-Bank cannot be
accepted and therefore, we have to hold that the impugned judgment and
order cannot be interfered with by this Court.
We are of the view that the High Court has rightly found fault with the DRT
and DRAT in rejecting the Misc. Application filed by the respondent, who
has sought for rectification of the recovery certificate filed by him.
Therefore, the High Court has rightly rejected the same after adverting to
the judgments in the cases of State Bank of Bikaner & Jaipur v. Ballabh Das
& Co. & Ors. (supra) and Punjab National Bank, Dasuya v. Chajju Ram & Ors.
(supra). The exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court for giving the
direction to the Court Receiver to sell the mortgaged property even after
the DRT was established at Mumbai and in view of the fact that the
proceedings before the High Court were automatically transferred to it in
view of Section 31 of the DRT Act and therefore it was impermissible in law
for the High Court to direct the Court Receiver to sell the property of the
respondent in public auction by executing the Court decree, which action of
the Court Receiver is void ab initio in law. Therefore, the order of the
DRT and the DRAT, in dismissing the condonation of delay application by the
respondent holding that the same is barred by limitation and consequently
dismissing Misc. Application to set aside the sale is untenable in law and
therefore, the High Court has rightly answered the legal contentions in
favour of the respondent by giving valid and cogent reasons in the impugned
judgment in exercise of its Judicial Review power.
The provisions of the Limitation Act are applicable to the proceedings of
the DRT in view of Section 24 of the Act of 1993 and therefore, the
provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act are applicable to the
provisions of the said Act. The same has not been examined and considered
by the DRT-II and the DRAT at the time of passing the impugned orders in
the writ petitions. Therefore, the High Court has rightly exercised its
discretionary power keeping in view the rights of the respondent upon the
immovable property involved in this case and it has condoned the delay in
filing Misc. Application and accordingly the orders of the DRT-II and the
DRAT impugned in the writ petition are set aside by allowing the same.
In view of the foregoing reasons, the legal contentions urged on behalf of
the appellant-Bank have no substance in the matter for the reason that the
recovery certificate issued on 29.11.2004, was sought to be modified by the
appellant-Bank itself by filing an application before the DRT-II and the
same has not been modified, which is another strong ground for the
respondent to file Misc. application for the cancellation of the sale of
the property in favour of the appellant-Bank, along with condonation of
delay application urging tenable grounds.
The issue raised by the respondent in the present case strikes at the very
authority of the High Court in permitting the Court Receiver by its order
dated 3.12.1999 to auction the mortgaged property of the respondent in
public auction pursuant to the decree passed by the High Court in favour
of the appellant-Bank. The above said important aspect of the case is
required to be examined and considered by the DRT-II in the Miscellaneous
application which is remitted back to it in the impugned judgment of the
High Court.
Further, we make it clear that we have recorded our reasons in this
judgment on the basis of the rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the
parties. Nonetheless, the DRT-II is required to examine the Miscellaneous
application of the respondent independently on its own merit and in
accordance with law without being influenced by our observations made in
this judgment.
For the above stated reasons, the impugned judgment and order passed by
the High Court by setting aside the orders of DRT-II and DRAT and further
remanding the matter to DRT-II for its re-consideration of the
Miscellaneous application, is in accordance with the provisions of the Act
and the law laid down by this Court in this regard and the same cannot be
found fault with by this Court. Hence, there is no merit in this appeal,
and the same is liable to be dismissed. Accordingly, the appeal is
dismissed with costs of Rs.1,00,000/- payable to the respondent.
The parties are directed to maintain status quo of the property involved in
these proceedings which exists as on today till the disposal of the
Miscellaneous Application by the DRT-II.
……………………………………………………………J.
[V. GOPALA GOWDA]
……………………………………………………………J. [C. NAGAPPAN]
New Delhi,
February 3, 2015
ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment COURT NO.12 SECTION IX
S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s)………./2015 arising from SLP(C)No 12513/2013
INDIAN BANK Appellant(s)
VERSUS
MANILAL GOVINDJI KHONA Respondent(s)
Date : 03/02/2015 This petition was called on for pronouncement of JUDGMENT
today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Himanshu Munshi,Adv.
Mr. Durga Dutt, Adv.
For Respondent(s) Mr. Praveen Swarup,Adv.
Hon’ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced the judgment of
the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon’ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.
Leave granted.
The appeal is dismissed in terms of the signed Non-reportable
Judgment.
(VINOD KR. JHA) (MALA KUMARI SHARMA) COURT
MASTER COURT MASTER
(Signed Non-Reportable judgment is placed on the file)
———————–
[1] (2001) 7 SCC 71
[2] (2014) 6 SCC 397
[3] (2000) 2 BOMLR 567
[4] (2007) 2 SCC 230
[5] (2002) 4 SCC 475
[6] (1999) 7 SCC 539
[7] (2000) 6 SCC 655
[8] (1990) 1 SCC 193
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