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Supreme Court of India
Union Of India vs Ram Bahadur Yadav on 26 November, 2021Author: R. Subhash Reddy
Bench: R. Subhash Reddy, Hrishikesh Roy
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9334 OF 2010
Union of India & Ors. …Appellants
vs.
Ram Bahadur Yadav …Respondent
J U D G M E N T
R. SUBHASH REDDY, J.
1. This Civil Appeal is filed aggrieved by the
judgment and order dated 07.04.2009, passed by
the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in
Special Appeal No.230 of 2009. By the aforesaid
order, the intra–Court Appeal filed by the
Appellants is dismissed confirming the order of
the learned Single Judge allowing the writ
petition filed by the respondent.
2. The respondent herein was working as Head
Signature Not Verified
Digitally signed by
Rajni Mukhi
Date: 2021.11.26
Constable in the Railway Protection Force. In the
14:01:35 IST
Reason:
disciplinary inquiry initiated against him, he
was charged for collusion with main accused in
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the incident involving theft of more than Rs.1
Crore of Non-Judicial Stamp Papers. The competent
Authority, stating that it was not reasonably
practicable to hold an inquiry, has passed order
dated 22.10.1998, dismissing the respondent from
service. The appeal and revision filed by him,
ended in dismissal. When the said orders were
questioned, the learned Single Judge allowed the
writ petition by judgment and order dated
17.02.2009, by setting aside the dismissal order
with a direction for payment of all pensionary
benefits and 50% of back wages. The said order
was passed as the respondent–employee has
attained the age of superannuation. When the said
order was challenged by way of intra–Court
Appeal, the same ended in dismissal. Hence, this
Civil Appeal.
3. We have heard Ms. Kiran Suri, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the appellants and Sri S.R.
Singh, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondent.
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4. It is contended by learned Senior Counsel
for the appellants that Rule 161 of the Railway
Protection Force Rules, 1987 (hereinafter,
referred to as ‘RPF Rules’) empower the
authorities to dispense with inquiry, where the
competent Authority is of the view that it is not
reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry. It is
contended that having regard to nature of
allegations, as the delinquent employee has
threatened the witnesses who were not willing to
participate in the inquiry, the Authorities have
invoked Rule 161 and passed orders. It is further
submitted that even if the order of dismissal
does not contain reasons, it is sufficient if the
file discloses recording of reasons before
passing the order. Against the order allowing the
writ petition, though the Special Appeal was
filed before the Division Bench, the High Court
has not considered various grounds raised by the
appellants and erroneously confirmed the order of
the learned Single Judge. Lastly, it is contended
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that in any event, the High Court has committed
error in ordering payment of 50% of back-wages.
5. In support of the order of dismissal, learned
Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the
judgment of this Court in the Case of Sahadeo
Singh & Others v. Union Of India & Others1.
Against grant of back wages, learned Senior
Counsel appearing for the appellants has relied
on the judgment of this Court in the case of
Tarsem Singh v. State Of Punjab & Others2. It is
submitted that as the allegations made against
the respondent, are serious, no back wages were
to be granted in his favour. Reliance is placed
on the judgment of this Court in the case of
Deepali Gundu Surwase v. Kranti Junior Adhyapak
Mahavidyalaya (D.Ed.) & Others3 and also in the
case of Commissioner of Police, Delhi & Others v.
Jai Bhagwan4 in support of her argument.
6. On the other hand, Sri S.R. Singh, learned
Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent has
1
2003 (9) SCC 75
2
2006 (13) SCC 581
3
2013 (10) SCC 324
4
2011 (6) SCC 376
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drawn our attention to Rule 161 of the RPF Rules
and submitted that no reasons are recorded for
passing such order by invoking the said rule. It
is submitted that the very rule requires
recording of reasons, order passed without
recording any reason cannot stand to legal
scrutiny. Further, it is contended that the
allegation against the respondent that he
conspired with the other Head Constable in
commission of theft of Non-Judicial Stamp Papers,
is vague and is no ground at all, to dispense
with the inquiry. It is submitted that conduct of
inquiry before any punishment, is a normal rule
and Rule 161 of the RPF Rules can be invoked only
in exceptional cases, but not in a routine
manner. It is submitted that when the Rule itself
mandates recording of reasons, the argument of
the other side that it is sufficient if file
contains reasons, is no ground to sustain the
order. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the
respondent has placed reliance on the judgment of
this Court in the case of Jaswant Singh v. State
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of Punjab & Others5 to support the view taken by
the High Court.
7. We have heard learned Senior Counsel for the
parties and perused the material on record.
8. The disciplinary proceeding against the
respondent is governed by the RPF Rules, 1987.
The regular inquiry against a member of Force, is
governed by Rules 132, 148 and 153 of the RPF
Rules. The respondent was only a Head Constable
at the relevant point of time. Allegation against
him is that he conspired and colluded with
another Head Constable by name Mr. Jai Veer Singh
in commission of theft of Non-Judicial Stamp
Papers. The alleged incident was on 17th/18th
September 1998, and order of dismissal was passed
against the respondent on 22nd October, 1998 by
dispensing with inquiry by invoking Rule 161 of
the RPF Rules. Rule 161 of the RPF Rules itself
indicates special procedure in certain cases. The
relevant portion of Rule 161 of RPF Rules, reads
as under:
5
1991 (1) SCC 362
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“161.Special Procedure in certain cases:
Notwithstanding anything contained
anywhere in these rules –
(i) where any punishment is imposed on
an enrolled member of the Force on the
ground of conduct which has led to his
conviction on a criminal charge; or
(ii) where the authority competent to
impose the punishment is satisfied for
reasons to be recorded by it in writing
that it is not reasonably practicable to
hold an inquiry in the manner provided in
these rules;
(iii) where the President is satisfied
that in the interest of security of State
and the maintenance of integrity in the
Force, it is not expedient to hold any
inquiry in the manner provided in these
rules;
the authority competent to impose the
punishment may consider the circumstances
of the case and make such orders thereon
as it deems fit.”
9. From a reading of the above said Rule, it is
clear that to pass an order as disciplinary
measure, by adopting special procedure in certain
cases, Rule 161 itself mandates recording of
reasons. The normal rule for conducting an
inquiry is governed by Rules 132, 148 and 153 of
the RPF Rules. If the Authorities invoke special
procedure, unless they record reasons, as
contemplated in the Rule itself, no order could
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have been passed by invoking Rule 161. At no
point of time, appellants have produced file to
show that any reasons are recorded in such file
also. It is a settled legal position that when
Rules contemplate method and manner to adopt
special procedure, it is mandatory on the part of
the authorities to exercise such power by
adhering to the Rule strictly. Dismissal of a
regular member of Force, is a drastic measure.
Rule 161, which prescribes dispensing with an
inquiry and to pass order against a member of
Force, cannot be invoked in a routine and
mechanical manner, unless there are compelling
and valid reasons. The dismissal order dated
22.10.1998 does not indicate any reason for
dispensing with inquiry except stating that the
respondent had colluded with the other Head
Constable for theft of Non Judicial Stamp Papers.
By merely repeating the language of the Rule in
the order of dismissal, will not make the order
valid one, unless valid and sufficient reasons
are recorded to dispense with the inquiry. When
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the Rule mandates recording of reasons, the very
order should disclose the reasons for dispensing
with the inquiry. The argument of learned Senior
Counsel for the appellants that if file contains
reasons, same is sufficient to maintain the
order, deserves rejection. When inquiry is not
conducted, member of the Force is entitled to
know the reasons for dispensing with inquiry
before passing any order as a disciplinary
measure. The respondent was only a Head Constable
during the relevant point of time and he was not
in powerful position, so as to say that he would
have influenced or threatened the witnesses, had
the inquiry was conducted. The very fact that
they have conducted confidential inquiry,
falsifies the stand of the appellants that it was
not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry.
The words ‘not reasonably practicable’ as used in
the Rule, are to be understood in a manner that
in a given situation, ordinary and prudent man
should come to conclusion that in such
circumstances, it is not practicable. In the
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present case, there appears no valid reason to
dispense with inquiry and to invoke Rule 161 of
the Rules. We are in agreement with the view
taken by the High Court. In the case of Sahadeo
Singh & Others v. Union of India & Others 1, this
Court has held that in the facts and
circumstances of the said case, it was not
reasonably practicable to hold a fair inquiry, as
such, it was held to be justifiable on the facts
of the case. Whether it is practicable or not to
hold an inquiry, is a matter to be considered
with reference to the facts of each case and
nature of charge, etc.
10. In the judgment in the case of Tarsem Singh
v. State of Punjab & Others2, this Court has
categorically held that when the Authority is of
the opinion that it is not reasonably practicable
to hold inquiry, such finding shall be recorded
on the subjective satisfaction by the authority,
and same must be based on the objective criteria.
In the aforesaid case, it is further held that
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reasons for dispensing with the inquiry must be
supported by material.
11. With regard to plea of the appellants for
grant of back wages, in the case of Tarsem Singh2,
this Court has held that payment of back-wages
would depend on result of the inquiry. In the
present case on hand, by the time, the order came
to be passed by the learned Single Judge, the
respondent had retired from service on attaining
the age of superannuation. In normal course, we
would have permitted to hold inquiry, but keeping
in mind that the respondent had retired from
service even before the judgment was rendered by
the learned Single Judge, we are not inclined to
do so at this stage. Though, it is alleged that
the respondent had conspired with the main
accused for commission of theft of Non-Judicial
Stamp Papers nearly worth of Rs.1 Crore, but not
even a police complaint was filed for reasons
best known to the appellants. Opposing the award
of back wages, learned Senior Counsel for the
appellants has placed reliance on the judgment of
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this Court in the case of Deepali Gundu Surwase3.
Grant of back wages depends on facts and
circumstances of each case. In the aforesaid
case, while dealing with grant of back-wages,
this Court has held that in the case of wrongful
termination of service, reinstatement with
continuity of service and back-wages is normal
rule and the adjudicating authority to take into
consideration the length of service of the
employee, nature of misconduct, financial
condition of the employer and similar other
factors. Coming to the case on hand, the
respondent was not given any opportunity to
defend his case at all. It is clearly well
settled that any amount of suspicion cannot be
equated to proof. Keeping in mind ratio in the
judgment of this Court in the case of Deepali
Gundu Surwase3, we are of the considered opinion
that grant of 50% of back-wages is just and fair
in the facts and circumstances of the case. The
judgment relied on by the learned Senior Counsel
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for the appellants would not, in any way, support
their case.
12. On the other hand, in the case of M/s.
Hindustan Tin Works Pvt. Limited v. The Employees
of M/s. Hindustan Tin Works Private Limited &
others6, this Court has held that reinstatement
with back-wages, fully or partially, is a matter
of discretion of the Tribunal.
13. In the facts of the present case, we are of
the view that the High Court has correctly
granted 50% of the back wages to the respondent.
14. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any
good ground to interfere with the impugned order
passed by the High Court. Accordingly, this Civil
Appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs.
……………………………………………J
(R. SUBHASH REDDY)
………………………………………………J
(HRISHIKESH ROY)
NEW DELHI;
November 26, 2021
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(1979) 2 SCC 80
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