caselaws
Supreme Court of India
International Confederation Of … vs Aditya Pandey & Ors on 20 September, 2016Author: P C Pant
Bench: Ranjan Gogoi, Prafulla C. Pant
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 9412-9413 OF 2016
(arising out of S.L.P (C) Nos. 2380-2381 OF 2014)
International Confederation
of Societies of Authors and
Composers (CISAC) … Appellants
Versus
Aditya Pandey & ors …Respondents
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 9414-9415 OF 2016
(arising out of S.L.P(C) Nos. 21082-21083 OF 2012)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9416 OF 2016
(arising out of S.L.P(C) No. 2379 OF 2014)
J U D G M E N T
Prafulla C. Pant, J.
Leave granted.
All these three appeals are directed against the order dated May 08, 2012
passed by Division Bench of High Court of Delhi in FAO (OS) Nos. 423-424 of
2011 and FAO (OS) No. 425 of 2011 with CM No. 19128 of 2011, whereby said
Court has dismissed the appeals, and affirmed the order of the learned
Single Judge in Suit CS (OS) No. 1185 of 2006 and Copyright Infringement
Suit CS(OS) No. 1996 of 2009 disposing of the Interim Applications moved
for temporary injunction and directions.
Learned Single Judge had disposed of Interim Applications in above
mentioned suits as under:-
“55. In the light of the above conclusions- which are prima facie in
nature, and do not preclude the plaintiffs in both cases, from establishing
and proving their case- the following directions are issued:
In the synergy suit, (i.e. CS(OS) 1185/2006) the applications for temporary
injunctions, i.e. IA Nos., 6486/2006, 7027/2006 and 6487/2006 are disposed
of by stating that the defendants do not have to secure a license from the
plaintiffs;
In the CRI suit, (i.e. CS(OS) No. 1996/2009) the application, i.e. IA Nos.
13691/2009, 13692/2009 are disposed of with the directions that in case the
defendants wish to perform the sound recording in public, i.e. play them, a
license from PPRS is essential; in case the musical works are to be
communicated or performed in the public, independently, through an artiste,
the license of IPRS is essential. In case the defendant wishes to hold an
event involving performances or communication of works of both kinds to the
public, the license or authorization of both IPRS and PPRS are necessary.
The defendant is accordingly restrained from communicating any of such
works to the public, or performing them, in the public, without such
appropriate authorization, or licensing pending adjudication of the suit.”
Issue involved in the present appeals is that where lyric written by ‘X’
(lyricist) and music composed by ‘Y’ (musician) are used to make sound
recording by ‘Z’ (Sound Recording Company), whether ‘A’ (Event Management
Company/Event Organizer) is required to seek licence from ‘X’ and ‘Y’ for
subsequently playing the song in public even after ‘A’ had paid for the
broadcasting of the song to ‘Z’ (Sound Recording Company) ?
Indian Performing Rights Society Limited (For short “IPRS”) (appellant
before us in two of the three appeals) is the Society of authors of
literary work, and composers of musical work, is the plaintiff/appellant.
And International Confederation of Societies, is a non-governmental
organization, an association of copyright societies, registered in France,
which was not the party before the trial court, is the appellant in one of
the above three appeals. Respondent No.2 – Synergy Media Entertainment is
the Event Management Company of which Respondent No.1 is the Senior Manager
(Finance).
The case of the plaintiff/appellant is that authors of literary work and
composers of musical work are the first owners of copyright in lyric and
musical work respectively under the Copyright Act, 1957. As such they have
the right to get restrained Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from infringing their
copyright, and licence given to sound recording company does not affect the
rights of lyricist or the musician. Reference has been made to the
definition of expression “communication to the public” defined under
Section 2(ff) and that of ‘performance’ defined in Section 2(q) of the Act.
Further, reference has been made to the amendment introduced in 1994 in
the Copyright Act, 1957 and it is pleaded that the right created under
Section 14(a)(iv) cannot be read in derogation of right created under
Section 14(a)(iii) of the Act.
The grievance of the International Confederation Society (IFS)/3rd party
appellant is that the petitioner is aggrieved due to the findings and
alleged legal infirmities in the impugned order as it has an immediate and
direct impact on its members and the creative community for their interest
(which the petitioner represents), stands to suffer loss and injury as the
impugned judgment deprives them of their exclusive right to collect royalty
in cases of communication of sound recordings to the public.
On behalf of the appellants, it is further argued that the erroneous
finding in the impugned judgment denies the members of the appellants the
right recognized under various international conventions to which India is
a party, which they hold under copyright law. It is further submitted that
the impugned judgment creates discord between the manner of exploitation
and treatment of same works, in two different countries, contrary to what
the International Conventions and Treaties seek to achieve. It is
contended that the erroneous interpretation of law in the impugned judgment
stands in direct conflict with India’s obligations under the Berne
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works (Paris Act,
1971) and the agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights Agreement, 1994 (TRIPS Agreement), to which India has acceded. It
thus places India out of step with international copyright norms and
practice. Also, it is contended that the impugned judgment places the
reciprocal agreements between IPRS and other collecting societies under
considerable stress as it makes impossible for the Indian Performing Right
Society Limited to fulfill its contractual obligations under the reciprocal
arrangements, thus affecting the rights of millions of songwriters,
composers and publishers.
On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent, it is pointed out that with
the amendment made in the Copyright Act, 1957, in the year 2012, the
producer of sound recording has an independent copyright of his work.
Relying on the law laid down by this Court in Indian Performing Right
Society Ltd. v. Eastern Indian Motion Pictures Association and others[1],
it is contended that once the author of a lyric or a musical work parts
with a portion of his copyright, by authorizing a film producer, or
producer of sound recording in respect of his work, a right exists with the
latter to exhibit his work to the public. Also, it is pleaded that the
appeals filed by Societies, not registered in India, on behalf of the
lyricists and musicians, under Section 33 of the Act, are not maintainable.
Before further discussion, we think it just and proper to reproduce the
relevant provisions of The Copyright Act, 1957 to understand the meaning of
various words and expressions relevant for the purposes of this case and to
appreciate the rights of the parties. Word ‘copyright’ is defined in
Section 14 of the Act which reads as under:
“[2]14. Meaning of copyright.-
For the purposes of this Act, “copyright” means the exclusive right subject
to the provisions of this Act, to do or authorise the doing of any of the
following acts in respect of a work or any substantial part thereof,
namely:-
(a) in the case of a literary, dramatic or musical work, not being a
computer programme, –
to reproduce the work in any material form including the storing of it in
any medium by electronic means;
to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in
circulation;
to perform the work in public, or communicate it to the public;
to make any cinematograph film or sound recording in respect of the work;
to make any translation of the work;
to make any adaptation of the work;
to do, in relation to a translation or an adaptation of the work, any of
the acts specified in relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (vi);
(b) in the case of a computer programme,-
to do any of the acts specified in clause (a);
[3][(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for
commercial rental any copy of the computer programme:
Provided that such commercial rental does not apply in respect of
computer programmes where the programme itself is not the essential object
of the rental.]
(c) in the case of an artistic work,-
[4][(i) to reproduce the work in any material form including –
(A) the storing of it in any medium by electronic or other means; or
(B) depiction in three dimensions of a two dimensional work; or
(C) depiction in two dimensions of a three dimensional work;]
to communicate the work to the public;
to issue copies of the work to the public not being copies already in
circulation;
to include the work in any cinematograph film;
to make any adaptation of the work;
to do in relation to an adaptation of the work any of the acts specified in
relation to the work in sub-clauses (i) to (iv);
(d) In the case of cinematograph film, –
[5][(i) to make a copy of the film, including
(A) a photograph of any image forming part thereof; or
(B) storing of it in any medium by electronic or other means;]
[6][(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for
such rental, any copy of the film;]
(iii) to communicate the film to the public;
(e) In the case of sound recording, –
(i) to make any other sound recording embodying it [7][including
storing of it in any medium by electronic or other means];
[8][(ii) to sell or give on commercial rental or offer for sale or for
such rental, any copy of the sound recording.[
(iii) to communicate the sound recording to the public.
Explanation: For the purposes of this section, a copy which has been sold
once shall be deemed to be a copy already in circulation.”
To appreciate the copyrights of author of literary work on one hand, and
that of the producer of sound recording on the other, it is necessary to
refer to the meaning of “author”, given in clause (d) of Section 2 of the
Act. The same is reproduced below: –
“(2)(d) ‘author’ means,-
(i) in relation to literary or dramatic work, the author of the work;
(ii) in relation to a musical work, the composer;
(iii) in relation to an artistic work other than a photograph, the
artist;
(iv) in relation to a photograph, the person taking the photograph;
[(v) in relation to a cinematograph film or sound recording, the producer;
and
(vi) in relation to any literary, dramatic, musical or artistic work which
is computer-generated, the person who causes the work to be created;][9]
The above definition shows that after amendment made in the definition of
“author” by Act No. 38 of 1994, the producer of sound recording is also an
author. But his right would not affect the separate right of any work in
respect of which sound recording is made, as provided in Section 13(4)
quoted below:
“13(4) The copyright in a cinematograph film or a [sound recording] shall
not affect the separate copyright in any work in respect of which or a
substantial part of which, the film, or as the case may be, the [sound
recording][10] is made”.
It is relevant to mention here that as defined in Section 2(xx), inserted
vide Act No. 27 of 2012, “sound recording” means a recording of sound from
which such sounds may be produced regardless of the medium on which such
recording is the method by which the sounds are produced. And Section
2(ff), inserted by same Amending Act, explains expression “communication to
the public” as under: –
“(ff) “communication to the public” means making any work or
performance available for being seen or heard or otherwise enjoyed by the
public directly or by any means of display or diffusion other than by
issuing physical copies of it, whether simultaneously or at places and
times chosen individually, regardless of whether any member of the public
actually sees, hears or otherwise enjoys the work or performance so made
available.
Explanation.- For the purposes of this clause, communication through
satellite or cable or any other means of simultaneous communication to more
than one household or place of residence including residential rooms of any
hotel or hostel shall be deemed to be communication to the public;”
Section 16 of the Copyright Act, 1957 provides that no person shall be
entitled to copyright otherwise than in accordance of the Act, and it reads
as follows: –
“16. No copyright except as provided in this Act.- No person shall be
entitled to copyright or any similar right in any work, whether published
or unpublished, otherwise than under and in accordance with the provisions
of this Act or of any other law for the time being in force, but nothing in
this section shall be construed as abrogating any right or jurisdiction to
restrain a breach of trust or confidence.
Now, we have to see who is the first owner of copyright and how to
harmonize the copyrights of author of literary work and that of the
‘author’ of sound recording. Clauses (a) and (b) of Section 17 of the
Copyright Act, 1957 and proviso added to it by Act No. 27 of 2012, read as
under: –
“17. First owner of copyright. – Subject to the provisions of this Act, the
author of a work shall be the first owner of the copyright therein:
Provided that –
(a) In the case of a literary, dramatic or artistic work made by the
author in the course of his employment by the proprietor of a newspaper,
magazine or similar periodical under a contract of service or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of publication in a newspaper, magazine or
similar periodical, the same proprietor shall, in the absence of any
agreement to the contrary, be the first owner of the copyright in the work
in so far as the copyright relates to the publication of the work in any
newspaper, magazine or similar periodical, or to the reproduction of the
work for the purpose of its being so published, but in all other respects
the author shall be the first owner of the copyright in the work;
(b) Subject to the provisions of clause (a), in the case of a photograph
taken, or a painting or portrait drawn, or an engraving or a cinematograph
film made, for valuable consideration at the instance of any person, such
person shall, in the absence of any agreement to the contrary, be the first
owner of the copyright therein;
………………………………
Provided that in case of any work incorporated in a cinematograph
work, nothing contained in clauses (b) and (c) shall affect the right of
the author in the work referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (1) of
Section 13.”
Section 13(1)(a) of the Act refers to copyright of original literary,
dramatic, musical and artistic works.”
Let us now look into the relevant provisions which govern the assignment of
work by an author of literary or musical work and licenses in respect
thereof to prospective owner of the copyright or user of the work. Last
proviso to Section 18 with its main part, makes following reading: –
“18. Assignment of copyright. – (1) The owner of the copyright in an
existing work or the prospective owner of the copyright in a future work
may assign to any person the copyright either wholly or partially and
either generally or subject to limitations and either for the whole of the
copyright or any part thereof:
…………………….
……. Provided also that the author of the literary or musical work
included in the sound recording but not forming part of any cinematograph
film shall not assign or waive the right to receive royalties to be shared
on an equal basis with the assignee of copyright for any utilization of
such work except to the legal heirs of the authors or to a collecting
society for collection and distribution and any assignment to the contrary
shall be void.[11]
Needless to say that appellants are the collecting societies.
Further, sub-sections (3), (4) and (10) of Section 19, which are relevant
for the purposes of this case, provide as to mode of assignment as under: –
“19. Mode of assignment. –
…………………………..
(3) The assignment of copyright in any work shall also specify the
amount of royalty and any other consideration payable, to the author or his
legal heirs during the currency of the assignment and the assignment shall
be subject to revision, extension or termination on terms mutually agreed
upon by the parties.
(4) Where the assignee does not exercise the right assigned to him
under any of the other sub-sections of this section within period of one
year from the date of assignment, the assignment in respect of such rights
shall be deemed to have lapsed after the expiry of the said period unless
otherwise specified in the assignment.
…………………….
[(10) No assignment of the copyright in any work to make a sound
recording which does not form part of any cinematograph film shall affect
the right of the author of the work to claim an equal share of royalties
and consideration payable for any utilization of such work in any
form.”][12]
Above quoted sub-section (10) of Section 19 is inserted with effect from
21.06.2012 vide Act No. 27 of 2012, which did not exist on the day the
plaint was filed before trial court in the year 2006. As such rights as
exist w.e.f. 21.06.2012 were not the same prior to it.
In Chapter VI of the Copyright Act, 1957, Section 30 relates to licence
granted by an owner of copyright which reads as under :-
“30. Licences by owners of copyright.- The owner of the copyright in any
existing work or the prospective owner of the copyright in any future work
may grant any interest in the right by licence in [writing by him][13] or
by his duly authorised agent:
Provided that in the case of a licence relating to copyright in any future
work, the licence shall take effect only when the work comes into
existence.
Explanation.- Where a person to whom a licence relating to copyright in any
future work is granted under this section dies before the work comes into
existence, his legal representatives shall, in the absence of any provision
to the contrary in the licence, be entitled to the benefit of the licence.”
“31. Compulsory licence in works withheld from public.-(1) If at any time
during the term of copyright in any work which has been published or
performed in public, a complaint is made to the Copyright Board that the
owner of copyright in the work –
(a) …………………
(b) has refused to allow communication to the public by broadcast, of
such work or in the case of sound recording the work recorded in such sound
recording, on terms which the complainant considers reasonable;
the Copyright Board, after giving to the owner of the copyright in the work
a reasonable opportunity of being heard and after holding such inquiry as
it may deem necessary, may, if it is satisfied that the grounds for such
refusal are not reasonable, direct the Registrar of Copyrights to grant to
the complainant a licence to republish the work, perform the work in public
or communicate the work to the public by [broadcast], as the case may be,
subject to payment to the owner of the copyright of such compensation and
subject to such other terms and conditions as the Copyright Board may
determine; and thereupon the Registrar of Copyrights shall grant the
[licence to such person or persons who, in the opinion of the Copyright
Board, is or are qualified to do so] in accordance with the directions of
the Copyright Board, on payment of such fee as may be prescribed.”[14]
However, we are not aware if any complaint was made before Copyright
Board in the present matter.
At this stage, it is necessary to understand distinction between assignment
of a copyright of a work and licence to use the work. In the assignment,
normally, ownership of the copyright of the work is transferred but in the
case of licence another person is allowed to use the work by the author.
A conjoint reading of various provisions of the Act leaves no doubt that
though each of the seven sub-clauses of clause (a) of Section 14 relating
to literary, dramatic or musical work, are independent of one another, but
reading these sub-clauses independently cannot be interpreted to mean that
the right of producer of sound recording, who also comes under definition
of author under Section 2(d)(v), and has a right to communicate his work to
the public under Section 14(e)(iii) of the Act is lost. It is nobody’s
case that the defendant/respondents had stolen the lyric or that sound
recording is made without licence from the lyricist or musician. Argument
advanced on behalf of the appellants that the permission granted to
defendant was sans the right to communicate the sound recording to the
public, cannot be accepted as there appears no such term and condition
between the parties depriving the defendant from communicating his work of
making song to the public. As far as the International Conventions and
Treaties are concerned, the law has been amended by Act 27 of 2012 w.e.f.
21.06.2012. In the present case the suit was filed in 2006, and the law as
it existed has to be applied, for the period prior to 21.06.2012.
We agree with the Division Bench of the High Court that a song is created
by three players namely lyricist, musician and singer. We have to examine
in the present case as to what extent, if any, identities of above three
players break or get diluted when a song is created and sound recording is
done. To understand this and the relevant provisions of law quoted
above, we would like to remind the observations made by this Court in
paragraphs 63, 64 and 69 in Entertainment Network (India) Ltd. v. Super
Cassette Industries Ltd.[15], which reads as under:
“63. A statute as is well known must be read in its entirety. It is
required to be read chapter by chapter, section by section and clause by
clause. The definitions of the term “broadcast” as also “sound recording”
must be given a wide meaning. Clause (a) of Section 13 protects original
work whereas clauses (b) and (c) protect derivative works. It provides for
commercial manifestation of original work and the fields specified therein.
Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 14 deals with original work. It is
extremely broad. In contrast thereto, the copyright on films or sound
recording work operates in restrictive field; they provide for a
restrictive right as would appear from the provisions contained in Section
14(1)(e) of the Act.
64. For a proper construction of the provisions, will it be necessary to
keep in mind the difference between the right of the original work and
right of sound recording? Should we also bear in mind that there are
various forms of intellectual property rights. Section 16 provides that a
right, inter alia, in respect of any work must be claimed only under and in
accordance with the provisions of the Act unlike trade mark and passing off
rights can be enforced even though they are not registered. It must also be
noticed that whereas the term of a copyright in original literary,
dramatic, musical and artistic works not only remains protected in the
entire lifetime of the author but also until 60 years from the beginning of
the calendar year next following the year in which the author dies, the
term of copyright in sound recording subsists only for 60 years, but as
indicated hereinbefore, the same would not mean that the right of an owner
of sound recording is in any way inferior to that of right of an owner of
copyright on original literary work, etc.
……………………………………..
69. If the right of an author/society is so pervasive, is it necessary to
construe the provisions under Section 31 of the Act having regard to the
international covenants and the laws operating in the other countries? The
answer to the said question must be rendered in affirmative. Interpretation
of a statute cannot remain static. Different canons and principles are to
be applied having regard to the purport and object of the Act. What is
essential therefor is to see that the expanding area in which the copyright
will have a role to play is covered. While India is a signatory to the
international covenants, the law should have been amended in terms thereof.
Only because laws have not been amended, the same would not by itself mean
that the purport and object of the Act would be allowed to be defeated. If
the ground realities change, the interpretation should also change. Ground
realities would not only depend upon the new situations and changes in the
societal conditions vis-à-vis the use of sound recording extensively by a
large public, but also keeping in view of the fact that the Government with
its eyes wide open have become a signatory to international conventions”.
In Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. vs. Eastern Indian Motion Pictures
Association and Other (supra) (Which was decided long before 2012
Amendments) in paragraph 15, this Court has made following observations: –
“15. ……………………….Though a conflict may at first sight seem to exist between
Section 13(4) and Section 14(1)(a)(iii) on the one hand and Section
14(1)(c)(ii) on the other, a close scrutiny and a harmonious and rational
instead of a mechanical construction of the said provisions cannot but lead
to the irresistible conclusion that once the author of a lyric or a musical
work parts with a portion of his copyright by authorising a film producer
to make a cinematograph film in respect of his work and thereby to have his
work incorporated or recorded on the sound track of a cinematograph film,
the latter acquires by virtue of Section 14(1)(c) of the Act on completion
of the cinematograph film a copyright which gives him the exclusive right
inter alia of performing the work in public i.e. to cause the film insofar
as it consists of visual images to be seen in public and insofar as it
consists of the acoustic portion including a lyric or a musical work to be
heard in public without securing any further permission of the author
(composer) of the lyric or musical work for the performance of the work in
public. …………………….”
In view of the above settled principles of law, and for the reasons
discussed by us, we are unable to find any error in the impugned order
passed by the High Court in a suit filed in 2006. However, we would like to
clarify, that with effect from 21.06.2012, in view of sub-section (10) of
Section 19, the assignment of the copyright in the work to make sound
recording which does not form part of any cinematograph film, shall not
affect the right of the author of the work to claim an equal share of
royalties or/and consideration payable for utilization of such work in any
form by the plaintiff/respondent.
Therefore, all the appeals stand disposed of with the observations as
above. No order as to costs.
.……………….……………J.
New Delhi; [Prafulla C. Pant]
September 20, 2016.
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.9412-9413 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.2380-2381 of 2014)
International Confederation of Societies
of Authors and Composers (CISAC) …….Appellant
Versus
Mr. Aditya Pandey & Ors. …….Respondents
With
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.9414-9415 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(C) Nos.21082-21083 of 2012)
CIVIL APPEAL NO.9416 OF 2016
(Arising out of SLP(C) No.2379 of 2014)
J U D G M E N T
PER RANJAN GOGOI, J.
1. I have had the privilege of going through the judgment prepared by my
learned brother (Prafulla C. Pant, J.). While agreeing with the conclusions
reached by my learned brother, I would like to very briefly indicate the
reasons for the same which are somewhat different.
2. The relevant provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957, as amended, have
been set out in detail in the judgment of my learned brother. I, therefore,
need not extract the same all over again. Suffice it to notice that three
classes of works in which copyright subsists under Section 13(1) of the Act
are (a) original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, (b)
cinematograph films and (c) sound recording. A reading of the provisions
of the Act show that such copyright co-exists. The question in the suit in
which the impugned order has been passed by the High Court is one of
determination of the precise extent of such co-existence and the interplay
between the rights in the three classes of works enumerated under Section
13. The said question has been identified in Para 35 of the impugned order
of the Division Bench which is as follows:
“The area of dispute is: what happens to the copyright in an underlying
work (literary and musical works) when the derivative work (sound
recording) is exploited. Does he who obtains a permission from the
copyright owner of the derivative work to broadcast by way of communicating
to the public said derivative work, additionally requires a similar
permission from the owner of the underlying works i.e. the literary and
musical works?”
3. The present appeals being against an interim order, naturally, strong
and compulsive reasons exist for exercise of judicial restraint in the
manner and extent of exercise of jurisdiction. Though it is too elementary
it must be said that the court must refrain from expressing any opinion,
whatsoever, touching upon the merits of the controversy, lest, the same may
prejudice either of the parties in the suit. While there can be no doubt
that an order, even interim, sans any reasons, would not be judicially
acceptable, the precise exercise that a court would be required to
undertake at the interim stage must be left to the wise discretion of the
concerned court itself. It is not only difficult but also undesirable to
lay down the parameters and contours of the exercise of judicial power at
the interim stage by expressly laying conditions which would be binding
under Article 141 of the Constitution. But it needs to be reminded that an
elaborate reasoning with the “footnote” that the same are prima facie or
tentative is hardly an effective remedy to prevent the imprint of such
observations on the human mind that mans the court at different levels.
This is what appears to have happened in the present case.
4. The object of an interim exercise by the court is to find a
reasonable solution to the matter which should govern the parties until
disposal of the suit where the main controversy is required to be decided.
Having perused the order of the learned Single Judge as well as the
Division Bench, I am of the view that the order of the Single Judge, set
out in opening part of the judgment of my learned brother (which has been
affirmed in appeal by the Division Bench of the High Court), strikes a
reasonable note to find a workable solution during the pendency of the
suit. I therefore fully agree with the views expressed by my learned
brother that the order of the High Court needs to be upheld.
5. However, while saying so I would like to take note of two disturbing
trends which have emerged from the facts of the present cases. The suits,
by now, are over 10 years old; yet, there has been no substantial progress
therein. Parties to the suits seem to have lost all interest in prosecuting
the same, perhaps, because the exhaustive orders at the interim stage had
virtually foreclosed the issues in the suits. It is evident from the order
dated 24th August, 2016 passed by the Joint Registrar of the High Court in
O.S No. 1185 of 2006 that due to repeated adjournments sought on behalf of
the plaintiff and on account of the failure of the plaintiff to file
affidavit evidence of witnesses, the right of the plaintiff to lead
evidence has been closed. In the other suits i.e. O.S. No.666 of 2006 and
O.S. No.1996 of 2009 there has, again, been persistent defaults on the part
of the plaintiffs and the said suits now stand transferred to the competent
Civil Court from the Delhi High Court. The pendency of the suits, for a
period of over 10 years with no progress and the conduct of the plaintiffs
in not filing/placing their evidence before the learned trial Judge, though
vehemently contesting the present appeals (against interim orders) are
facts which are difficult to reconcile. Equally difficult is to accept the
fact that the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and
Composers (ICSAC), though not a party to any of the suits but have been
allowed to contest the interim matter before this Court on the basis that
the order of the High Court adversely affects the societies’ rights, has
chosen not to implead itself as a party to the suits and pursue the same.
6. Having said what was felt required and necessary we dispose of all
the appeals by holding all observations, findings and views expressed by
the High Court in the original as well as appellate proceedings before it
to be of no legal effect, whatsoever, in so far as the merits of the suits
are concerned which will now be expedited and heard and disposed of within
a year from today.
……………………….J.
[RANJAN GOGOI]
NEW DELHI
SEPTEMBER 20, 2016.
———————–
[1]
(1977) 2 SCC 820
[2] Substituted vide Act No. 38 of 1994 w.e.f. 10.05.1995
[3] Substituted by Act No. 49 of 1999 w.e.f. 15.01.2000
[4] Substituted by Act No. 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
[5] Substituted by Act No. 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
[6] Substituted by Act No. 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
[7] Inserted by Act No. 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
[8] Substituted by Act No. 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
[9] Sub clauses (v) and (vi) are added vide Act No. 38 of 1994 w.e.f.
10.05.1995
[10] Expression “sound recording” is substituted for “record” vide Act
No. 38 of 1994 w.e.f. 10.05.1995
[11] Second, third and fourth (Last) provisos are added by Act 27 of
2012.
[12] Inserted by Act No. 27 of 2012 w.e.f. 21.06.2012
[13] Substituted for words ‘writing signed by him’ Vide Act 27 of 2012.
[14] As amended Vide Act 27 of 2012
[15] (2008) 13 SCC 30
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