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Supreme Court of India
Krishna Lal Chawla vs State Of U.P. on 8 March, 2021Author: Mohan M. Shantanagoudar
Bench: Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, Vineet Saran
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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 283 OF 2021
(arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 6432/2020)
KRISHNA LAL CHAWLA & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, J.
Leave granted.
2. This appeal arises out of final order and judgement of the
High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter, ‘High Court’)
dated 28.09.2020, dismissing the Miscellaneous Petition No.
2561 of 2020 filed by Appellants herein praying for quashing of
Signature Not Verified
the following orders:
Digitally signed by
GULSHAN KUMAR
ARORA
Date: 2021.03.08
16:07:42 IST
Reason:
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(i) Order dated 4.04.2019 of Learned Additional Chief Judicial
Magistrate, Meerut (hereinafter, ‘Magistrate’) in Complaint Case
No. 2943/2018, issuing summons against the Appellants;
(ii) Order dated 13.01.2020 of the Ld. Additional District and
Sessions Judge, Meerut (hereinafter, ‘Sessions Judge’) in
Criminal Revision No.202/2019, dismissing the Appellants’
revision application against the aforesaid summoning order.
3. The brief facts leading to this appeal are as follows:
3.1 The Appellants and Respondent No. 2 are neighbours. The
genesis of the proceedings before us lies in a physical altercation
that took place between the Appellants, and the Respondent No.
2 and his wife on 5.08.2012. While the occurrence of such an
altercation is an admitted fact between the parties, the details
thereof form the crux of this prolonged litigation.
3.2 On 5.08.2012, the Respondent No. 2 filed a NonCognizable
Report (NCR) No. 158/2012 against the Appellants alleging
offences under Sections 323, 504 and 506, Indian Penal Code,
1860 (hereinafter, ‘IPC’). It was his case that the Appellants came
to his house, beat him and his wife with iron rods, and
threatened to kill them.
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3.3 The son of Appellant No. 1 also filed information on
5.08.2012, which was registered as NonCognizable Report (NCR)
No. 160/2012 with the Daurala Police Station, alleging offences
under Sections 323, 504 and 506, IPC against the Respondent
No. 2 and his wife. This Report counteralleged that the
Respondent No. 2 and his wife came to the Appellants’ house,
beat them up with wooden sticks and iron rods, and threatened
to kill their family.
3.4 It seems that even prior to the alleged occurrences, there
were disputes between the parties in 2006. A mutual settlement
took place on 6.02.2006 by which Respondent No. 2 agreed to
pay a penalty of Rs. 3,000/ to the Appellant No. 1.
Subsequently, in another dispute, on 21.12.2013 the Special
Chief Judicial Magistrate imposed a penalty of Rs. 1,500/ on
Appellant No. 4. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the
parties have been at loggerheads from 2006 onwards. It appears
that they have been fighting litigations on one pretext or the
other since 2006. Though they were agriculturists and
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neighbours, peace did not prevail between them, which resulted
in a number of cases being lodged by them against each other.
3.5 The Appellants filed an application under Section 155(2) of
the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘CrPC’) before
the Magistrate on 27.04.2017, almost 5 years after the alleged
incident, seeking permission for the police to investigate NCR No.
160/2012. The learned Magistrate directed that NCR No.
160/2012 filed by the Appellants be registered as FIR in Crime
No. 283/2017. Investigation was conducted, and on 17.09.2017
a charge sheet was filed against the Respondent No. 2 and his
wife under Sections 323, 325, 504 and 506 of the IPC.
Subsequently, the Magistrate framed charges against Respondent
No. 2 and his wife. There is nothing on record to show that even
a single witness has been examined till date, though charges
were framed by the Magistrate long back. Thus, there has been
considerable delay in these proceedings, during both the
investigation and trial stages.
3.6 Being unsatisfied with the allegations made and charge sheet
filed against him, the Respondent No. 2 instituted a fresh private
complaint against the Appellants under Section 200 of CrPC in
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Complaint Case No. 2943 of 2018 in respect of the very incident
that took place on 5.08.2012. This private complaint was filed
only on 11.05.2018, that is about six years from the date of
alleged incident. In the private complaint, not only new
allegations were added but all allegations are wilder and different
from the averments made in NCR No. 158/12, though the
incident is the same as of 5.08.2012 and between the same
parties. It may not be necessary for us to narrate the contents of
the private complaint inasmuch as we find and have satisfied
ourselves that the allegations made in the private complaint are
absolute material improvements over the allegations in NCR No.
158/12. Among other things, not only three additional eye
witnesses are inducted in the private complaint, but allegations
of fraud, injury to bull, forging of affidavit, etc. which were not
found in the 2012 complaint are also found in the private
complaint. The private complaint for the first time mentions
commission of offences under Section 429, IPC and Sections 10
and 11 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960. It is an
admitted fact that Appellant No. 4 had inflicted injury on
Respondent No. 2’s bull on 26.09.2011, for which Appellant No. 4
had voluntarily confessed and accepted penalty of Rs. 1,500 from
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the Magistrate as mentioned supra. Be that as it may, we see no
reason why Respondent No. 2 chose to rehash this incident in
the private complaint given that Appellant No. 4 has already been
convicted for the offence, and it is of no relevance to the present
case.
Curiously, the Magistrate was pleased to issue process
against the Appellants based on this vexatious private complaint,
which came to be confirmed by the Learned Sessions Judge in
the impugned order. The Learned Sessions Judge has thus not
only misunderstood Section 200, CrPC and its scope but also
made a new case in favour of Respondent No.2 by reading
Section 506 Part II, IPC which is punishable by 7 years in the
place of Section 506, IPC, probably only to bring the private
complaint within the prescribed period of limitation under
Section 468 CrPC. It is nobody’s case that the offence under
Section 506(II) has taken place, which means that the Courts
took extra interest to improve the case of the
respondent/complainant.
This appeal is filed challenging both the orders of the
Magistrate as well as the Sessions Judge in respect of issuance of
process, as mentioned supra.
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4. The learned counsel for Respondent No. 2 sought to justify
the impugned orders by relying on the following excerpt from this
Court’s decision in Upkar Singh v. Ved Prakash & ors., (2004)
13 SCC 292, which clarified the import of its previous holding in
T.T. Antony v. State of Kerala, (2001) 6 SCC 181:
“23. Be that as it may, if the law laid down by this
Court in T.T. Antony case [(2001) 6 SCC 181: 2001
SCC (Cri) 1048] is to be accepted as holding that a
second complaint in regard to the same incident filed
as a countercomplaint is prohibited under the Code
then, in our opinion, such conclusion would lead to
serious consequences. This will be clear from the
hypothetical example given hereinbelow i.e. if in regard
to a crime committed by the real accused he takes the
first opportunity to lodge a false complaint and the
same is registered by the jurisdictional police then the
aggrieved victim of such crime will be precluded from
lodging a complaint giving his version of the incident in
question, consequently he will be deprived of his
legitimated right to bring the real accused to book.
This cannot be the purport of the Code.”
Therefore, Upkar Singh clarified that this Court’s previous
decision in T.T. Anthony will not bar the filing of a second
complaint with respect to the same incident, if such second
complaint is filed as a countercomplaint by the other party. We
are in agreement with the aforementioned construction of T.T.
Anthony. However, we fail to see how this position of law comes
to Respondent No.2’s rescue. The question posed in the present
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case for consideration before us is wholly different, and concerns
the validity of the private complaint filed by Respondent No. 2,
after an earlier information filed as NCR No. 158/2012 – both of
which were filed by the same party, against the same accused,
and in relation to the same incident that too after the charge
sheet was filed in case arising out of NCR No. 160/12 in Crime
No. 283/2017 after taking due permission of Magistrate. The
aforementioned portion of Upkar Singh relied on by Respondent
No. 2, thus, does not benefit his case.
5. Indeed, a closer look at the decision in Upkar Singh takes us
to the contrary conclusion. In regard to the question of material
improvements made in a subsequent private complaint by the
same complainant against the same accused with regard to the
same incident, it may be useful to refer to the following excerpt
from Upkar Singh, which further clarifies the holding in T.T.
Antony:
“17…In our opinion, this Court in that case only held
that any further complaint by the same complainant or
others against the same accused, subsequent to the
registration of a case, is prohibited under the Code
because an investigation in this regard would have
already started and further complaint against the
same accused will amount to an improvement on the
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facts mentioned in the original complaint, hence will
be prohibited under Section 162 of the Code.”
(emphasis supplied)
It is the aforementioned part of the holding in Upkar Singh
that bears directly and strongly upon the present case. This
Court in Upkar Singh has clearly stated that any further
complaint by the same complainant against the same accused,
after the case has already been registered, will be deemed to be
an improvement from the original complaint. Though Upkar
Singh was rendered in the context of a case involving cognizable
offences, the same principle would also apply where a person
gives information of a noncognizable offence and subsequently
lodges a private complaint with respect to the same offence
against the same accused person. Even in a noncognizable case,
the police officer after the order of the Magistrate, is empowered
to investigate the offence in the same manner as a cognizable
case, except the power to arrest without a warrant. Therefore, the
complainant cannot subject the accused to a double whammy of
investigation by the police and inquiry before the Magistrate.
We are cognizant of the fact that in the present case, no
investigation had begun pursuant to NCR No. 158/2012 filed by
the Respondent No. 2 for a certain period. However, the overall
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concern expressed by this Court in Upkar Singh, about the
misuse of successive complaints by the same party, where the
second complaint is clearly propped up to materially improve on
the earlier one, resonates with us. We regret to say that the same
thing which this Court had categorically prohibited in Upkar
Singh has happened in the present case.
6. The grave implications of allowing such misuse may be
understood better in light of the following exposition by this
Court in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah v. CBI & anr., (2013) 6
SCC 348:
“37. This Court has consistently laid down the law on
the issue interpreting the Code, that a second FIR in
respect of an offence or different offences committed in
the course of the same transaction is not only
impermissible but it violates Article 21 of the
Constitution. In T.T. Antony [(2001) 6 SCC 181 : 2001
SCC (Cri) 1048] , this Court has categorically held that
registration of second FIR (which is not a crosscase) is
violative of Article 21 of the Constitution…” (emphasis
supplied)
Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees that the right to
life and liberty shall not be taken away except by due process of
law. Permitting multiple complaints by the same party in respect
of the same incident, whether it involves a cognizable or private
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complaint offence, will lead to the accused being entangled in
numerous criminal proceedings. As such, he would be forced to
keep surrendering his liberty and precious time before the police
and the Courts, as and when required in each case. As this Court
has held in Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah (supra), such an
absurd and mischievous interpretation of the provisions of the
CrPC will not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny, and
therefore cannot be adopted by us.
7. The implications of such successive FIRs on an individual’s
rights under Article 21 of the Constitution has been elaborated
further in T.T. Antony (supra):
“27. A just balance between the fundamental rights of
the citizens under Articles 19 and 21 of the
Constitution and the expansive power of the police to
investigate a cognizable offence has to be struck by the
court. There cannot be any controversy that sub
section (8) of Section 173 CrPC empowers the police to
make further investigation, obtain further evidence
(both oral and documentary) and forward a further
report or reports to the Magistrate. In Narang case
[Ram Lal Narang v. State (Delhi Admn.), (1979) 2 SCC
322 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 479] it was, however, observed
that it would be appropriate to conduct further
investigation with the permission of the court.
However, the sweeping power of investigation does not
warrant subjecting a citizen each time to fresh
investigation by the police in respect of the same
incident, giving rise to one or more cognizable offences,
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consequent upon filing of successive FIRs whether
before or after filing the final report under Section
173(2) CrPC…”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is incumbent upon this Court to preserve this
delicate balance between the power to investigate offences under
the CrPC, and the fundamental right of the individual to be free
from frivolous and repetitive criminal prosecutions forced upon
him by the might of the State. If the Respondent No. 2 was
aggrieved by lack of speedy investigation in the earlier case filed
by him, the appropriate remedy would have been to apply to the
Magistrate under Section 155(2), CrPC for directions to the police
in this regard. Filing a private complaint without any prelude,
after a gap of six years from the date of giving information to the
police, smacks of mala fide on the part of Respondent No. 2.
8. It is also crucial to note that, in the fresh complaint case
instituted by him, Respondent No. 2 seems to have deliberately
suppressed the material fact that a charge sheet was already filed
in relation to the same incident, against him and his wife,
pursuant to NCR No.160/2012 (Crime No. 283/2017) filed by
Appellant No.1’s son. No reference to this charge sheet is found
in the private complaint, or in the statements under Section 200,
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CrPC filed by Respondent No. 2 and his wife. In fact, both the
private complaint and the statement filed on behalf of his wife,
merely state that the police officials have informed them that
investigation is ongoing pursuant to their NCR No.158/2012. The
wife’s statement additionally even states that no action has been
taken so far by the police. It is the litigant’s bounden duty to
make a full and true disclosure of facts. It is a matter of trite law,
and yet bears repetition, that suppression of material facts before
a court amounts to abuse of the process of the court, and shall
be dealt with a heavy hand (Ram Dhan v. State of Uttar
Pradesh & Anr., (2012) 5 SCC 536; K.D. Sharma v. Steel
Authority of India Ltd., (2008) 12 SCC 481).
9. It is also pertinent to note that as on 5.08.2012, Appellant
No.1 was a 76yearold man; Appellant No.2 was suffering from
epileptic seizures; and Appellant No. 4 was of unsound mind.
There is no equity in allowing them to be dragged into criminal
proceedings pertaining to a petty offence, instituted 6 years after
the alleged incident. The sword of Damocles cannot be allowed to
forever hang on their heads, falling unpredictably at the whims of
a litigant seeking to harass and persecute at will. We gain
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strength in our conclusions from Article 21 of the Constitution,
which encapsulates the right to a speedy trial. This right has
been interpreted to include not only the actual trial before the
Court, but also the preceding stages of inquiry and police
investigation as well (Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar,
(2009) 3 SCC 355; Abdul Rehman Antulay & ors. v. R.S.
Nayak & anr., (1992) 1 SCC 225).
10. The sum of the above circumstances and precedents leads
us to what we see as an inevitable conclusion. That Respondent
No. 2’s institution of the fresh complaint case in 2018 under
Section 200 CrPC was a concerted effort to mislead the
Magistrate with the oblique motive of harassing the Appellants
with a frivolous and vexatious case against them. That the same
was a counterblast to the charge sheet dated 17.09.2017 filed
against Respondent No. 2 and his wife in the case registered by
the Appellant. The history of illwill and malice between the
parties leads further credence to Respondent No.2’s motivations
for tying up the Appellants in frivolous and harrowing criminal
litigation, long years after the alleged incident. Respondent No.2’s
conduct in filing a delayed complaint case, suppressing material
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facts, and utilising fresh proceedings to materially improve on his
earlier version, in totality, amounts to gross abuse of the process
of court.
Role of the Lower Judiciary in Preventing Abuse of Court
Process:
11. We find it imperative to observe that this is a case that
should not have been allowed to reach as far as this Court. The
justice dispensation machinery in India is plagued with backlogs,
with 70% of the pendency before the subordinate courts being on
the criminal side.1 A significant factor in this backlog is the vast
mass of frivolous litigation instituted year after year by litigants
with an intent to use the courts of justice for their own
mischievous ends. Curtailing such vexatious litigation is, thus, a
crucial step towards a more effective justice system – a step that
cannot be taken without the active involvement of the lower
judiciary, especially in criminal proceedings.
12. Immediately after the criminal justice system is set in
motion, its course is almost entirely dependent on the judicial
application of mind by the Magistrate. When a police complaint is
1 Roshni Sinha, ‘Examining pendency of cases in the Judiciary’, PRS INDIA
(August 8, 2019).
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filed on the commission of a cognizable offence under Section 154
CrPC, the Magistrate decides if the charge against the accused
person is made out before the trial begins. Separate procedure is
prescribed if the complaint under Section 200 CrPC is filed. The
aforesaid provisions make it abundantly clear that the Magistrate
carries the stream of criminal proceeding forward after it is set in
motion by the informant/complainant. Consequently, and
automatically, the Magistrate also carries the responsibility for
ensuring this stream does not carry forward in cases where it
should not.
13. The aforesaid powers bestowed on the Magistrate have grave
repercussions on individual citizens’ life and liberty. Thus, these
powers also confer great responsibility on the shoulders of the
Magistrate – and must be exercised with great caution, and after
suitable judicial application of mind. Observations in a similar
vein were made by this Court in Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special
Judicial Magistrate, (1998) 5 SCC 749:
“28. Summoning of an accused in a criminal case is a
serious matter. Criminal law cannot be set into motion
as a matter of course. It is not that the complainant
has to bring only two witnesses to support his
allegations in the complaint to have the criminal law
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set into motion. The order of the Magistrate
summoning the accused must reflect that he has
applied his mind to the facts of the case and the law
applicable thereto. He has to examine the nature of
allegations made in the complaint and the evidence
both oral and documentary in support thereof and
would that be sufficient for the complainant to succeed
in bringing charge home to the accused. It is not that
the Magistrate is a silent spectator at the time of
recording of preliminary evidence before summoning of
the accused. The Magistrate has to carefully scrutinise
the evidence brought on record and may even himself
put questions to the complainant and his witnesses to
elicit answers to find out the truthfulness of the
allegations or otherwise and then examine if any
offence is prima facie committed by all or any of the
accused.”
(emphasis supplied)
This Court, thus, clearly emphasised that the power to issue
a summoning order is a matter of grave importance, and that the
Magistrate must only allow criminal law to take its course after
satisfying himself that there is a real case to be made.
14. Similarly, the power conferred on the Magistrate under
Section 202, CrPC to postpone the issue of process pursuant to a
private complaint also provides an important avenue for filtering
out of frivolous complaints that must be fully exercised. A four
Judge Bench of this Court has eloquently expounded on this in
Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose & Anr., AIR
1963 SC 1430:
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“7. …No doubt, one of the objects behind the
provisions of Section 202 CrPC is to enable the
Magistrate to scrutinise carefully the allegations made
in the complaint with a view to prevent a person
named therein as accused from being called upon to
face an obviously frivolous complaint. But there is also
another object behind this provision and it is to find
out what material there is to support the allegations
made in the complaint. It is the bounden duty of the
Magistrate while making an enquiry to elicit all facts
not merely with a view to protect the interests of an
absent accused person, but also with a view to bring to
book a person or persons against whom grave
allegations are made. Whether the complaint is
frivolous or not has, at that stage, necessarily to be
determined on the basis of the material placed before
him by the complainant…”
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is clear that, on receipt of a private complaint, the
Magistrate must first, scrutinise it to examine if the allegations
made in the private complaint, inter alia, smack of an instance of
frivolous litigation; and second, examine and elicit the material
that supports the case of the complainant.
15. It is said that every trial is a voyage of discovery in which the
truth is the quest. In India, typically, the Judge is not actively
involved in ‘factfinding’ owing to the adversarial nature of our
justice system. However, Section 165 of the Indian Evidence Act,
1872 by providing the Judge with the power to order production
of material and put forth questions of any form at any time,
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marks the influence of inquisitorial processes in our legal system.
This wideranging power further demonstrates the central role
played by the Magistrate in the quest for justice and truth in
criminal proceedings, and must be judiciously employed to stem
the flow of frivolous litigation.
16. All of this leads to one inescapable conclusion. That the Trial
Judge has a duty under the Constitution and the CrPC, to
identify and dispose of frivolous litigation at an early stage by
exercising, substantially and to the fullest extent, the powers
conferred on him. This Court has earlier emphasised on the high
degree of responsibility shouldered by the trial Judges in All
India Judges’ Association v. Union of India, (1992) 1 SCC
119. Ranganath Misra CJ (as he was then) writing for himself
and two others stated:
“42. The trial Judge is the kingpin in the hierarchical
system of administration of justice. He directly comes
in contact with the litigant during the proceedings in
Court. On him lies the responsibility of building up of
the case appropriately and on his understanding of the
matter the cause of justice is first answered. The
personality, knowledge, judicial restraint, capacity to
maintain dignity are the additional aspects which go
into making the Court’s functioning successful.”
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17. Frivolous litigation should not become the order of the day in
India. From misusing the Public Interest Litigation jurisdiction of
the Indian courts to abusing the criminal procedure for harassing
their adversaries, the justice delivery system should not be used
as a tool to fulfil personal vendetta. The Indian judiciary has
taken cognizance of this issue. In 2014, this Court elucidated as
follows, the plight of a litigant caught in the cobweb of frivolous
proceedings in Subrata Roy Sahara v. Union of India, (2014) 8
SCC 470:
“191…One needs to keep in mind, that in the process
of litigation, there is an innocent sufferer on the other
side, of every irresponsible and senseless claim. He
suffers long drawn anxious periods of nervousness and
restlessness, whilst the litigation is pending, without
any fault on his part. He pays for the litigation, from
out of his savings (or out of his borrowings), worrying
that the other side may trick him into defeat, for no
fault of his. He spends invaluable time briefing counsel
and preparing them for his claim. Time which he
should have spent at work, or with his family, is lost,
for no fault of his…”
While the Court’s ruling pertained to civil proceedings, these
observations ring true for the criminal justice machinery as well.
We note, with regret, that 7 years hence, and there has still been
no reduction in such plight. A falsely accused person not only
suffers monetary damages but is exposed to disrepute and stigma
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from society. While running from pillar to post to find a lawyer to
represent his case and arranging finances to defend himself
before the court of law, he loses a part of himself.
18. As aforesaid, the trial courts and the Magistrates have an
important role in curbing this injustice. They are the first lines of
defence for both the integrity of the criminal justice system, and
the harassed and distraught litigant. We are of the considered
opinion that the trial courts have the power to not merely decide
on acquittal or conviction of the accused person after the trial,
but also the duty to nip frivolous litigations in the bud even
before they reach the stage of trial by discharging the accused in
fit cases. This would not only save judicial time that comes at the
cost of public money, but would also protect the right to liberty
that every person is entitled to under Article 21 of the
Constitution. In this context, the trial Judges have as much, if
not more, responsibility in safeguarding the fundamental rights
of the citizens of India as the highest court of this land.
19. As recorded by us above, the present controversy poses a
typical example of frivolous litigants abusing court process to
achieve their mischievous ends. In the case before us, the
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Magistrate was aware of the significant delay in the filing of
private complaint by Respondent No. 2, and of the material
improvements from the earlier NCR No. 158/2012 which were
made in the private complaint. It was incumbent on the
Magistrate to examine any possibility of abuse of process of the
court, make further enquiries, and dismiss the frivolous
complaint at the outset after judicial application of mind.
20. However, this was not done – the Magistrate issued process
against the Appellants by order dated 4.04.2019, and this
controversy has now reached this Court for disposal.
21. It is a settled canon of law that this Court has inherent
powers to prevent the abuse of its own processes, that this Court
shall not suffer a litigant utilising the institution of justice for
unjust means. Thus, it would be only proper for this Court to
deny any relief to a litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of
justice by coming to it with his unclean hands. Similarly, a
litigant pursuing frivolous and vexatious proceedings cannot
claim unlimited right upon court time and public money to
achieve his ends.
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22. This Court’s inherent powers under Article 142 of the
Constitution to do ‘complete justice’ empowers us to give
preference to equity and a justiceoriented approach over the
strict rigours of procedural law (State of Punjab v. Rafiq Masih
(Whitewasher), (2014) 8 SCC 883). This Court has used this
inherent power to quash criminal proceedings where the
proceedings are instituted with an oblique motive, or on
manufactured evidence (Monica Kumar (Dr.) & anr. v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 781). Other decisions have held
that inherent powers of High Courts provided in Section 482,
CrPC may be utilised to quash criminal proceedings instituted
after great delay, or with vengeful or malafide motives. (Sirajul
& ors. v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2015) 9 SCC 201; State of
Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, AIR 1992 SCC 604). Thus, it is the
constitutional duty of this Court to quash criminal proceedings
that were instituted by misleading the court and abusing its
processes of law, only with a view to harass the hapless litigants.
23. In this Court’s quest for complete justice, and to bring peace
between the parties, who are fighting various litigations since
24
2006, we exercise our powers under Article 142 to quash all the
litigations between the parties arising out of this incident.
Our Conclusions:
24. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 28.09.2020
in Miscellaneous Petition No. 2561 of 2020 is set aside.
25. The proceedings in Complaint Case No.2943/2018, including
the order of summons against the Appellants dated 4.04.2019 be
quashed.
26. Further, proceedings pursuant to NCR No. 158/2012 dated
5.08.2012 filed by Respondent No. 2 also be quashed, in order to
foreclose further frivolous litigation.
27. Any other criminal cases between the parties initiated by
them in relation to the incident dated 5.08.2012, including the
criminal proceedings arising from NCR No.160/2012 (Crime No.
283/2017) instituted by the Appellants, are quashed in exercise
of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, in the
interests of giving quietus to these criminal proceedings arising
out of a petty incident 9 years ago.
28. The Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms.
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………………………………………….J.
(MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)
………………………………………….J.
(R. SUBHASH REDDY)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 08, 2021
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