THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.981 of 2013
JUDGMENT: (Per the Hon’ble the Chief Justice Satish Chandra Sharma)

Though the matter is listed on interlocutory application
for suspension of sentence, preferred under Section 389(1) of
Cr.P.C, the parties have agreed to argue the matter finally.
The matter was heard with the consent of the parties finally.

  1. The appellant/sole accused is aggrieved by the
    judgment dated 08.11.2013 passed by the learned Additional
    District and Sessions Judge, Vikarabad, Ranga Reddy District
    in S.C.No.25 of 2010, by which he has been convicted for
    offences punishable under Sections 302 and 201 I.P.C. and
    has been sentenced to undergo life imprisonment along with
    fine of Rs.10,000/- for the offence under Section 302 of I.P.C
    and to undergo seven years rigorous imprisonment along with
    a fine of Rs.5,000/- for the offence under Section 201 of I.P.C,
    with a default clause to undergo further simple imprisonment
    for a period of one year. The sentences have been directed to
    run concurrently.
  2. The facts of the case reveal that on 15.05.2008 at about
    9:00 AM, one Ananthaiah lodged a complaint at Kullakachrela
    Police Station stating that his mother, Smt. Anjilamma, had
    gone to work as a labour at Rajaiah’s Brick Factory on
    13.05.2008 and later she went to the house of Md. Rasheed,
    2
    who was celebrating Gyarme festival. It was also stated that
    her mother disappeared after that and on 15.05.2008, one
    Jakkulapally Venkataiah informed him about a female dead
    body lying in Patel Water Tank and he has identified the dead
    body of his mother. He has further stated that he suspects
    one Anjilaiah, who was having illegal intimacy with his
    mother and is responsible for the death of his mother. A case
    was accordingly registered in Crime No.43 of 2008 invoking
    the provisions of Section 174 of Cr.P.C. The police, after
    carrying out the investigation, filed a charge sheet.
  3. The prosecution has examined as many as 11 witnesses
    (P.Ws.1 to 11) and as many as 12 documents were marked as
    Exs.P.1 to P.12. The defence has also produced three
    documents, which were marked as Exs.D.1 to D.3. The
    conviction in the present case is based upon the testimonies
    of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.5. None of the witnesses
    examined by the prosecution are interested witnesses, except
    P.W.1, who is the son of the deceased.
    The record of the case reveals that P.W.1 is the
    complainant and son of the deceased. P.W.2 is the daughter
    of the deceased. P.Ws.3 to 5 are the circumstantial
    witnesses. P.W.6 is the panch witness in respect of scene of
    offence, inquest and rough sketch. P.W.7 is the panch for
    confession and seizure. P.W.8 is the Medical Officer who
    conducted the post-mortem examination and P.Ws.9 to 11 are
    the Investigating Officers.
    3
    P.W.1, in his statement before the trial Court, has
    stated that he knows the accused since last five years and his
    mother left the house along with the accused to work as a
    coolie. He also stated that the wife of the accused used to
    quarrel with his mother and after working as a labour, on the
    date of the incident the accused went along with his mother
    to the house of one Md. Rasheed to have dinner. However, he
    has nowhere stated that the accused left with his mother after
    dinner was over.
    Similarly, P.W.2, who is the daughter of the deceased,
    has stated that his mother went out on the date of the
    incident with the accused and returned home. She has
    further stated that later the accused along with her mother
    went to the house of Md. Rasheed to attend a dinner.
    However, she has also not stated that the accused and the
    deceased left the house of Md. Rasheed together after
    attending dinner. The only common statement made by them
    is that their mother went out to work as a labour with the
    accused and also went out to attend a dinner at the house of
    Md. Rasheed.
    P.W.4, whose house is in front of the house of the
    deceased, has stated that the accused used to visit the house
    of the deceased on and off. However, he has not made any
    statement incriminating the accused with the crime.
    P.W.5 is the person, at whose house dinner took place,
    namely Md. Rasheed. He has stated categorically that it was
    4
    the deceased alone who came to his house to have dinner.
    P.Ws.3, 4 and 5 have been declared hostile by the
    prosecution.
    P.W.8, who is a Doctor working as a Senior Public
    Health Officer did autopsy over the body of the deceased and
    found contusions on the frontal right parietal, temporal and
    occipital region of the skull, right temporal muscle, lower slip
    including neck muscle besides other injuries. He has opined
    that the death was due to the pressure applied on the neck
    resulting in the fracture of the right hyoid bone. Meaning
    thereby, homicidal in nature.
    P.W.6 is the panch witness and he has stated that in his
    presence, the body was taken out of the water tank and scene
    of offence panchanama and inquest panchanama were drawn
    in his presence and he has signed the same. He also stated
    that he noticed scratch marks on the face of the deceased
    Anjialamma. He also stated that the police drew the rough
    sketch of the scene of crime in his presence.
    P.W.7 is also the panch witness and he has stated that
    he has gone to the police station five years back along with
    Vittal Naik, who is from his village, where the accused was
    present, and at the instance of the police, he enquired from
    the accused about the incident and the accused has
    confessed that he has killed a woman and at his instance, a
    wooden stick was seized by the police.
    5
    The trial Court, based upon the evidence of
    P.Ws.1 and 2, who have stated that their mother went out
    with the accused, has convicted the accused for offences
    punishable under Sections 302 and 201 of I.P.C.
    The trial Court has taken into account extra-judicial
    confession of the appellant/sole accused as well as the
    statements of the panch witnesses, P.Ws.6 and 7 and the
    seizure of the wooden stick at the behest of the appellant/sole
    appellant and has arrived at a conclusion that the injuries,
    which were found on the body of the deceased were caused
    with the seized stick, keeping in view the evidence of the
    medical officer. The trial Court has held that the evidence of
    circumstantial witnesses, i.e., P.Ws.3 and 5, panch witnesses
    along with the evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2, who are the children
    of the deceased, and injuries on the dead body, when all read
    together, clearly establishes the fact the appellant/sole
    accused has in fact committed the offence of murder. The trial
    Court has also held that no explanation was offered in respect
    of the disappearance of the deceased after parting with his
    company. Thus, in short, the trial Court based upon
    circumstantial evidence has arrived at a conclusion that it
    was the appellant/sole accused, who has committed the
    offence of murder.
    Another important aspect of the case is that the stick
    was recovered the behest of the accused. However, there was
    no F.S.L. Report in respect of any bloodstains on the stick.
    6
    The entire case of the prosecution is based upon
    circumstantial evidence and based upon the circumstantial
    evidence, the appellant has been convicted by the trial Court.
  4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue of
    conviction based upon the circumstantial evidence and has
    held that the Judge while deciding matters resting on
    circumstantial evidence should always tread cautiously so as
    to not allow conjectures or suspicion, however strong, to take
    the place of proof. Paragraphs 30 and 66 of the Judgment
    delivered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pattu
    Rajan v. State of Tamil Nadu1 are reproduced as under:-
    “30. Before we undertake a consideration of the evidence
    supporting such circumstances, we would like to note that the law
    relating to circumstantial evidence is well settled. The Judge while
    deciding matters resting on circumstantial evidence should always
    tread cautiously so as to not allow conjectures or suspicion,
    however strong, to take the place of proof. If the alleged
    circumstances are conclusively proved before the Court by leading
    cogent and reliable evidence, the Court need not look any further
    before affirming the guilt of the accused. Moreover, human agency
    may be faulty in expressing the picturisation of the actual
    incident, but circumstances cannot fail or be ignored. As aptly put
    in this oft-quoted phrase: “Men may lie, but circumstances do
    not”.
  5. In our considered opinion, the prosecution has proved the
    complicity of all the appellants in murdering Santhakumar by
    strangulating him and thereafter throwing the dead body at TigerChola. It is worth recalling that while it is necessary that proof
    beyond reasonable doubt should be adduced in all criminal cases,
    it is not necessary that such proof should be perfect, and someone
    who is guilty cannot get away with impunity only because the
    truth may develop some infirmity when projected through human
    processes. The traditional dogmatic hypertechnical approach has
    to be replaced by a rational, realistic and genuine approach for

1
(2019) 4 SCC 771
7
administering justice in a criminal trial. Justice cannot be made
sterile by exaggerated adherence to the rule of proof, inasmuch as
the benefit of doubt must always be reasonable and not fanciful.
[See Inder Singh v. State (UT of Delhi) [Inder Singh v. State (UT of
Delhi), (1978) 4 SCC 161 : 1978 SCC (Cri) 564] ; State of
H.P. v. Lekh Raj [State of H.P. v. Lekh Raj, (2000) 1 SCC 247 : 2000
SCC (Cri) 147]; Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing
Chamansing [Takhaji Hiraji v. Thakore Kubersing Chamansing,
(2001) 6 SCC 145 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 1070] and Chaman v. State of
Uttarakhand [Chaman v. State of Uttarakhand, (2016) 12 SCC 76 :
(2016) 4 SCC (Cri) 6] .]”
In the present case, it is true that the deceased went out
to work as a labour with the appellant/sole accused.
However, the deceased and the accused went to the house of
Md. Rasheed to attend dinner and they never left together
after attending the dinner. In fact, there is no evidence on
record to establish that the deceased and the accused left
together after the dinner. The only statement, which has been
made by P.Ws.1 and 2 is that their mother went out to work
as labour with the accused and therefore, the theory of last
seen together is not applicable in the present case.

  1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gargi v. State of
    Haryana2 has again dealt with the conviction based upon
    circumstantial evidence. In the aforesaid case, there was a
    gap between point of time when the accused and the deceased
    were last seen together. Paragraphs 33.1 and 33.3 of the
    aforesaid Judgment read as under:-
    “33.1. Insofar as the “last seen theory” is concerned, there
    is no doubt that the appellant being none other than the wife of
    the deceased and staying under the same roof, was the last person

2
(2019) 9 SCC 738
8
the deceased was seen with. However, such companionship of the
deceased and the appellant, by itself, does not mean that a
presumption of guilt of the appellant is to be drawn. The trial court
and the High Court have proceeded on the assumption that
Section 106 of the Evidence Act [“106. Burden of proving fact
especially within knowledge.—When any fact is especially
within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that
fact is upon him.”] directly operates against the appellant. In our
view, such an approach has also not been free from error where it
was omitted to be considered that Section 106 of the Evidence Act
does not absolve the prosecution of its primary burden. This Court
has explained the principle in Sawal Das [Sawal Das v. State of
Bihar, (1974) 4 SCC 193 : 1974 SCC (Cri) 362] in the following :
(SCC p. 197, para 10)
“10. Neither an application of Section 103 nor of 106 of the
Evidence Act could, however, absolve the prosecution from the
duty of discharging its general or primary burden of proving the
prosecution case beyond reasonable doubt. It is only when the
prosecution has led evidence which, if believed, will sustain a
conviction, or which makes out a prima facie case, that the
question arises of considering facts of which the burden of proof
may lie upon the accused.”
33.3. In the given set of circumstances, the last seen theory
cannot be operated against the appellant only because she was the
wife of the deceased and was living with him. The gap between the
point of time when the appellant and the deceased were last seen
together and when the deceased was found dead had not been that
small that possibility of any other person being the author of the
crime is rendered totally improbable. In Sk. Yusuf [Sk.
Yusuf v. State of W.B., (2011) 11 SCC 754 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri)
620], this Court has said : (SCC pp. 760-61, para 21)
“21. The last-seen theory comes into play where the time gap
between the point of time when the accused and the deceased
were last seen alive and when the deceased is found dead is so
small that possibility of any person other than the accused being
the author of the crime becomes impossible.”
In the present case also, the appellant/sole accused and
the deceased went out together to work as a labour and
thereafter the deceased went to the house of Md. Rasheed to
attend dinner and it is nobody’s case that they left the house
together and they were seen together in the morning. There
was a substantial gap between the point of time when they
9
were last seen together and therefore, the conviction based
upon the circumstantial evidence is bad in law.

  1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Gargi (supra)
    has dealt with the principles governing the circumstantial
    evidence in paragraphs 17 and 18, which are reproduced as
    under:-
    “17. When the present case pivots around circumstantial
    evidence, having regard to the questions involved, apposite it
    would be to take note of a few fundamental principles governing
    the circumstantial evidence and its appreciation.
  2. It remains trite that in judicial proceedings, proof is made
    by means of production of evidence, which may be either oral or
    documentary. As regards its nature, the evidence is either direct or
    circumstantial. The direct evidence proves the existence of a
    particular fact that emanates from a document or an object
    and/or what has been observed by the witness. The circumstantial
    evidence is the one whereby other facts are proved from which the
    existence of fact in issue may either be logically inferred, or at least
    rendered more probable. [A Text Book of Jurisprudence by G.W.
    Paton, 4th Edn., p. 598.]
    18.1. In umpteen number of decisions, this Court has
    explained the essentials before a particular fact could be held
    proved by way of the proof of other fact or facts; and has
    expounded on the principles as to how circumstantial evidence
    need to be approached in a criminal case. We need not multiply on
    the case law on the subject; only a brief reference to the relevant
    decisions would suffice.
    18.2. In Chandmal v. State of Rajasthan [Chandmal v. State of
    Rajasthan, (1976) 1 SCC 621 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 120], this Court
    said : (SCC p. 625, para 14)
    “14. It is well settled that when a case rests entirely on
    circumstantial evidence, such evidence must satisfy three tests.
    Firstly, the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
    sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established.
    Secondly, these circumstances should be of a definite tendency
    unerringly pointing towards the guilt of the accused. Thirdly, the
    circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a chain so
    complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within
    all human probability the crime was committed by the accused
    and none else. That is to say, the circumstances should be
    incapable of explanation on any reasonable hypothesis save that
    of the accused’s guilt.”
    18.3. In Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of
    Maharashtra [Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra,
    10
    (1984) 4 SCC 116 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 487], this Court laid down the
    golden principles of standard of proof required in a case sought to
    be established on circumstantial evidence with reference to several
    past decisions, including that in Hanumant v. State of
    M.P. [Hanumant v. State of M.P., AIR 1952 SC 343 : 1953 Cri LJ
    129] , in the following : (SCC p. 185, paras 153-54)
    “153. A close analysis of this decision would show that the
    following conditions must be fulfilled before a case against an
    accused can be said to be fully established:
    (1) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to
    be drawn should be fully established.
    It may be noted here that this Court indicated that the
    circumstances concerned “must or should” and not “may be”
    established. There is not only a grammatical but a legal distinction
    between “may be proved” and “must be or should be proved” as
    was held by this Court in Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of
    Maharashtra [Shivaji Sahabrao Bobade v. State of Maharashtra,
    (1973) 2 SCC 793 : 1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] where the observations
    were made : [SCC p. 807, para 19 : SCC (Cri) p. 1047]
    ‘19. … Certainly, it is a primary principle that the accused
    must be and not merely may be guilty before a court can convict
    and the mental distance between “may be” and “must be” is long
    and divides vague conjectures from sure conclusions.’
    (2) the facts so established should be consistent only with the
    hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say, they should
    not be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the
    accused is guilty,
    (3) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and
    tendency,
    (4) they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the
    one to be proved, and
    (5) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to
    leave any reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the
    innocence of the accused and must show that in all human
    probability the act must have been done by the accused.
  3. These five golden principles, if we may say so, constitute
    the panchsheel of the proof of a case based on circumstantial
    evidence.”
    18.4. In the decision cited by the learned counsel for the
    appellant in Sonvir [Sonvir v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 8 SCC 24
    : (2018) 3 SCC (Cri) 486], this Court, after taking note of the other
    cited decisions, pointed out the principles as under : (SCC p. 52,
    para 82)
    “82. … Law of conviction based on circumstantial evidence is
    well settled. It is sufficient to refer to the judgment of this Court
    in Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan [Ramesh v. State of Rajasthan,
    11
    (2011) 3 SCC 685 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 54] where in para 17 the
    following has been held : (SCC p. 693)
    ‘17. Before we proceed with the matter, it has to be borne in
    mind that this case depends upon circumstantial evidence and,
    as such, as per the settled law, every circumstance would have
    to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and further the chain of
    circumstances should be so complete and perfect that the only
    inference of the guilt of the accused should emanate therefrom.
    At the same time, there should be no possibility whatsoever of
    the defence version being true.’”
    18.5. Thus, circumstantial evidence, in the context of a crime,
    essentially means such facts and surrounding factors which do
    point towards the complicity of the charged accused; and then,
    chain of circumstances means such unquestionable linking of the
    facts and the surrounding factors that they establish only the guilt
    of the charged accused beyond reasonable doubt, while ruling out
    any other theory or possibility or hypothesis.
    18.6. Incidental to the principles aforesaid, which are neither
    of any doubt nor of any dispute, profitable it would be to keep in
    view the caveat entered by G.W. Paton [A Text Book of
    Jurisprudence by G.W. Paton, 4th Edn., p. 598.] as regards
    circumstantial evidence thus:
    “On the other hand, circumstances may mislead or false
    clues may have been laid by the wrongdoer to cast suspicion on
    another.” [This has been stated with reference to in Criminal Law
    by C.S. Kenny wherein, it is cautioned that : though
    ‘circumstances cannot lie’, they can mislead. They may even have
    been brought about for the very purpose of misleading, as when
    Joseph’s silver cup was placed in Benjamin’s sack, or when Lady
    Macbeth ‘smeared the sleeping grooms with blood’.]
    Keeping in view the aforesaid principles laid down by
    the Hon’ble Supreme Court and keeping in view the evidence
    on record, as the chain of events is not complete in the
    present case, the conviction of the appellant/sole accused is
    bad in law.
  4. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of State of
    Rajasthan v. Mahesh Kumar3 in paragraphs 10 and 12 has held as
    under:-
    “10. It is well settled that in the cases of circumstantial
    evidence, the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is
    to be drawn should in the first instance be fully established, and
    all the facts so established should be consistent only with the
    hypothesis of guilt of the accused. The circumstances should be of

3
(2019) 7 SCC 678
12
a conclusive nature and should be such as to exclude every
hypothesis but the one proposed to be proved. In other words,
there must be a complete chain of evidence as not to leave any
reasonable ground for a conclusion consistent with the innocence
of the accused and it must be such as to show that within all
human probability the act must have been done by the accused
and none else.

  1. It has been further relied on by this Court in Sujit
    Biswas v. State of Assam [Sujit Biswas v. State of Assam, (2013)
    12 SCC 406 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 677] and Raja v. State of
    Haryana [Raja v. State of Haryana, (2015) 11 SCC 43 : (2015) 4
    SCC (Cri) 267] and has been propounded that while scrutinising
    the circumstantial evidence, it is the duty of the Court to evaluate
    it to ensure the chain of events clearly established and completely
    to rule out any reasonable likelihood of innocence of the accused.
    It is true that the underlying principle whether the chain is
    complete or not, indeed would depend on the facts of each case
    emanating from the evidence and there cannot be a straitjacket
    formula which can be laid down for the purpose. It is always to be
    kept in mind that the circumstances adduced when considered
    collectively, must lead only to the conclusion that there cannot be
    a person other than the accused who alone is the perpetrator of
    the crime alleged and the circumstances must establish the
    conclusive nature consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt
    of the accused.”
    The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that as the
    circumstantial evidence should be of conclusive nature and
    should be such as to exclude every hypothesis but the one
    proposed to be proved. The chain of evidence must be
    complete chain of evidence to arrive at a conclusion that it is
    only the accused who has committed offence.
    In the present case, the chain of evidence is not
    complete. It was not established that the stick, which was
    recovered at the behest of the accused, was the same stick
    used for causing injuries over the body of the deceased
    resulting in her death. The so called extra-judicial confession
    13
    was in presence of police, and therefore, in the light of the
    aforesaid judgment, the conviction of the accused is bad in
    law and deserves to be set aside.
  2. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Suresh v. State
    of Haryana4 has dealt with the extra-judicial confession.
    Paragraph 50 of the aforesaid Judgment reads as under:-
    “50. Now we need to concentrate on the relevance of the
    alleged confessions of the co-accused made before Zile Singh (PW
    16). In Periaswami Moopan, In re [Periaswami Moopan, In re, 1930
    SCC OnLine Mad 86 : AIR 1931 Mad 177] , Reilly, J. observed:
    (SCC OnLine Mad)
    “… where there is evidence against the co-accused sufficient,
    if believed, to support his conviction, then the kind of confession
    described in Section 30 may be thrown into the scale as an
    additional reason for believing that evidence.”
    Therefore, the aforesaid extra-judicial confession against
    the co-accused needs to be taken into consideration if at all it is
    one, only if other independent evidence on record have established
    the basic premise of the prosecution. The confession of the coaccused cannot be solely utilised to convict a person, when the
    surrounding circumstances are improbable and create suspicion
    (refer to Haricharan Kurmi v. State of Bihar [Haricharan
    Kurmi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1964 SC 1184 : (1964) 2 Cri LJ 344] ).
    As the confession of a co-accused is weak piece of evidence, we
    need to consider whether other circumstances prove the
    prosecution case.”
    The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid Judgment
    has held that extra-judicial confession cannot be the sole
    basis of conviction and cannot be relied on when surrounding
    circumstances are improbable and create suspicion. The weak
    piece of evidence is the extra-judicial confession which was
    recorded in the presence of the police and the chain of

4
(2018) 18 SCC 654
14
evidence is certainly not at all complete and therefore, the
conviction of the accused deserves to be set aside.

  1. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Satish Nirankari
    v. State of Rajasthan5, in paragraphs 29, 30 and 31 has held as
    under:-
    “29. It is now well established, by a catena of judgments of this
    Court, that circumstantial evidence of the following character
    needs to be fully established:
    (i) Circumstances should be fully proved.
    (ii) Circumstances should be conclusive in nature.
    (iii) All the facts established should be consistent only with the
    hypothesis of guilt.
    (iv) The circumstances should, to a moral certainty, exclude
    the possibility of guilt of any person other than the accused
    (see State of U.P. v. Ravindra Prakash Mittal [State of
    U.P. v. Ravindra Prakash Mittal, (1992) 3 SCC 300 : 1992 SCC (Cri)
    642]; Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai v. State of
    Gujarat [Chandrakant Chimanlal Desai v. State of Gujarat, (1992) 1
    SCC 473 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 157] ). It also needs to be emphasised
    that what is required is not the quantitative, but qualitative,
    reliable and probable circumstances to complete the claim
    connecting the accused with the crime. Suspicion, however grave,
    cannot take place of legal proof. In the case of circumstantial
    evidence, the influence of guilt can be justified only when all the
    incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be not
    compatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any
    other person.
  2. The following tests laid down in Padala Veera
    Reddy v. State of A.P. [Padala Veera Reddy v. State of A.P., 1989
    Supp (2) SCC 706 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 407] also need to be kept in
    mind : (SCC pp. 710-11, para 10)
    “10. (1) the circumstances from which an inference of guilt is
    sought to be drawn, must be cogently and firmly established;
    (2) those circumstances should be of a definite tendency
    unerringly pointing towards guilt of the accused;
    (3) the circumstances, taken cumulatively, should form a
    chain so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion
    that within all human probability the crime was committed by
    the accused and none else; and
    (4) the circumstantial evidence in order to sustain conviction
    must be complete and incapable of explanation of any other
    hypothesis than that of the guilt of the accused and such
    evidence should not only be consistent with the guilt of the
    accused but should be inconsistent with his innocence.”

5
(2017) 8 SCC 497
15

  1. Sir Alfred Wills in his book Wills’ Circumstantial
    Evidence (Chapter VI) lays down the following rules specially to be
    observed in the case of circumstantial evidence:
    “(1) the facts alleged as the basis of any legal inference must be
    clearly proved and beyond reasonable doubt connected with the
    factum probandum;
    (2) the burden of proof is always on the party who asserts the
    existence of any fact, which infers legal accountability;
    (3) in all cases, whether of direct or circumstantial evidence,
    the best evidence must be adduced which the nature of the case
    admits;
    (4) in order to justify the inference of guilt, the inculpatory
    facts must be incompatible with the innocence of the accused and
    incapable of explanation, upon any other reasonable hypothesis
    than that of his guilt; and
    (5) if there by any reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused,
    he is entitled as of right to be acquitted.”
    Keeping in view the aforesaid Judgement, no prudent
    person can draw a conclusion that the chain of events is
    complete. It is true that the stick which was allegedly used for
    causing injuries resulting in her death was recovered at the
    behest of the appellant/sole accused, however, there is no
    FSL Report in respect of any blood stains on the stick.
  2. The trial Court has taken into account the extrajudicial confession. However, it does not help the prosecution
    at all, as the chain of events does not lead to the result i.e.,
    accused committing the crime of murder. The appellant/sole
    accused has been convicted based upon the circumstantial
    evidence and the chain of events is certainly incomplete. It is
    true that P.W.1 and P.W.2 have stated that their mother went
    out of the house along with the appellant to work as a labour.
    However, they have stated that after working as a labour for
    16
    the whole day, the appellant and the deceased went to the
    house of Md. Rasheed. There is no evidence on record of any
    person stating that they left the house of Md. Rasheed
    together.
    Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, as
    the evidence does not establish the factum of crime to be
    attributed to the present appellant/sole accused, this Court is
    of the opinion that the impugned judgment delivered by the
    trial Court deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set
    aside.
    Resultantly, the Criminal Appeal stands allowed. The
    appellant/sole accused is acquitted of the offences for which
    he was charged. The appellant/sole accused shall be set at
    liberty forthwith, if not wanted in any other case.
    Miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall stand
    closed.
    ____________ SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA, CJ
    ___________ ABHINAND KUMAR SHAVILI, J
    08.02.2022
    JSU/PLN

Comments

Leave a Reply

Sign In

Register

Reset Password

Please enter your username or email address, you will receive a link to create a new password via email.