M/S Bombay Chemical Industries vs Deputy Labour Commissioner on 4 February, 2022

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Supreme Court of India
M/S Bombay Chemical Industries vs Deputy Labour Commissioner on 4 February, 2022Author: M.R. Shah

Bench: M.R. Shah, B.V. Nagarathna

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.813 OF 2022

M/s Bombay Chemical Industries ..Appellant (S)

VERSUS

Deputy Labour Commissioner & Anr. ..Respondent (S)

JUDGMENT

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

judgment and order dated 14.11.2018 passed by the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Petition No.33482

of 2018, by which the High Court has dismissed the said

writ petition preferred by the appellant herein and has

Signature Not Verified
confirmed the order passed by the Presiding Officer,
Digitally signed by R
Natarajan
Date: 2022.02.04
16:47:00 IST
Reason:
Labour Court IV, U.P., Kanpur Nagar, under Section 33(C)

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 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the original writ

petitioner has preferred the present appeal.

2. That respondent No.2 herein moved an application before

the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial

Disputes Act in Misc. Case No.26 of 2012 demanding the

difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012. The

said application was contested by the appellant herein

denying any relationship of employee­employer. It was the

categorical stand of the appellant that respondent No.2

herein was never engaged by it. Before the Labour Court

respondent No.2 herein relied upon the documents exhibit

W­1 to W­6 in support of his case that he had worked in

the establishment as a salesman. That by order dated

28.11.2017 the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court

allowed the said application and directed the appellant

herein to pay the difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to

31.03.2012 as claimed in the application.

2.1 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order

passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Labour Court

under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the

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 appellant herein preferred a writ petition before the High

Court. By the impugned judgment and order the High

Court has dismissed the said writ petition which has given

rise to the present appeal.

3. Shri Vishal Yadav, learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the appellant has vehemently submitted that in the facts

and circumstances of the case the High Court has erred in

dismissing the writ petition and confirming the order

passed by the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act.

3.1 It is submitted by Shri Yadav appearing on behalf of the

appellant that the High Court ought to have appreciated

that when there was a serious issue raised with respect to

the employer­employee relationship between the appellant

and respondent No.2 and that it was seriously disputed

that respondent No.2 was at any point of time in

employment as a salesman, the Labour Court ought not to

have entertained/allowed the application under Section

33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act as the same could

have been decided in the reference under Section 10 of the

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 Industrial Disputes Act. It is therefore submitted that the

order passed by the Labour Court is completely without

jurisdiction. Therefore, the High Court ought to have set

aside the same. Reliance is placed on the decisions of this

Court in the case of Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs.

Ganesh Razak and Anr., (1995) 1 SCC 235 and Union of

India and another Vs. Kankuben (Dead) By Lrs. and

Others, (2006) 9 SCC 292, in support of his submissions

that in a proceeding under Section 33(C)(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court cannot

adjudicate the dispute of entitlement or the basis of the

claim and it can only interpret the award or settlement on

which the claim is based.

3.2 Making the above submissions and relying on the above

decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeal.

4. The present appeal is vehemently opposed by Dr. Vinod

Kumar Tewari, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the

respondent(s).

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4.1 It is submitted that in the present case respondent No.2

placed on record voluminous record namely exhibit W­1 to

W­6 to show that respondent No.2 was working as a

salesman with the appellant. It is submitted that the

appellant came out with a false case to get out of the

obligation difference in salary to be paid as claimed in the

application. It is therefore submitted that when on

appreciation of evidence and considering the material

available on record the Labour Court held that respondent

No.2 was employed as a salesman and thereafter directed

the appellant to pay the difference of wages it cannot be

said that the Labour Court exceeded in its jurisdiction.

4.2 It is submitted that when on the face of the record

available it was found by the Labour Court that

respondent No.2 was in employment of the appellant as a

salesman, and in the claim before the Labour Court there

was found a difference in the salary/pay for the period

from 01.04.2006 to 31.03.2012, the Labour Court has not

committed any error. The High Court has rightly dismissed

the writ petition.

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5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of

the respective parties at length.

6. At the outset it is required to be noted that respondent

No.2 herein filed an application before the Labour Court

under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act,

demanding difference of wages from 01.04.2006 to

31.03.2012. It was thus the case on behalf of respondent

No.2 that he was working with the appellant as a

salesman. However, the appellant had taken a categorical

stand that respondent No.2 was never engaged by the

appellant. It was specifically the case on behalf of the

appellant that respondent No.2 had never worked in the

establishment in the post of salesman. Therefore, once

there was a serious dispute that respondent No.2 had

worked as an employee of the appellant and there was a

very serious dispute raised by the appellant that

respondent No.2 was not in employment as a salesman as

claimed by respondent No.2, thereafter, it was not open for

the Labour Court to entertain disputed questions and

adjudicate upon the employer­employee relationship

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between the appellant and respondent No.2. As per the

settled proposition of law, in an application under Section

33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the Labour Court

has no jurisdiction and cannot adjudicate dispute of

entitlement or the basis of the claim of workmen. It can

only interpret the award or settlement on which the claim

is based. As held by this Court in the case of Ganesh

Razak and Anr. (supra), the labour court’s jurisdiction

under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act is like

that of an executing court. As per the settled preposition of

law without prior adjudication or recognition of the

disputed claim of the workmen, proceedings for

computation of the arrears of wages and/or difference of

wages claimed by the workmen shall not be maintainable

under Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. (See

Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ganesh Razak and Anr.

(1995) 1 SCC 235).

In the case of Kankuben (supra), it is observed and

held that whenever a workman is entitled to receive from

his employer any money or any benefit which is capable of

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 being computed in terms of money and which he is entitled

to receive from his employer and is denied of such benefit

can approach Labour Court under Section 33­C (2) of the

ID Act. It is further observed that the benefit sought to be

enforced under Section 33­C (2) of the ID Act is necessarily

a pre­existing benefit or one flowing from a pre­existing

right. The difference between a pre­existing right or

benefit on one hand and the right or benefit, which is

considered just and fair on the other hand is vital. The

former falls within jurisdiction of Labour Court exercising

powers under Section 33­C (2) of the ID Act while the latter

does not.

7. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid

decisions to the facts of the case on hand, when there was

no prior adjudication on the issue whether respondent

No.2 herein was in employment as a salesman as claimed

by respondent No.2 herein and there was a serious dispute

raised that respondent No.2 was never in employment as a

salesman and the documents relied upon by respondent

No.2 were seriously disputed by the appellant and it was

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 the case on behalf of the appellant that those documents

are forged and/or false, thereafter the Labour Court ought

not to have proceeded further with the application under

Section 33(C)(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. The Labour

Court ought to have relegated respondent No.2 to initiate

appropriate proceedings by way of reference and get his

right crystalized and/or adjudicate upon. Therefore, the

order passed by the Labour Court was beyond the

jurisdiction conferred under Section 33(C)(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act. The High Court has not

appreciated the aforesaid facts and has confirmed the

same without adverting to the scope and ambit of the

jurisdiction of the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of

the Industrial Disputes Act.

8. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above the

present appeal succeeds. The impugned judgment and

order passed by the High Court as well as that of the order

passed by the Labour Court under Section 33(C)(2) of the

Industrial Disputes Act in Misc. Case No.26 of 2012 are

hereby quashed and set aside. Respondent No.2 is

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 relegated to avail any other remedy which may be available

under the Industrial Disputes Act, including that of

reference to adjudicate his right as an employee of the

appellant as claimed by him. As and when such

proceedings are initiated the same to be considered in

accordance with law and on its own merits and without in

anyway being influenced by the present order, as this

Court has not expressed anything in favour of either of the

parties on the aspect of employer­employee relationship

between the appellant and respondent No.2. The present

appeal is allowed with the above observations and to the

aforesaid extent. No costs.

…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J.
(B.V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
February, 04 2022.

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