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Supreme Court of India
Jaswant Singh vs The State Of Punjab on 20 October, 2021Author: Dinesh Maheshwari
Bench: Dinesh Maheshwari, Vikram Nath
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Criminal Appeal No.1233 of 2021
(Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No 7072 of 2021)
Jaswant Singh … Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Punjab & Anr. … Respondent(s)
ORDER
VIKRAM NATH, J.
1. By means of this appeal, the appellant Jaswant Singh has prayed for quashing of the
order dated 06.02.2020 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Punjab and Haryana High
Court in CRM-M-32011 of 2018 (O&M) whereby the High Court declined to exercise its powers
under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code 1 to quash the criminal proceedings arising
out of FIR No. 179 dated 29.10.2009 under Section 406/420 of the Indian Penal Code 2 , Police
Station Fatehgarh Sahib, District Fatehgarh Sahib. However, the High Court granted bail to the
appellant subject to certain conditions contained in the said order. The factual matrix giving rise
to the present appeal is narrated hereunder:
2. Respondent no.2 Nasib Singh (the Complainant) moved an application dated
18.08.2009 addressed to the Senior Superintendent of Police, District Fatehgarh Sahib stating
Signature Not Verified
therein that he was known to one Gurmeet Singh, who was in the business of sending people
Digitally signed by
NEETU KHAJURIA
Date: 2021.10.29
17:49:10 IST
Reason:
1 Cr.P.C.
2 I.P.C.
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abroad. Gurmeet Singh had assured the Complainant that his two acquaintances Jaswant
Singh and Gurpreet Singh who were already settled in Italy, would help his son to get a job and
settle in Italy. For the aforesaid arrangement, Gurmeet Singh demanded a total amount of Rs 7
lacs. Further, according to the Complainant, Rs 4 lacs was paid in cash on 10.12.2008 and
thereafter Rs. 2 lacs were paid by way of a cheque dated 18.02.2009 of the Punjab National
Bank, Branch AS College, Khanna in favour of Gurmeet Singh which amount has since been
credited in the account of Gurmeet Singh. Soon thereafter Sarpreet Singh, son of the
Complainant, was put on a flight to Italy on 19.02.2009. Further allegation is that Jaswant
Singh and Gurpreet Singh did not honour their promise and harassed his son. They did not
arrange for a job as per their promise. The documents were misplaced by them and ultimately
his son had to return after three/four months. The complaint further alleges that the named
accused further demanded Rs. 3 lacs and also threatened of dire consequences in case the
money was not paid. That his son was mentally upset and he has also spent huge amount in
travelling and treatment of his son. It is thus prayed that appropriate action be taken and justice
be done to the Complainant.
3. The said complaint was inquired into by the ASI Manjit Singh of the Economic Offences
Wing, Fatehgarh Sahib. In the inquiry, the statements of the Complainant, his son and Gurmeet
Singh were recorded. Further Jaswant Singh and Gurpreet Singh, who were settled abroad
and named in the complaint, were also called upon to submit their statements which they have
forwarded through e-mail. The Inquiry Officer did not find the case so as to make out any
offence of cheating or breach of trust and, accordingly, recommended that the application be
consigned by order dated 04.09.2009.
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4. The in-charge, Economic Offences Wing, Shri Gurdeep Singh, also examined the
material and the evidence on record and concurred with the recommendation made by the ASI
on 04.09.2009. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Bassi Pathana, Shri Rajwinder Singh
also recommended that there is no need of any action on the application and the same may be
consigned. However, the Senior Superintendent of Police Shri Kostav Sharma, directed the
Station House Officer to register a first information report and accordingly an FIR was
registered on 29.10.2009. The matter was further investigated and a police report under
Section 173(2) of the Cr.P.C. was submitted with the finding that a triable case was made out
only against Gurmeet Singh, and as against the other two named accused Jaswant Singh and
Gurpreet Singh, as there was no evidence of any offence, they were exonerated.
5. In the meantime, an additional statement of the complainant Nasib Singh was recorded
on 20.05.2010 in which also he clearly stated that he had paid the amount to Gurmeet Singh,
Rs. 4 lacs in cash and Rs. 2 lacs by cheque.
6. Based on the police report and the material enclosed with it, the Magistrate First Class
at Fatehgarh Sahib took cognizance and registered the Case No CHI/0600029/2010. During
the trial the prosecution moved an application on 11.06.2013 purported to be under Section 319
Cr.P.C. praying for summoning the appellant and the other co-accused Gurpreet Singh to face
trial under Section 420 I.P.C. On the same day the Trial Court summoned both the accused
under Section 420 I.P.C. As the appellant was in Italy, he did not appear and accordingly was
declared as a proclaimed offender on 28.04.2014. The appellant filed a petition under Section
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482 Cr.P.C. before the High Court in September, 2018 for quashing of the order dated
28.04.2014 declaring him as a proclaimed offender.
7. In the meantime, the complainant Nasib Singh entered into a compromise with the main
accused Gurmeet Singh and they jointly applied before the Trial Court. The Trial Court, vide
order dated 26.09.2014 allowed the parties to amicably resolve their issue being of economic
import and accordingly compounded the offence. Proceedings were eliminated against the
accused Gurmeet Singh.
8. The High Court, vide interim order dated 10.09.2018, stayed the order of the Trial Court
dated 28.04.2014 and further directed the appellant to surrender before the Trial Court within
two weeks and on his doing so the Trial Court was directed to release him on interim bail
subject to its satisfaction. The appellant thereafter appeared before the Trial Court on
27.10.2018 whereafter the Trial Court admitted him to interim bail on his furnishing bail bonds
and surety bonds and in the sum of Rs.1 lac.
9. In the pending 482 Cr.P.C. petition before the High Court, the appellant filed another
application registered as CRM No 4655/2020 wherein he prayed for quashing of the
proceedings on various grounds and in particular that the complainant had already settled his
score with the main accused Gurmeet Singh and on their joint request the Trial Court had
already eliminated/ acquitted Gurmeet Singh of the offence.
10. The High Court vide order dated 10.01.2020 permitted to place on record the order
granting interim bail and also the order of compounding/acquittal of the co-accused and any
other material which the appellant may wish to file. All the relevant material was filed by the
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appellant before the High Court by way of an application dated 04.02.2020.
11. The High Court, vide the impugned judgment, declined to quash the proceedings on the
ground that a perusal of the FIR goes to show that the name of the appellant is specifically
mentioned in the FIR and criminal acts have been attributed to him. However, the High Court
with respect to the order dated 28.04.2014 declared the appellant to be a proclaimed offender
and directed him to surrender before the Trial Court within two weeks and to move an
application for a regular bail, which was to be decided within two weeks subject to three
conditions. It would be worthwhile to reproduce the order of the High Court, which reads as
follows:
“By way of filing the present petition, petitioner Jaswant Singh, a non resident
Indian seeks quashing of F.I.R.No.179 dated 29.10.2009 under Sections 406/420
IPC registered at Police Station Fatehgarh Sahib, District Fatehgarh Sahib.
I have gone through the F.I.R. A perusal thereof goes to show that name of
petitioner is specifically mentioned in the F.I.R. and criminal acts have been
attributed to him. Therefore, no ground is there to quash the F.I.R., as such
request in that regard is declined. With regard to order dated 28.4.2014 vide
which he has been declared a proclaimed offender, he is directed to surrender in
the trial Court within two weeks. On his doing so and moving application for
regular bail, the same be decided within two weeks. Till then he may not be
arrested. This order is subject to the following conditions:-
i) The petitioner shall surrender his Passport in the trial Court.
ii) The petitioner shall appear in the trial Court on each and every date of
hearing.
iii) The petitioner shall not give any threat or intimidation to the prosecution
witnesses.
The petition is disposed of.”
12. When this matter came up before us on 24.09.2021, we had issued notice and further
provided that no coercive steps be taken against the appellant.
13. We have heard Shri Lakhwinder Singh Mann, learned counsel for the appellant and Shri
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Jaspreet Singh Gogia, learned counsel for the respondent.
14. In our view, the present one is amongst those fittest cases where the High Court ought
to have exercised its powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. and ought to have secured the ends of
justice by closing the proceedings against the appellants. It is also surprising as to how and in
what circumstances after moving an application under Section 319 Cr.P.C., the prosecution
continued to contest the case even after 26.09.2014 when the matter had already been
compromised and compounded as against the main accused Gurmeet Singh. Apparently, the
parties were not able to correctly place the facts and material before the Trial Court or the High
Court, which could have closed this matter then and there without proceeding any further.
15. The power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised to prevent the abuse of process
of any Court and also to secure the ends of justice. This Court, time and again, has laid
emphasis that inherent powers should be exercised in a given and deserving case where the
Court is satisfied that exercise of such power would either prevent abuse of such power or such
exercise would result in securing the ends of justice. In the case of S.W. Palanitkar and others.
v. State of Bihar and another 3. Shivraj V Patil, J., in paragraph 27 of the report, has laid similar
emphasis. The same is reproduced below:
“Para 27:
…….whereas while exercising power under Section 482 CrPC the High
Court has to look at the object and purpose for which such power is
conferred on it under the said provision. Exercise of inherent power is
available to the High Court to give effect to any order under CrPC, or
to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure
the ends of justice. This being the position, exercise of power under
Section 482 CrPC should be consistent with the scope and ambit of the
same in the light of the decisions aforementioned. In appropriate cases, to
prevent judicial process from being an instrument of oppression or
harassment in the hands of frustrated or vindictive litigants, exercise of
3 (2002) 1 SCC 241
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inherent power is not only desirable but necessary also, so that the
judicial forum of court may not be allowed to be utilized for any oblique
motive. When a person approaches the High Court under Section 482
CrPC to quash the very issue of process, the High Court on the facts and
circumstances of a case has to exercise the powers with circumspection
as stated above to really serve the purpose and object for which they are
conferred.”
16. A seven-Judge Bench in the case of P. Ramachandra Rao vs State of Karnataka 4, also laid
down the same principles for use of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. in a case where the
Court was convinced that such exercise was necessary for whatever reason in order to prevent
abuse of the process of any Court or to secure the ends of justice. Lahoti,J., speaking for him-
self and Bharucha, Quadri, Santosh Hegde, Ruma Pal and Arijit Pasayat,JJ., observed as
follows in paragraph 21:
“Para 21. “… In appropriate cases, inherent power of the High Court,
under Section 482 can be invoked to make such orders, as may be
necessary, to give effect to any order under the Code of Criminal
Procedure or to prevent abuse of the process of any court, or otherwise,
to secure the ends of justice. The power is wide and, if judiciously and
consciously exercised, can take care of almost all the situations where
interference by the High Court becomes necessary on account of delay in
proceedings or for any other reason amounting to oppression or
harassment in any trial, inquiry or proceedings. In appropriate cases, the
High Courts have exercised their jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC for
quashing of first information report and investigation, and terminating
criminal proceedings if the case of abuse of process of law was clearly
made out. Such power can certainly be exercised on a case being made
out of breach of fundamental right conferred by Article 21 of the
Constitution. The Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay case referred to such
power, vesting in the High Court (vide paras 62 and 65 of its judgment)
and held that it was clear that even apart from Article 21, the courts can
take care of undue or inordinate delays in criminal matters or proceedings
if they remain pending for too long and putting an end, by making
appropriate orders, to further proceedings when they are found to be
oppressive and unwarranted.””
4 (2002) 4 SCC 578
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17. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Gian Singh vs State of Punjab 5 again summarized
the legal position which emerged regarding powers of the High Court in quashing criminal pro-
ceedings in exercise of power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. R.M. Lodha, J., (as he then was)
speaking for the Bench, clearly observed in paragraph 61 of the report that criminal cases hav –
ing overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the pur-
poses of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil,
partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry,
etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the
parties have resolved their entire dispute. The relevant extract from paragraph 61 is
reproduced below:
“61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be
summarised thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal
proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is
distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for
compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power
is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in
accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz.: (i) to secure the
ends of justice, or (in) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In
what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR
may be exercised where the offender and the victim have settled their
dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and
no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power,
the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the
crime. Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like
murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the
victim or victim’s family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such
offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society.
Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation
to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act
or the offences committed by public servants while working in that
capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal
proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having
overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different
footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from
commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like
transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry,
5 (2012) 10 SCC 303
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etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal
in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this
category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if
in its View, because of the compromise between the offender and the
victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of
the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and
prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing
the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise
with the victim. In other words, the High Court must consider whether it
would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the
criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would
tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and
compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure
the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end
and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High
Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”
18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in Parbatbhai Aahir Alias Parbatbhai Bhimsinhbhai
Karmur and others v. State Gujarat and others 6 laid down the broad principles for exercising the
inherent powers of the High Court under section 482 Cr.P.C. Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud,J.,
speaking for the bench, enumerated the principles in paragraph 16 and in sub paragraphs. The
same are reproduced below:
“16. The broad principles which emerge from the precedents on the
subject, may be summarised in the following propositions:
16.1. Section 482 preserves the inherent powers of the High Court to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court or to secure the ends of
justice. The provision does not confer new powers. It only recognises and
preserves powers which inhere in the High Court.
16.2. The invocation of the jurisdiction of the High Court to quash a first
information report or a criminal proceeding on the ground that a
settlement has been arrived at between the offender and the victim is not
the same as the invocation of jurisdiction for the purpose of compounding
an offence. While compounding an offence, the power of the court is
governed by the provisions of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973. The power to quash under Section 482 is attracted even
if the offence is non-compoundable.
16.3. In forming an opinion whether a criminal proceeding or complaint
should be quashed in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482, the
High Court must evaluate whether the ends of justice would justify the
exercise of the inherent power.
16.4. While the inherent power of the High Court has a wide ambit and
6 (2017) 9 SCC 641
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plenitude it has to be exercised (0) to secure the ends of justice, or ) to
prevent an abuse of the process of any court.
16.5. The decision as to whether a complaint or first information report
should be quashed on the ground that the offender and victim have
settled the dispute, revolves ultimately on the facts and circumstances of
each case and no exhaustive elaboration of principles can be formulated.
16.6. In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing
with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have
due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence. Heinous and serious
offences involving mental depravity or offences such as murder, rape and
dacoity cannot appropriately be quashed though the victim or the family of
the victim have settled the dispute. Such offences are, truly speaking, not
private in nature but have a serious impact upon society. The decision to
continue with the trial in such cases is founded on the overriding element
of public interest in punishing persons for serious offences.
16.7. distinguished from serious offences, there may be criminal cases
which have an overwhelming or predominant element of a civil dispute.
They stand on a distinct footing insofar as the exercise of the inherent
power to quash is concerned.
16.8. Criminal cases involving offences which arise from commercial,
financial, mercantile, partnership or similar transactions with an essentially
civil flavour may in appropriate situations fall for quashing where parties
have settled the dispute.
16.9. In such a case, the High Court may quash the criminal proceeding if
in view of the compromise between the disputants, the possibility of a
conviction is remote and the continuation of a criminal proceeding would
cause oppression and prejudice; and
16.10. There is yet an exception to the principle set out in propositions
16.8, and 16.9. above. Economic offences involving the financial and
economic well-being of the State have implications which lie beyond the
domain of a mere dispute between private disputants. The High Court
would be justified in declining to quash where the offender is involved in
an activity akin to a financial or economic fraud or misdemeanour. The
consequences of the act complained of upon the financial or economic
system will weigh in the balance.”
19. From the above discussion on the settled legal principles, it is clear from the facts of the
present case that there was a clear abuse of the process of the Court and further that the Court
had a duty to secure the ends of justice. We say so for the following reasons:
a) The allegations made in the FIR had an overwhelmingly and predominatingly a civil
flavour inasmuch as the complainant alleged that he had paid money to Gurmeet Singh,
the main accused to get employment for his son abroad. If Gurmeet Singh failed the
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complainant could have filed a suit for recovery of the amount paid for not fulfilling the
promise.
b) Initially, the investigating officer and two superior officers of the economic wing has
found that there is no substance in the complaint making out even a prima facie triable
case and had therefore, recommended for closure. However, on the orders of the
Senior Superintendent of Police, the FIR was registered and the matter was
investigated. No criminal breach of trust was found and the charge sheet was submitted
only against Gurmeet Singh under section 420 I.P.C.
c) The complainant Nasib Singh had clearly deposed that he had paid Rs 4 lacs cash to
Gurmeet Singh and had also given a cheque of Rs 2 lacs favouring Gurmeet Singh
which he had encashed.
d) During trial the present appellant as also the other co-accused Gurpreet Singh were
summoned in April 2014 invoking powers of Section 319 Cr.P.C., for being tried under
Section 420 I.P.C. It may be noted that no specific allegations of cheating are made
against these two accused as they were both settled abroad in Italy.
e) The complainant Nasib Singh entered into a compromise with the main accused
Gurmeet Singh which was filed before the learned Magistrate and the same was
accepted vide order dated 26.09.2014 and the alleged offence being of financial
transaction stood compounded. Proceedings against Gurmeet Singh were closed.
f) Right from 2014, the present appellant and other co-accused Gurpreet Singh who were
in Italy were being summoned by the Court. The appellant was declared proclaimed
offender. The appellant applied before the High Court challenging the order declaring
him proclaimed offender and also filed a 482 Cr.P.C. petition for quashing of the
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proceedings wherein, he also filed the compounding order of 26.09.2014.
g) The High Court merely perused the FIR and noting the fact that the name of the
appellant was mentioned in the FIR, declined to exercise the inherent power under
Section 482 Cr.P.C.
20. In our considered view, the High Court erred in firstly not considering the entire material
on record and further in not appreciating the fact that the dispute, if any, was civil in nature and
that the complainant had already settled his score with the main accused Gurmeet Singh
against whom the proceedings have been closed as far back as 26.09.2014. In this scenario,
there remains no justification to continue with the proceedings against the appellant.
21. For all the reasons recorded above on facts and on law both the present appeals deserve
to be allowed. The impugned proceedings arising out of FIR No.179 dated 29.10.2009, PS
Fatehgarh Sahib and all consequential proceedings stand quashed qua the appellant.
…….…………………………………………………….J.
[Dinesh Maheshwari]
…….…………………………………………………….J.
[Vikram Nath]
New Delhi;
October 20, 2021.
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