caselaws.org
Supreme Court of India
Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao vs Reddy Sridevi on 16 December, 2021Author: M.R. Shah
Bench: M.R. Shah, Sanjiv Khanna
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.7696 OF 2021
Majji Sannemma @ Sanyasirao ..Appellant (S)
Versus
Reddy Sridevi & Ors. ..Respondent (S)
JUDGMENT
M. R. Shah, J.
1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned order
dated 16.09.2021 passed by the High Court of Andhra
Pradesh at Amaravati in I.A. No.1 of 2021 in Second Appeal
No.331 of 2021 by which the High Court has condoned a
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by R
Natarajan
Date: 2021.12.16
huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the Second Appeal, the
16:40:28 IST
Reason:
1
appellant original plaintiff – respondent before the High
Court, has preferred the present appeal.
2. That the appellant herein – original plaintiff filed a civil suit
being O.S. No. 40 of 2013 for permanent injunction against
the respondents herein – original defendants. That the Trial
Court dismissed the said suit by judgment and decree dated
23.04.2016. That the First Appellate Court allowed the suit
by quashing and setting aside the judgment and decree
passed by the Trial Court, by judgment and decree dated
01.02.2017. That the original defendants – respondents
herein applied for the certified copy of the judgment and
order on 04.02.2017. The same was ready for delivery on
10.03.2017. That after a period of approximately 1011 days,
the respondents herein – original defendants preferred the
Second Appeal before the High Court. Application to condone
the delay was also filed being I.A. No.1 of 2021. By the
impugned order, the High Court has condoned the delay of
1011 days in preferring the Second Appeal, which is the
subject matter of appeal before this Court.
2
3. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant herein
– original plaintiff has vehemently submitted that in the
present case, High Court has committed a grave error in
condoning huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal.
3.1 It is submitted that as such no sufficient cause was shown
by the respondents herein appellants before the High Court,
explaining the huge delay of 1011 days in preferring the
Second Appeal.
3.2 It is further submitted that even while condoning the huge
delay of 1011 days, the High Court has also not observed
that sufficient cause has been shown explaining the delay of
1011 days in preferring the Second Appeal.
3.3 It is further submitted that even considering the averments
in the application for condonation of delay, there is no
explanation whatsoever explaining the delay for the period
after 15.03.2017 till June, 2021 till the Second Appeal was
preferred.
3.4 Making the above submissions and relying upon the
decisions of this Court in the cases of Ramlal, Motilal and
3
Chhotelal Vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., (1962) 2 SCR 762; P.K.
Ramachandran Vs. State of Kerala and Anr., (1997) 7 SCC
556 as well as the decision in the cases of Pundlik Jalam
Patil Vs. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project,
(2008) 17 SCC 448 and Basawaraj and Anr. Vs. Special
Land Acquisition Officer., (2013) 14 SCC 81, it is prayed to
allow the present appeal.
4. Shri Siddhartha Srivastava, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent Nos.1 and No.2 – appellants before the
High Court, has supported the impugned order passed by the
High Court allowing the application for condonation of delay
and condoning the delay in preferring the appeal.
4.1 It is submitted that when the High Court has exercised
discretion and has condoned the delay, the same may not be
interfered with by this Court in exercise of powers under
Article 136 of the Constitution of India.
4.2 It is further submitted by learned counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent Nos.1 and 2 that as rightly observed by
the High Court if the delay is condoned in that case the
4
appeal will be considered and decided on merits and
therefore, no prejudice would be caused to the appellant. It is
submitted that in order to enable the respondents –
appellants before the High Court, to submit the case on
merits instead of nonsuiting them on the technical ground of
delay, it is prayed to dismiss the present appeal.
5. We have heard the learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the respective parties at length.
6. At the outset, it is noted that by the impugned order the High
Court has condoned a huge delay of 1011 days in preferring
the Second Appeal by respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein –
original defendants – appellants before the High Court. While
condoning the delay, the High Court has observed as under:
“In these circumstances, when there are certain
questions, which require a debate in the second appeal, it
is not necessary that this matter be rejected at this stage,
without inviting a decision on merits. lf the delay is
condoned though enormous, what happens at best is to
give an opportunity to the parties to canvass their
respective case. Since this question being of procedure,
the attempt of the court should be to encourage a healthy
discussion on merits than rejecting at threshold.
Viewed from such perspective, accepting the reasons
assigned by the petitioner, the delay in presenting this
second appeal should be condoned.
Apparently, there is no wilful negligence on the part
of the petitioners nor this attempt suffers from want of
5
due diligence. It appears being a bonafide attempt on the
part of the petitioners to canvass their claim particularly
when the trial court had accepted their plea, which was
subjected to reversal by the appellate court. However, the
petitioners should compensate the respondent by means
of costs for this delay. The contention of the respondent
that valuable rights are accrued to her on account of
inaction of the petitioners in failing to prefer the Second
Appeal within time, cannot be a significant factor in the
backdrop of the circumstances found in this case.
In the result, this petition is allowed condoning the
delay of 1011 days in filing the second appeal subject to
payment of costs of Rs.2,000/ (Rupees Two thousand
only) to the learned counsel for the respondent on or
before 05.10.2021.”
Thus from the aforesaid, it can be seen that the High Court
has not observed that any sufficient cause explaining the
huge delay of 1011 days has been made out.
6.1 The High Court has observed that if the delay is condoned no
prejudice will be caused to the appellant as the appeal would
be heard on merits. The High Court has also observed that
there is no wilful negligence on the part of the respondents
herein nor it suffers from want of due diligence. However,
from the averments in the application for condonation of
delay, we are of the opinion that it was a case of a gross
negligence and/or want of due diligence on the part of the
respondents herein – appellants before the High Court in
filing such a belated appeal.
6
6.2 We have gone through the averments in the application for
the condonation of delay. There is no sufficient explanation
for the period from 15.03.2017 till the Second Appeal was
preferred in the year 2021. In the application seeking
condonation of delay it was stated that she is aged 45 years
and was looking after the entire litigation and that she was
suffering from health issues and she had fallen sick from
01.01.2017 to 15.03.2017 and she was advised to take bed
rest for the said period. However, there is no explanation for
the period after 15.03.2017. Thus, the period of delay from
15.03.2017 till the Second Appeal was filed in the year 2021
has not at all been explained. Therefore, the High Court has
not exercised the discretion judiciously.
7. At this stage, a few decisions of this Court on delay in filing
the appeal are referred to and considered as under:
7.1 In the case of Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal (supra), it is
observed and held as under:
In construing s. 5 it is relevant to bear in mind two
important considerations. The first consideration is that
the expiration of the period of limitation prescribed for
7
making an appeal gives rise to a right in favour of the
decreeholder to treat the decree as binding between the
parties. In other words, when the period of limitation
prescribed has expired the decreeholder has obtained a
benefit under the law of limitation to treat the decree as
beyond challenge, and this legal right which has accrued
to the decreeholder by lapse of time should not be light
heartedly disturbed. The other consideration which
cannot be ignored is that if sufficient cause for excusing
delay is shown discretion is given to the Court to condone
delay and admit the appeal. This discretion has been
deliberately conferred on the Court in order that judicial
power and discretion in that behalf should be exercised
to advance substantial justice. As has been observed by
the Madras High Court in Krishna v. Chattappan, (1890)
J.L.R. 13 Mad. 269, “s. 5 gives the Court a discretion
which in respect of jurisdiction is to be exercised in the
way in which judicial power and discretion ought to be
exercised upon principles which are well understood; the
words ‘sufficient cause’ receiving a liberal construction so
as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor
inaction nor want of bona fide is imputable to the
appellant.”
7.2 In the case of P.K. Ramachandran (supra), while refusing to
condone the delay of 565 days, it is observed that in the
absence of reasonable, satisfactory or even appropriate
explanation for seeking condonation of delay, the same is not
to be condoned lightly. It is further observed that the law of
limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to
be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes
and the courts have no power to extend the period of
limitation on equitable grounds. It is further observed that
8
while exercising discretion for condoning the delay, the court
has to exercise discretion judiciously.
7.3 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed as
under:
“The laws of limitation are founded on public policy.
Statutes of limitation are sometimes described as
“statutes of peace”. An unlimited and perpetual threat of
limitation creates insecurity and uncertainty; some kind
of limitation is essential for public order. The principle is
based on the maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis
litium”, that is, the interest of the State requires that
there should be end to litigation but at the same time
laws of limitation are a means to ensure private justice
suppressing fraud and perjury, quickening diligence and
preventing oppression. The object for fixing timelimit for
litigation is based on public policy fixing a lifespan for
legal remedy for the purpose of general welfare. They are
meant to see that the parties do not resort to dilatory
tactics but avail their legal remedies promptly. Salmond
in his Jurisprudence states that the laws come to the
assistance of the vigilant and not of the sleepy.”
7.4 In the case of Basawaraj (supra), it is observed and held by
this Court that the discretion to condone the delay has to be
exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstances of
each case. It is further observed that the expression
“sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence,
inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. It is
further observed that even though limitation may harshly
affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its
9
rigour when prescribed by statute. It is further observed that
in case a party has acted with negligence, lack of bona fides
or there is inaction then there cannot be any justified ground
for condoning the delay even by imposing conditions. It is
observed that each application for condonation of delay has
to be decided within the framework laid down by this Court.
It is further observed that if courts start condoning delay
where no sufficient cause is made out by imposing conditions
then that would amount to violation of statutory principles
and showing utter disregard to legislature.
7.5 In the case of Pundlik Jalam Patil (supra), it is observed by
this Court that the court cannot enquire into belated and
stale claims on the ground of equity. Delay defeats equity.
The Courts help those who are vigilant and “do not slumber
over their rights”.
8. Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid
decisions to the facts of the case on hand and considering
the averments in the application for condonation of delay, we
are of the opinion that as such no explanation much less a
sufficient or a satisfactory explanation had been offered by
10
respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein – appellants before the High
Court for condonation of huge delay of 1011 days in
preferring the Second Appeal. The High Court is not at all
justified in exercising its discretion to condone such a huge
delay. The High Court has not exercised the discretion
judiciously. The reasoning given by the High Court while
condoning huge delay of 1011 days is not germane.
Therefore, the High Court has erred in condoning the huge
delay of 1011 days in preferring the appeal by respondent
Nos.1 and 2 herein – original defendants. Impugned order
passed by the High Court is unsustainable both, on law as
well as on facts.
9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the
present Appeal is Allowed. The impugned order dated
16.09.2021 passed by the High Court condoning the delay of
1011 days in preferring the Second Appeal by respondent
Nos.1 and 2 herein is hereby quashed and set aside.
Consequently, Second Appeal No.331 of 2021 preferred by
respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein stands dismissed on the
11
ground of delay. The present Appeal is accordingly Allowed.
However, there shall be no order as to costs.
…………………………………J.
(M. R. SHAH)
…………………………………J.
(B. V. NAGARATHNA)
New Delhi,
December 16, 2021
12
Comments