caselaws
Supreme Court of India
The Spl.Agr.Produce Market … vs N.Krishnappa & Ors on 17 April, 2017Author: N Sinha
Bench: Ranjan Gogoi, Navin Sinha
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5248-5274 OF 2017
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2355-2381 of 2012]
The Special Agricultural Produce Market Committee
For Fruits and Vegetables … Appellant(s)
Versus
N. Krishnappa and others etc. … Respondent(s)
WITH
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.5275-5278 OF 2017
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 39357-39360 of 2012]
N. Krishnappa and others … Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Karnataka and others … Respondent(s)
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5279-5287 OF 2017
[Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 2834-2842 of 2014]
M. Suresh Kumar and another etc. … Appellant(s)
Versus
The State of Karnataka and others … Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
NAVIN SINHA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The controversy in these appeals relates to the acquisition of 42
acres 32 guntas of lands in village Golimangala, Sarjapur Hobli, Anchal
Taluk, District Bangalore, for expansion of the Appellant’s marketing yard.
Noticing infirmities in the acquisition proceedings, but declining to quash
the acquisition adverting to the larger public purpose, the High Court
shifted the date of the notification under Section 4 of the Land
Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’) to the date of
its order i.e. 22.11.2010, for determination of compensation. Aggrieved by
the order, both the Appellant and the landowners are in appeal before this
Court.
3. The statutory notification under Section 4(1) of the Act was
published on 20.5.2002 and the Award made on 31.01.2005. On a challenge to
the acquisition proceedings by the landowners, the Learned Single Judge,
after perusing the original acquisition records, held that the declaration
under Section 6(1) of the Act was made within statutory time from the last
date of publication under Section 4(1) of the Act. But that the acquisition
suffered from statutory non-compliance with regard to publication in two
daily newspapers under Section 4(1) of the Act and improper consideration
of the objections under Section 5A of the Act. Adverting to the public
purpose of the acquisition, the proceedings were, however, declined
interference and instead, the relief was moulded relying upon Competent
Authority vs. Barangore Jute Factory & Ors., (2005) 13 SCC 477, by shifting
the date of the Section 4(1) Notification.
4. Appeals were preferred both by the Landowners and the Appellant. The
Division Bench summoned the original records afresh. It arrived at a
finding at variance with the Learned Single Judge for reasons discussed in
paragraph 40 of the Order that the declaration under Section 6(1) of the
Act was not within statutory time. But, declining interference with the
acquisition proceedings, it concurred with the reasoning ascribed by the
Learned Single Judge of the larger public importance of the acquisition.
5. Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant
– Market Committee urged that the conclusion of the Learned Single Judge
from the original records that the declaration under Section 6(1) of the
Act was made within statutory time of one year was correct and warranted no
interference by the Division Bench. The last date of publication under
Section 4(1) in the Chavdi of the village was 05.08.2002. The declaration
made under Section 6(1) on 02.08.2003 was within time. The date of the
notification under Section 4(1) of the Act could not have been shifted in
the manner done.
6. Learned Counsel for the State of Karnataka submitted that in the
facts of the case, the High Court rightly shifted the date of the Section
4(1) notification keeping in mind the larger public interest involved in
the acquisition as also the interest of the landowners.
7. Sri V.Lakshmi Narayanna, Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
landowners, submitted that once the Division Bench arrived at a finding
that the declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act was beyond the statutory
time, the acquisition proceedings could not have been sustained in the
manner done. Without prejudice to the same, it was further submitted that
neither had possession been taken till date nor had compensation been
disbursed to the landowners. The acquisition proceedings, therefore,
additionally stood lapsed under Section 24(2) of The Right to Fair
Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and
Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the 2013 Act’).
8. We have considered the submissions on behalf of the parties. The
original acquisition records had also been summoned by us. The observations
of the Division Bench appear justified. But in the nature of the order
passed, moulding the relief keeping in mind the larger public interest
involved in the acquisition, and in view of Barangore Jute Factory (supra),
we are not satisfied that the order of the High Court calls for
interference.
9. In Barangore Jute Factory (supra) the acquisition suffered from
statutory non-compliance. In view of the larger public interest involved in
the acquisition, declining to set aside the acquisition the relief was
moulded in the interest of justice observing:-
“14………No useful purpose will be served by quashing the impugned
notification at this stage. We cannot be unmindful of the legal position
that the acquiring authority can always issue a fresh notification for
acquisition of the land in the event of the impugned notification being
quashed. The consequence of this will only be that keeping in view the
rising trend in prices of land, the amount of compensation payable to the
landowners may be more. Therefore, the ultimate question will be about the
quantum of compensation payable to the landowners. Quashing of the
notification at this stage will give rise to several difficulties and
practical problems. Balancing the rights of the petitioners as against the
problems involved in quashing the impugned notification, we are of the view
that a better course will be to compensate the landowners, that is, the
writ petitioners appropriately for what they have been deprived of.
Interests of justice persuade us to adopt this course of action.”
10. Since the contention with regard to the 2013 Act will require
examination of facts with due opportunity, we do not consider it necessary
to deal with the same in the present proceedings and leave it open for the
aggrieved to pursue their remedies in accordance with law before the
appropriate forum, if so advised.
11. All the appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
………………………………….J.
(Ranjan Gogoi)
……….………………………..J.
(Navin Sinha)
New Delhi,
April 17, 2017
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