Supreme Court of India
Narasamma vs A.Krishnappa (Dead) Thr. Lrs. on 26 August, 2020Author: Sanjay Kishan Kaul

Bench: Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Ajay Rastogi




NARASAMMA & ORS. …Appellants


A. KRISHNAPPA (Dead) Through LRs. …Respondents



1. A plaint was laid before the City Civil Judge at Bangalore by

A. Krishnappa, predecessor-in-interest of the respondents herein (original

plaintiff) against Sri Jayaram, predecessor-in-interest of the appellants

herein(original defendant) under Order VII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil
Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘said Code’), being O.S.
Date: 2020.08.26
19:24:02 IST

No.4268/1989 in respect of the schedule property to the plaint being

described as a portion of property bearing Revenue Site No.9, part of

Corporation No.2, 2ndmain road, 1st block, Goraguntepalya, Bangalore–22

(hereinafter referred to as ‘schedule property’).

2. The original plaintiff stated that he and his late brother, Mr. A.

Muniswamappa, were full and absolute owners of agricultural land

measuring 2 acres and 22guntas in Survey No.8/4 of Goraguntepalya,

Yeswanthpur Hobli, Bangalore North Taluk. The said land was an

ancestral property, and in a family partition drawn among the plaintiff’s

uncles, the plaintiff and his elder brother by a registered Partition Deed

dated 29.8.1956, the said land fell to the share of the plaintiff and his

elder brother, Mr. A. Muniswamappa. In a portion of the said land, the

two brothers formed a revenue layout and sold the revenue sites to

different persons, while retaining some of the sites. The area was

subsequently included within the limits of the Corporation of the City of

Bangalore (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Corporation’) for which

betterment charges and other taxes were collected by the Corporation.

Mr. A. Muniswamappa passed away on 4.9.1988 and was survived by his

two wives but no children. The wives were stated to be residing in the

residence of the original plaintiff.
3. The original plaintiff stated that the Revenue Sites bearing Nos.8

and 9 were assigned as Site No.2 by the Corporation, which collected

betterment charges of Rs.4,320/- for both the sites which fell under the

aforementioned common Site No. 2. The khata of the property was made

out in the name of the original plaintiff who paid taxes and, thus, he

claimed full and absolute ownership of the revenue site in question,

which was being maintained by him as a karta of the joint family

comprising of himself and his late brother, Mr. A. Muniswamappa.

4. It is the case of the original plaintiff that during the lifetime of his

late brother, Mr. A. Muniswamappa, the original defendant approached

them after having resigned from his job in B.H.E.L. to permit him to

occupy the schedule property, to facilitate him to eke out his livelihood

by running a fuel depot. This was acceded to and the portion of the land

was given free of rent to the original defendant on the condition that

whenever original plaintiff and his elder brother directed the defendant to

vacate the schedule property, he would oblige. This arrangement was

accepted by the original defendant for running a fuel depot as a licensee.

This arrangement is stated to have continued till before the plaint was

instituted, when the original defendant made an attempt to lease out the

schedule property. It is conceded that the original defendant was

permitted to put a temporary structure for running a fuel depot on the

specific condition that when he was called upon to vacate that land, he

would remove the structure. In view of the endeavour of the original

defendant to induct third parties in the schedule property, the original

plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated 3.7.1989, calling upon him to

surrender possession and withdrawing permission to occupy the same.

There was no response to the notice, and thus, a suit was laid on these

allegations seeking a decree in the following terms:

“a) The plaintiff is the full and absolute owner of the schedule

b) Directing the defendant to remove the temporary structure
put up by him on the schedule property and put the plaintiff in
vacant possession of the schedule property;

c) To pay the mesne profits from the date of suit till the
delivery of the possession;

d) To grant such other relief or reliefs as this Hon’ble Court
deems fit to grant under the circumstances of the case; and

e) To award costs of the suit.”

5. The suit was resisted by the original defendant and a different

narrative was sought to be set out. On the ownership of the property, the

same was denied as the original defendant disclaimed any knowledge of

the same. It was stated that a notice for payment of betterment charges

and to furnish particulars for the assessment of tax for the building from

the Corporation were also issued to the wife of the original defendant,

Smt. Narasamma (appellant 1 herein). The other averments have been

generally denied and the narrative put forth was that the elder brother of

the original plaintiff, Mr. A. Muniswamappa, sold Revenue Site No.9

measuring 30 ft. x 40 ft. to Smt. Narasamma for a consideration of

Rs.11,000/-, out of which Rs.8,500/- was paid and the balance of

Rs.2,500/- was to be paid upon the execution of the sale deed. A sale

agreement was stated to have been executed on 10.10.1976 in favour of

Smt. Narasamma and she was put in possession of the schedule property.

She was also authorized to put up construction on the property and enjoy

the said property as owner. The sale deed was, however, not registered as

there was a prohibition on registration of piece lands. Mr. A.

Muniswamappa is stated to have relinquished the ownership rights in

favour of Smt. Narasamma making her the absolute owner of the

schedule property. A house was constructed with tiles and asbestos

sheets, along with a compound wall around the entire site where she

resided along with family members including the original defendant from

1976.They began to run a fuel depot in a portion of the house from the

same year. Some fruit trees were also planted. The averments in respect

of possession in para 13 are as under:

“13. …The possession and enjoyment of the above said site
property in the occupation of the defendant and his family has been
continuous and peaceful since from 10.10.1976 which is the date
of sale in favour of the defendant’s wife. Thus the defendant has
been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the site property
said above for more than 12 years, to the knowledge of the plaintiff
and other public including the wives of late Sri A. Muniswamappa
who are still alive.”

6. The aforesaid portion of the written statement has been extracted

as this is stated to be the basis of the plea of adverse possession, which

was sought to be advanced subsequently.

7. The original defendant has stated that even after a lapse of more

than ten (10) years, the prohibition for sale of piece land was not lifted,

but the balance sum of Rs.2,500/- was received and a General Power of

Attorney was executed in favour of Smt. Narasammaon 8.8.1988 by Mr.

A. Muniswamappa declaring her right of possession and enjoyment of
the schedule property as owner. An affidavit of the same date is also

stated to have been executed acknowledging the receipt of the entire sale

consideration and conferring upon her the right of the ownership of the

property. Even thereafter the sale deed was undisputedly not executed

and the running of the fuel depot is stated to have been discontinued after

some years of occupation and a cycle repair shop was being run

thereafter. In para 14 the specific plea of adverse possession was raised,

which reads as under:

“14. …The defendant also submits that his wife has also got the
prescriptive right of ownership over the said site property by way
of adverse possession.”

8. The original defendant also pleads that the area of the site property

came to be acquired by the Bangalore Development Authority

(hereinafter referred to as ‘B.D.A.’), and an award was passed with the

Award Notice dated 30.10.1981 in respect of the acquisition of the land in

Survey No.8/4 issued to the original defendant. Smt. Narasamma was

served with a notice dated 8.9.1986 for furnishing the information to

assess the building for property tax as was required under the Karnataka

Municipal Corporation Act, 1976, and betterment charges were

demanded from her when Corporation Site No.2 was allocated, after

being renumbered, to comprise of the schedule property. The betterment

charges are stated to have been tendered by Smt. Narasamma, but the

Corporation informed her that the receipt of the same was stopped and

that a fresh notice would be issued for the same. It is the original

defendant’s case that Revenue Site No.9 was sold to his wife which was

renumbered as Site No.2 by the Corporation but the suit had been filed in

respect of the same property with different measurements and different

name of boundaries to confuse the issues and deny the lawful right of the

defendant’s wife. Late Mr. A. Muniswamappa, being the elder brother,

was stated to be the head of his family during his lifetime and was

dealing in selling of sites which fell to the share of the two brothers. This

dealing was not objected to by anybody including the original plaintiff.

The original plaintiff’s right over the schedule property is, thus, denied.

The allegation of the endeavour to lease it out to a third party has also

been denied. It is contested that the suit is liable to be dismissed with


9. On these pleading of the parties, the following issues were framed

by the Trial Court:
“(1) Whether the plaintiff proves that the valuation made and court
fee paid are proper and correct?

(2) Whether the plaintiff proves description of suit property?

(3) Whether the plaintiff proves his title to suit property?

(4) Whether the defendant proves that his wife has perfected title
to suit property by adverse possession as pleaded?

(5) Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant was permitted
to occupy and put up a structure in the suit property as alleged?

(6) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to have possession of suit
property from the defendant as claimed?

(7) Whether plaintiff proves cause of action for the suit?

(8) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to past and future mesne profits
from the defendant and if so, at what rate and from which date?

(9) To what relief, the parties are entitled?”

10. On trial taking place, the plaintiff appeared as a witness in support

of his claims and exhibited documents, while the defendant also appeared

along with two other witnesses in support of his case exhibiting

documents. The Trial Court by the judgment and decree dated 12.3.1999

found Issue Nos.1, 2 and 4 in the affirmative, while the other issues were

found in the negative and it dismissed the suit with costs. A close

examination of the Trial Court judgment shows that a finding was

reached that the property in question was joint family property and thus,

in any case, late Mr. A. Muniswamappa, in the absence of any partition,

could not have alienated, at least, the half share of the original plaintiff

unless there was a family necessity, though he was selling different

revenue sites. However, the crucial aspect was that no evidence was

produced by the original defendant to substantiate the plea that there was

bar on registration of revenue sites in the year 1976 and thereafter. The

Agreement of Sale, Exhibit D-1, was closely examined, as also the Power

of Attorney being Exhibit D-2. The inconsistencies and the

contradictions in the deposition ofDW-2, one Mariswamy Naik who

scribed Exhibit D-1 and Exhibit D-2, and who was closely related to the

original defendant, resulted in a finding that these two crucial documents

were not proved. In fact, the observation on his demeanour was that this

witness had either forgotten all facts or has given tutored evidence. This

finding, inter alia, was based on the deposition of DW-2 that both

Exhibits D-1 and D-2 were prepared and written by him on the same

date, while the two documents were dated twelve (12) years apart and

Exhibit D-2 was not hand written. The treasury seals were found to be

erased and fresh dates affixed on Exhibit D-1. In this Exhibit, the

signature of late Mr. A. Muniswamappa was also found to be erased at a

particular place, as also the fact that his signature had been erased and

thereafter traced one in the General Power of Attorney, Exhibit D-2.

Moreover, the Notary was not examined qua the execution of the General

Power of Attorney and the affidavit.

11. On the plea of adverse possession, there is a detailed discussion of

the legal position. The khata of the schedule property stood in the name

of the original plaintiff. A notice was issued to the wife of the original

defendant by the Corporation as an occupier. However, the Trial Court

found that it was a case of continuous possession since 1976 to the

knowledge of the original plaintiff and his brother who never obstructed

the possession of Smt. Narasamma till 1989 and, thus, they could be said

to have perfected their title to the schedule property, their possession

being continuous, open, uninterrupted and hostile. Relief of possession

to the original plaintiff was, thus, declined. In view of the finding on

adverse possession it was opined that mesne profits were also to be


12. An appeal was filed against the aforesaid judgment and decree

before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, which was registered

as RFA No.411/1999. The appeal was allowed by the impugned

judgment dated 20.3.2009 decreeing the suit with costs against the legal

heirs of the original defendant (who passed away in the meantime) giving

them time to hand over vacant and peaceful possession of the property

within three (3) months from the date of the judgment.

13. On the SLP being filed notice was issued and status quo in relation

to possession was directed by the order dated 13.5.2009. On 19.3.2010

leave was granted and interim orders were made absolute.

14. The matter was thereafter finally heard only now in 2020, and we

have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions of the learned

counsel for the appellants herein and learned senior counsel for the

respondent herein (now represented through his LRs as he passed away

on 19.4.2018). We have also examined the records placed before us in

these proceedings, as also the impugned judgment.

15. The High Court noticed that the plea of the appellants herein was

that the original plaintiff was not the absolute owner of the schedule

property, and that the wife of the original defendant, Smt. Narasamma,

was not impleaded and without impleading her as the one who claimed

ownership, the suit was not maintainable. This plea was negated on the

ground that both on admission and finding, the original plaintiff and

deceased Mr. A. Muniswamappa were brothers with the latter dying

issueless, and that no partition had taken place during Mr. A.

Muniswamappa’s lifetime or thereafter, and the family continued to stay

together. The High Court, as the first appellate court, re-examined in

extenso the evidence produced by both the parties and affirmed the

finding arrived at by the Trial Court that the document Exhibit D-1,

Agreement of Sale, contained too many manipulations and alterations to

be treated as a reliable document. The position was the same qua Exhibit

D-2. The affidavit purported to be dated 8.8.1988 was exhibited as

Exhibit P-13, but there is no reference to any Agreement of Sale dated

10.10.1976 therein. Further, the date of issuance of stamp paper had also

been altered. The contents of Exhibit P-13 were inconsistent with the

Agreement of Sale dated 10.10.1976, as it purported to state that the

deceased Mr. A. Muniswamappa was in possession of the schedule

property on 8.8.1988. Thus, the final court on facts has also disbelieved

all these documents.

16. That brought the High Court to the main aspect which resulted in

the appeal being allowed, i.e., the failure of the appellants herein on their

plea of adverse possession. Once again, there is an elaborate discussion

on the various judicial pronouncements of this Court on the plea of

adverse possession, emphasising that the success of this plea requires the

person claiming the same to prove that he is in possession and that, “his

possession is “nec vi, nec clam, nec precario”, that is, peaceful, open and

continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity

and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It

must start with a wrongful dispossession of the rightful owner and be

actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory


17. Accordingly, the findings of the High Court are contained in para

65 as under:

1Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India & Ors., (2004) 10 SCC 779, para

“65. In view of the foregoing discussion and for the reasons
stated hereinbefore, I hold that:

I. There is no specific plea of adverse possession.

II. The alleged adverse possessor was not examined
before the trial Court.

III. The defendant having pleaded that his wife was in
possession of suit schedule property under agreement of sale
dated 10.10.1976 has miserably failed to prove the
document and delivery of possession under said agreement.

IV. General Power of Attorney dated 8.8.1988 stated to
have been executed by deceased Muniswamappa had not
been proved by defendant. The said document would reveal
that as on 8.8.1988, deceased Muniswamappa was in
possession of suit schedule property.”

18. In view of the aforesaid, the appeal was allowed as the original

defendant had failed to prove that his wife, Smt. Narasamma, had

perfected her title to the schedule property by way of adverse possession.

Plea of the Appellants:

19. Learned counsel for the appellants herein sought to contend that

the suit was barred by limitation as the induction of the original

defendant’s wife was in 1976, while the suit was filed on 9.8.1989, i.e.,

beyond the period of twelve (12) years. The genuineness of the

Agreement of Sale dated 10.10.1976 was stated not to have been

questioned, nor was the suit amended to include the prayer for

cancellation of this document. Once the Agreement of Sale coupled with

the General Power of Attorney has been put on record, the burden to

disprove the same was pleaded to have shifted on to the respondent


20. It was also contended that the schedule property being joint family

property, the sale by any brother would be binding to the extent of half

share and the entire transfer could never have been nullified. On the

demise of Mr. A. Muniswamappa, the original plaintiff ought to have

impleaded his two widows as parties to the suit. The finding of the High

Court on the plea of adverse possession was sought to be assailed on the

ground that the original plaintiff and Mr. A. Muniswamappa did not claim

possession during the latter’s lifetime, which establishes that they

considered the possession to be legitimate. It was contended that the

appellants herein were well within their rights to set up an alternate plea

inconsistent with the main contention of claiming title under a document,

as the same was permitted by law, and assistance was sought from the
judgment of this Court in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors. v. Manjit Kaur

& Ors.2 to contend that the perfection of title by way of adverse

possession could be a shield available in the defence of the appellants


Plea of the Respondent:

21. On the other hand, learned senior counsel for the respondent herein

contended that once the original plaintiff had proved the title, the burden

would shift upon the original defendant to establish the Agreement of

Sale and General Power of Attorney, or for that matter even perfection of

title by adverse possession. There were concurrent findings of both the

courts qua the aspect of the failure of the original defendant to establish

and prove the documents, which would show that there was no

Agreement of Sale coupled with possession.

22. It was also submitted that since after the death of Mr. A.

Muniswamappa, the original plaintiff was the karta of the family, and

was paying betterment charges as well as tax from 1985 to the

Corporation till the date of the suit. He could also prosecute the suit on

2(2019) 8 SCC 729

behalf of the family and there was no dispute within the family including

the wives of late Mr. A. Muniswamappa. On the plea of adverse

possession, it was submitted that it was not an alternate plea, but rather

an inconsistent plea, which was not permissible for the appellants herein

to plead so. The judgment in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors.3 case is

concerned only with the aspect of whether a person claiming the title by

virtue of adverse possession could file a suit, and the requirement of

pleadings and proof of adverse possession as per settled law have not

been interfered with. In support of this plea, learned counsel relied upon

the following four judicial pronouncements of this Court:

i. Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Government of India& Ors.4

ii. Mohan Lal (Deceased) Thr. LRs. v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar &

iii. P.T. Munichikkamma Reddy & Ors. v. Revamma& Ors.6

iv. M. Siddiq (Dead) Through LRs (Ram Janmabhumi
Temple Case) v. Mahant Suresh Das& Ors.7


23. We have examined the rival contentions of the parties in the
5(1996) 1 SCC 639
6(2007) 6 SCC 59
7(2020) 1 SCC 1

conspectus of the facts set out hereinabove.

24. It is relevant to note that on the crucial issue of the factual matrix

regarding the documents and the conclusion to be drawn from them, both

the Courts are ad idem. Not only grave doubt has been thrown on the

story of the appellants herein, but both Courts also record that the

documents sought to be propounded by the appellants, i.e., the

Agreement of Sale, the Power of Attorney and the affidavit, have too

many discrepancies to be treated worth their while. This is apart from the

fact that the non-registration of the title document in favour of Smt.

Narasamma, appellant 1 herein, was sought to be explained away on the

ground of there being a bar/prohibition on transfer of land, which aspect

was however not proved by the appellants by leading any evidence.

There is also adverse comment on the testimony of the witnesses, who

appeared on behalf of the appellants, more so DW-2, who was alleged to

have scribed Exhibits D-1 and D-2. As noticed above, the conclusion of

the Trial Court was that this witness had either forgotten all facts or had

given tutored evidence as he claimed that both Exhibits D-1 and D-2

were prepared on the same date while the documents were twelve (12)

years apart. In fact, the Trial Court has succinctly set out that the treasury
seals were found to be erased and fresh dates affixed on Exhibit D-1, the

signature of late Mr. A. Muniswamappa was also found to be erased at a

particular place, as also the fact that his name was traced on in the

General Power of Attorney, Exhibit D-2. These findings have been

categorically affirmed by the High Court, which is the last court on facts.

25. We find no reason to disturb these concurrent findings of the

Courts below, and even if we independently examine the evidence, there

is no reason why we would come to a different conclusion.

26. We also note that insofar as the title of the wife of the original

defendant is concerned, there is no doubt that it was an HUF property and

was so managed; all technical objections sought to be raised by the

appellants herein have been repelled. However, despite this, the only

reason for the High Court to reverse the conclusion of the Trial Court was

that the original defendant had not been able to establish the plea of

adverse possession.

27. If we examine the judgments of the courts below, more so in the

context of the reasons which persuaded the High Court to interfere with

the conclusions, which are set out in para 65 of the impugned judgment

and extracted by us in para 17 hereinabove, it is our view that the finding

that there was no specific plea of adverse possession would be difficult to

sustain. We have already stated as to how and in what manner this plea

has been set out in the written statement and extracted above. However,

that is as far as it goes.

28. We have already observed, as aforesaid, that the plea of the

original defendant that his wife, Smt. Narasamma, possessed title was not

established on the basis of the documents sought to be propounded. It is

also relevant that none of the parties chose to implead her as a party.

Once the case of the original defendant was that it is Smt. Narasamma

who had derived title, and alternative plea was of her adverse possession,

then to establish that plea, at least, she ought to have been examined.

29. We may also note that on the one hand, the appellants herein have

sought to take a plea of bar of limitation vis-à-vis the original defendant

claiming that possession came to them in 1976, with the suit being filed

in 1989. Yet at the same time, it is claimed that the wife had title on the

basis of these very documents. The claim of title from 1976 and the plea

of adverse possession from 1976 cannot simultaneously hold. On the

failure to establish the plea of title, it was necessary to prove as to from

which date did the possession of the wife of the defendant amount to a

hostile possession in a peaceful, open and continuous manner. We fail to

appreciate how, on the one hand the appellants claimed that the wife of

the original defendant, appellant 1 herein, had title to the property in

1976 but on their failure to establish title, in the alternative, the plea of

adverse possession should be recognised from the very date.

30. We also find that the reliance placed by learned counsel for the

appellants in Ravinder Kaur Grewal & Ors.8 is also misplaced. The

question which arose for consideration before the three Judge Bench was

whether, a suit could be maintained for declaration of title and for

permanent injunction seeking protection on a plea of adverse possession,

or that it was an instrument of defence in a suit filed against such a

person. In fact, if one may say, there was, for a long time a consistent

view of the Court that the plea could only be of shield and not a sword.

The judgment changed this legal position by opining that a plea to retain

possession could be managed by the ripening of title by way of adverse

possession. However, to constitute such adverse possession, the three

classic requirements, which need to co-exist were again emphasized, nec

vi, i.e., adequate in continuity, nec clam, i.e., adequate in publicity and

nec precario, i.e., adverse to a competitor, in denial of title and his


31. The question which confronts us is not the aforesaid, but whether

simultaneously a plea can be taken of title and adverse possession, i.e.,

whether it would amount to taking contradictory pleas. In this behalf, we

may refer to the four judgments cited by learned counsel for the

respondent herein, which succinctly set forth the legal position.

32. In Karnataka Board of Wakf9 case, it has been clearly set out that

a plaintiff filing a title over the property must specifically plead it. When

such a plea of adverse possession is projected, it is inherent in the nature

of it that someone else is the owner of the property. In that context, it

was observed in para 12 that “….the pleas on title and adverse possession

are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the

former is renounced….”

33. The aforesaid judgment in turn relied upon the judgment in

Mohan Lal (Deceased) Thr. LRs.10, which observed in para 4 as under:

“4. As regards the first plea, it is inconsistent with the second plea.
Having come into possession under the agreement, he must
disclaim his right thereunder and plead and prove assertion of his
independent hostile adverse possession to the knowledge of the
transferor or his successor in title or interest and that the latter had
acquiesced to his illegal possession during the entire period of 12
years, i.e., upto completing the period of his title by prescription
nec vi, nec clam, nec precario. Since the appellant’s claim is
founded on Section 53-A, it goes without saying that he admits by
implication that he came into possession of the land lawfully under
the agreement and continued to remain in possession till date of the
suit. Thereby the plea of adverse possession is not available to the

34. In order to establish adverse possession an inquiry is required to be

made into the starting point of such adverse possession and, thus, when

the recorded owner got dispossessed would be crucial.11

35. In the facts of the present case, this fact has not at all been proved.

The possession of Smt. Narasamma, the wife of the defendant, is stated

11P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy & Ors. (supra)

to be on account of consideration paid. Assuming that the transaction did

not fructify into a sale deed for whatever reason, still the date when such

possession becomes adverse would have to be set out. Thus, the plea of

adverse possession is lacking in all material particulars.

36. The possession has to be in public and to the knowledge of the true

owner as adverse, and this is necessary as a plea of adverse possession

seeks to defeat the rights of the true owner. Thus, the law would not be

readily accepting of such a case unless a clear and cogent basis has been

made out12.

37. We may also note another judicial pronouncement in Ram Nagina

Rai & Anr. v. Deo Kumar Rai (Deceased) by LRs & Anr. 13 dealing with

a similar factual matrix, i.e., where there is permissive possession given

by the owner and the defendant claims that the same had become

adverse. It was held that it has to be specifically pleaded and proved as to

when possession becomes adverse in order for the real owner to lose title

12 years hence from that time.

12M. Siddiq (Dead) Through LRs (Ram Janmabhumi Temple Case) v. Mahant
Suresh Das & Ors.(supra)
13(2019) 13 SCC 324

38. The legal position, thus, stands as evolved against the appellants

herein in advancing a plea of title and adverse possession simultaneously

and from the same date.

39. We have, thus, no hesitation in coming to the conclusion that the

appeal is meritless and is accordingly dismissed with costs.

40. In view of the current position and the long possession of the

appellant, we grant time to the appellants herein to hand over vacant and

peaceful possession of the schedule property on or before 31.12.2020

subject to furnishing of the usual undertaking within a period of four (4)

weeks from today.

[Sanjay Kishan Kaul]

[Ajay Rastogi)

[Aniruddha Bose)
New Delhi.
August 26, 2020.



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