caselaws
Supreme Court of India
Shamima Farooqui vs Shahid Khan on 6 April, 2015Author: D Misra
Bench: Dipak Misra, Prafulla C. Pant
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.564-565 OF 2015
[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) Nos. 6380-6381 of 2014]
SHAMIMA FAROOQUI … Appellant
Versus
SHAHID KHAN … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dipak Misra, J.
Leave granted.
2. When centuries old obstructions are removed, age old shackles are
either burnt or lost their force, the chains get rusted, and the human
endowments and virtues are not indifferently treated and emphasis is laid
on “free identity” and not on “annexed identity”, and the women of today
can gracefully and boldly assert their legal rights and refuse to be tied
down to the obscurant conservatism, and further determined to ostracize the
“principle of commodity”, and the “barter system” to devoutly engage
themselves in learning, criticizing and professing certain principles with
committed sensibility and participating in all pertinent and concerned
issues, there is no warrant or justification or need to pave the innovative
multi-avenues which the law does not countenance or give its stamp of
approval. Chivalry, a perverse sense of human egotism, and clutching of
feudal megalomaniac ideas or for that matter, any kind of condescending
attitude have no room. They are bound to be sent to the ancient woods,
and in the new horizon people should proclaim their own ideas and
authority. They should be able to say that they are the persons of modern
age and they have the ideas of today’s “Bharat”. Any other idea floated or
any song sung in the invocation of male chauvinism is the proposition of an
alien, a total stranger – an outsider. That is the truth in essentiality.
3. The facts which are requisite to be stated for adjudication of these
appeals are that the appellant filed an application under Section 125 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) contending, inter alia, that she
married Shahid Khan, the respondent herein, on 26.4.1992 and during her
stay at the matrimonial home she was prohibited from talking to others, and
the husband not only demanded a car from the family but also started
harassing her. A time came when he sent her to the parental home where she
was compelled to stay for almost three months. The indifferent husband did
not come to take her back to the matrimonial home, but she returned with
the fond and firm hope that the bond of wedlock would be sustained and
cemented with love and peace but as the misfortune would have it, the
demand for the vehicle continued and the harassment was used as a weapon
for fulfilment of the demand. In due course she came to learn that the
husband had illicit relationship with another woman and he wanted to marry
her. Usual to sense of human curiosity and wife’s right when she asked him
she was assaulted. The situation gradually worsened and it became
unbearable for her to stay at the matrimonial home. At that juncture, she
sought help of her parents who came and took her to the parental home at
Lucknow where she availed treatment. Being deserted and ill-treated and,
in a way, suffering from fear psychosis she took shelter in the house of
her parents and when all her hopes got shattered for reunion, she filed an
application for grant of maintenance at the rate of Rs.4000/- per month on
the foundation that husband was working on the post of Nayak in the Army
and getting a salary of Rs.10,000/- approximately apart from other perks.
4. The application for grant of maintenance was resisted with immense
vigour by the husband disputing all the averments pertaining to demand of
dowry and harassment and further alleging that he had already given divorce
to her on 18.6.1997 and has also paid the Mehar to her.
5. A reply was filed to the same by wife asserting that she had neither
the knowledge of divorce nor had she received an amount of Mehar.
6. During the proceeding before the learned Family Judge the wife-
appellant examined herself and another, and the respondent-husband examined
four witnesses, including himself. The learned Family Judge, Family
Court, Lucknow while dealing with the application forming the subject
matter Criminal Case No. 1120 of 1998 did not accept the primary objection
as regards the maintainability under Section 125 CrPC as the applicant was
a Muslim woman and came to hold even after the divorce the application of
the wife under Section 125 CrPC was maintainable in the family court.
Thereafter, the learned Family Judge appreciating the evidence brought on
record came to opine that the marriage between the parties had taken place
on 26.4.1992; that the husband had given divorce on 18.6.1997; that she was
ill treated at her matrimonial home; and that she had come back to her
parental house and staying there; that the husband had not made any
provision for grant of maintenance; that the wife did not have any source
of income to support her, and the plea advanced by the husband that she had
means to sustain her had not been proved; that as the husband was getting
at the time of disposal of the application as per the salary certificate
Rs.17654/- and accordingly directed that a sum of Rs.2500/- should be paid
as monthly maintenance allowance from the date of submission of application
till the date of judgment and thereafter Rs.4000/- per month from the date
of judgment till the date of remarriage.
7. The aforesaid order passed by the learned Family Judge came to be
assailed before the High Court in Criminal Revision wherein, the High Court
after adumbrating the facts referred to the decisions in Anita Rani v.
Rakeshpal Singh[1], Dharmendra Kumar Gupta v. Chander Prabha Devi[2],
Rakesh Kumar Dikshit v. Jayanti Devi[3], Ashutosh Tripathi v. State of
U.P.[4], Paras Nath Kurmi v. The Session Judge[5] and Sartaj v. State of
U.P. and others[6] and came to hold that though the learned principal
Judge, Family Court had not ascribed any reason for grant of maintenance
from the date of application, yet when the case for maintenance was filed
in the year 1998 decided on 17.2.2012 and there was no order for interim
maintenance, the grant of Rs.2500/- as monthly maintenance from the date of
application was neither illegal nor excessive. The High Court took note of
the fact that the husband had retired on 1.4.2012 and consequently reduced
the maintenance allowance to Rs.2000/-from 1.4.2012 till remarriage of the
appellant herein. Being of this view the learned Single Judge modified the
order passed by the Family Court. Hence, the present appeal by special
leave, at the instance of the wife.
8. We have heard Dr. J.N. Dubey, learned senior counsel for the
appellant. Despite service of notice, none has appeared for the
respondent.
9. It is submitted by Dr. Dubey, learned senior counsel that Section 125
CrPC is applicable to the Muslim women and the Family Court has
jurisdiction to decide the issue. It is urged by him that the High Court
has fallen into error by opining that the grant of maintenance at the rate
of Rs.4,000/- per month is excessive and hence, it should be reduced to
Rs.2000/- per month from the date of retirement of the husband i.e.
1.4.2012 till her re-marriage. It is also contended that the High Court
failed to appreciate the plight of the appellant and reduced the amount and
hence, the impugned order is not supportable in law.
10. First of all, we intend to deal with the applicability of Section 125
CrPC to a Muslim woman who has been divorced. In Shamim Bano v. Asraf
Khan[7], this Court after referring to the Constitution Bench decisions in
Danial Latifi v. Union of India[8] and Khatoon Nisa v. State of U.P.[9] had
opined as follows:-
“13. The aforesaid principle clearly lays down that even after an
application has been filed under the provisions of the Act, the Magistrate
under the Act has the power to grant maintenance in favour of a divorced
Muslim woman and the parameters and the considerations are the same as
stipulated in Section 125 of the Code. We may note that while taking note
of the factual score to the effect that the plea of divorce was not
accepted by the Magistrate which was upheld by the High Court, the
Constitution Bench opined that as the Magistrate could exercise power under
Section 125 of the Code for grant of maintenance in favour of a divorced
Muslim woman under the Act, the order did not warrant any interference.
Thus, the emphasis was laid on the retention of the power by the Magistrate
under Section 125 of the Code and the effect of ultimate consequence.
14. Slightly recently, in Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan[10], a two-Judge
Bench, placing reliance on Danial Latifi (supra), has ruled that:-
“21. The appellant’s petition under Section 125 CrPC would be maintainable
before the Family Court as long as the appellant does not remarry. The
amount of maintenance to be awarded under Section 125 CrPC cannot be
restricted for the iddat period only.”
Though the aforesaid decision was rendered interpreting Section 7 of the
Family Courts Act, 1984, yet the principle stated therein would be
applicable, for the same is in consonance with the principle stated by the
Constitution Bench in Khatoon Nisa (supra).”
In view of the aforesaid dictum, there can be no shadow of doubt that
Section 125 CrPC has been rightly held to be applicable by the learned
Family Judge.
11. On a perusal of the order passed by the Family Court, it is manifest
that it has taken note of the fact that the salary of the husband was
Rs.17,654/- in May, 2009. It had fixed Rs.2,500/- as monthly maintenance
from the date of submission of application till the date of order i.e.
17.2.2012 and from the date of order, at the rate of Rs.4,000/- per month
till the date of remarriage. The High Court has opined that while granting
maintenance from the date of application, judicial discretion has to be
appropriately exercised, for the High Court has noted that the grant of
maintenance at the rate of Rs.2,500/- per month from the date of
application till date of order, did not call for modification.
12. The aforesaid finding of the High Court, affirming the view of the
learned Family Judge is absolutely correct. But what is disturbing is that
though the application for grant of maintenance was filed in the year 1998,
it was not decided till 17.2.2012. It is also shocking to note that there
was no order for grant of interim maintenance. It needs no special
emphasis to state that when an application for grant of maintenance is
filed by the wife the delay in disposal of the application, to say the
least, is an unacceptable situation. It is, in fact, a distressing
phenomenon. An application for grant of maintenance has to be disposed of
at the earliest. The family courts, which have been established to deal
with the matrimonial disputes, which include application under Section 125
CrPC, have become absolutely apathetic to the same. The concern and
anguish that was expressed by this Court in Bhuwan Mohan Singh v. Meena and
Ors.[11], is to the following effect:-
“13. The Family Courts have been established for adopting and facilitating
the conciliation procedure and to deal with family disputes in a speedy and
expeditious manner. A three-Judge Bench in K.A. Abdul Jaleel v. T.A.
Shahida[12], while highlighting on the purpose of bringing in the Family
Courts Act by the legislature, opined thus:-
“The Family Courts Act was enacted to provide for the establishment of
Family Courts with a view to promote conciliation in, and secure speedy
settlement of, disputes relating to marriage and family affairs and for
matters connected therewith.”
14. The purpose of highlighting this aspect is that in the case at hand the
proceeding before the Family Court was conducted without being alive to the
objects and reasons of the Act and the spirit of the provisions Under
Section 125 of the Code. It is unfortunate that the case continued for nine
years before the Family Court. It has come to the notice of the Court that
on certain occasions the Family Courts have been granting adjournments in a
routine manner as a consequence of which both the parties suffer or, on
certain occasions, the wife becomes the worst victim. When such a situation
occurs, the purpose of the law gets totally atrophied. The Family Judge is
expected to be sensitive to the issues, for he is dealing with extremely
delicate and sensitive issues pertaining to the marriage and issues
ancillary thereto. When we say this, we do not mean that the Family Courts
should show undue haste or impatience, but there is a distinction between
impatience and to be wisely anxious and conscious about dealing with a
situation. A Family Court Judge should remember that the procrastination is
the greatest assassin of the lis before it. It not only gives rise to more
family problems but also gradually builds unthinkable and Everestine
bitterness. It leads to the cold refrigeration of the hidden feelings, if
still left. The delineation of the lis by the Family Judge must reveal the
awareness and balance. Dilatory tactics by any of the parties has to be
sternly dealt with, for the Family Court Judge has to be alive to the fact
that the lis before him pertains to emotional fragmentation and delay can
feed it to grow. We hope and trust that the Family Court Judges shall
remain alert to this and decide the matters as expeditiously as possible
keeping in view the objects and reasons of the Act and the scheme of
various provisions pertaining to grant of maintenance, divorce, custody of
child, property disputes, etc.” [emphasis supplied]
13. When the aforesaid anguish was expressed, the predicament was not
expected to be removed with any kind of magic. However, the fact remains,
these litigations can really corrode the human relationship not only today
but will also have the impact for years to come and has the potentiality to
take a toll on the society. It occurs either due to the uncontrolled
design of the parties or the lethargy and apathy shown by the Judges who
man the Family Courts. As far as the first aspect is concerned, it is the
duty of the Courts to curtail them. There need not be hurry but
procrastination should not be manifest, reflecting the attitude of the
Court. As regards the second facet, it is the duty of the Court to have
the complete control over the proceeding and not permit the lis to swim the
unpredictable grand river of time without knowing when shall it land on the
shores or take shelter in a corner tree that stands “still” on some unknown
bank of the river. It cannot allow it to sing the song of the brook. “Men
may come and men may go, but I go on for ever.” This would be the greatest
tragedy that can happen to the adjudicating system which is required to
deal with most sensitive matters between the man and wife or other family
members relating to matrimonial and domestic affairs. There has to be a
pro-active approach in this regard and the said approach should be
instilled in the Family Court Judges by the Judicial Academies functioning
under the High Courts. For the present, we say no more.
14. Coming to the reduction of quantum by the High Court, it is noticed
that the High Court has shown immense sympathy to the husband by reducing
the amount after his retirement. It has come on record that the husband
was getting a monthly salary of Rs.17,654/-.
15. The High Court, without indicating any reason, has reduced the
monthly maintenance allowance to Rs.2,000/-. In today’s world, it is
extremely difficult to conceive that a woman of her status would be in a
position to manage within Rs.2,000/- per month. It can never be forgotten
that the inherent and fundamental principle behind Section 125 CrPC is for
amelioration of the financial state of affairs as well as mental agony and
anguish that woman suffers when she is compelled to leave her matrimonial
home. The statute commands there has to be some acceptable arrangements so
that she can sustain herself. The principle of sustenance gets more
heightened when the children are with her. Be it clarified that sustenance
does not mean and can never allow to mean a mere survival. A woman, who is
constrained to leave the marital home, should not be allowed to feel that
she has fallen from grace and move hither and thither arranging for
sustenance. As per law, she is entitled to lead a life in the similar
manner as she would have lived in the house of her husband. And that is
where the status and strata of the husband comes into play and that is
where the legal obligation of the husband becomes a prominent one. As long
as the wife is held entitled to grant of maintenance within the parameters
of Section 125 CrPC, it has to be adequate so that she can live with
dignity as she would have lived in her matrimonial home. She cannot be
compelled to become a destitute or a beggar. There can be no shadow of
doubt that an order under Section 125 CrPC can be passed if a person
despite having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain the wife.
Sometimes, a plea is advanced by the husband that he does not have the
means to pay, for he does not have a job or his business is not doing well.
These are only bald excuses and, in fact, they have no acceptability in
law. If the husband is healthy, able bodied and is in a position to
support himself, he is under the legal obligation to support his wife, for
wife’s right to receive maintenance under Section 125 CrPC, unless
disqualified, is an absolute right. While determining the quantum of
maintenance, this Court in Jabsir Kaur Sehgal v. District Judge Dehradun &
Ors.[13] has held as follows:-
“The court has to consider the status of the parties, their respective
needs, the capacity of the husband to pay having regard to his reasonable
expenses for his own maintenance and of those he is obliged under the law
and statutory but involuntary payments or deductions. The amount of
maintenance fixed for the wife should be such as she can live in reasonable
comfort considering her status and the mode of life she was used to when
she lived with her husband and also that she does not feel handicapped in
the prosecution of her case. At the same time, the amount so fixed cannot
be excessive or extortionate.”
16. Grant of maintenance to wife has been perceived as a measure of
social justice by this Court. In Chaturbhuj v. Sita Bai[14], it has been
ruled that:-
“Section 125 CrPC is a measure of social justice and is specially enacted
to protect women and children and as noted by this Court in Captain Ramesh
Chander Kaushal v. Veena Kaushal[15] falls within constitutional sweep of
Article 15(3) reinforced by Article 39 of the Constitution of India. It is
meant to achieve a social purpose. The object is to prevent vagrancy and
destitution. It provides a speedy remedy for the supply of food, clothing
and shelter to the deserted wife. It gives effect to fundamental rights and
natural duties of a man to maintain his wife, children and parents when
they are unable to maintain themselves. The aforesaid position was
highlighted in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya v. State of Gujarat[16].”
This being the position in law, it is the obligation of the husband
to maintain his wife. He cannot be permitted to plead that he is unable to
maintain the wife due to financial constraints as long as he is capable of
earning.
17. In this context, we may profitably quote a passage from the judgment
rendered by the High Court of Delhi in Chander Prakash Bodhraj v. Shila
Rani Chander Prakash[17] wherein it has been opined thus:-
“An able-bodied young man has to be presumed to be capable of earning
sufficient money so as to be able reasonably to maintain his wife and child
and he cannot be heard to say that he is not in a position to earn enough
to be able to maintain them according to the family standard. It is for
such able-bodies person to show to the Court cogent grounds for holding
that he is unable to reasons beyond his control, to earn enough to
discharge his legal obligation of maintaining his wife and child. When the
husband does not disclose to the Court the exact amount of his income, the
presumption will be easily permissible against him.”
18. From the aforesaid enunciation of law it is limpid that the
obligation of the husband is on a higher pedestal when the question of
maintenance of wife and children arises. When the woman leaves the
matrimonial home, the situation is quite different. She is deprived of
many a comfort. Sometimes the faith in life reduces. Sometimes, she feels
she has lost the tenderest friend. There may be a feeling that her
fearless courage has brought her the misfortune. At this stage, the only
comfort that the law can impose is that the husband is bound to give
monetary comfort. That is the only soothing legal balm, for she cannot be
allowed to resign to destiny. Therefore, the lawful imposition for grant of
maintenance allowance.
19. In the instant case, as is seen, the High Court has reduced the
amount of maintenance from Rs.4,000/- to Rs.2,000/-. As is manifest, the
High Court has become oblivious of the fact that she has to stay on her
own. Needless to say, the order of the learned Family Judge is not
manifestly perverse. There is nothing perceptible which would show that
order is a sanctuary of errors. In fact, when the order is based on proper
appreciation of evidence on record, no revisional court should have
interfered with the reason on the base that it would have arrived at a
different or another conclusion. When substantial justice has been done,
there was no reason to interfere. There may be a shelter over her head in
the parental house, but other real expenses cannot be ignored. Solely
because the husband had retired, there was no justification to reduce the
maintenance by 50%. It is not a huge fortune that was showered on the wife
that it deserved reduction. It only reflects the non-application of mind
and, therefore, we are unable to sustain the said order.
20. Having stated the principle, we would have proceeded to record our
consequential conclusion. But, a significant one, we cannot be oblivious
of the asseverations made by the appellant. It has been asserted that the
respondent had taken voluntary retirement after the judgment dated
17.2.2012 with the purpose of escaping the liability to pay the maintenance
amount as directed to the petitioner; that the last drawn salary of
respondent taken into account by the learned Family Judge was Rs.17,564/-
as per salary slip of May, 2009 and after deduction of AFPP Fund and AGI,
the salary of the respondent was Rs.12,564/- and hence, even on the basis
of the last basic pay (i.e. Rs.9,830/-) of the respondent the total pension
would come to Rs.14,611/- and if 40% of commutation is taken into account
then the pension of the respondent amounts to Rs.11,535/-; and that the
respondent, in addition to his pension, hand received encashment of
commutation to the extent of 40% i.e. Rs.3,84,500/- and other retiral dues
i.e. AFPP, AFGI, Gratuity and leave encashment to the tune of Rs.16,01,455/-
.
21. The aforesaid aspects have gone uncontroverted as the respondent-
husband has not appeared and contested the matter. Therefore, we are
disposed to accept the assertions. This exposition of facts further impels
us to set aside the order of the High Court.
22. Consequently, the appeals are allowed, the orders passed by the High
Court are set aside and that of the Family Court is restored. There shall
be no order as to costs.
………………………………….J.
[DIPAK MISRA]
………………………………….J.
[PRAFULLA C. PANT]
NEW DELHI
APRIL 06, 2015.
———————–
[1] 1991 (2) Crimes 725 (All)
[2] 1990 Cr.L.J. 1884
[3] 1999 (2) JIC, 323 (ACC)
[4] 1999 (2) 763, Allahabad J.I.C
[5] 1999 (2) JIC 522 All
[6] 2000 (2) JIC 967 All
[7] (2014) 12 SCC 636
[8] (2001) 7 SCC 740
[9] (2014) 12 SCC 646
[10] (2010) 1 SCC 666
[11] AIR 2014 SC 2875
[12] (2003) 4 SCC 166
[13] (1997) 7 SCC 7
[14] (2008) 2 SCC 316
[15] (1978) 4 SCC 70
[16] (2005) 3 SCC 636
[17] AIR 1968 Delhi 174
Comments